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How Would the Date of 52-week High/low of a Bidder Affect M&A? 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of three empirical studies. First, it discusses how the acquirers' date 
of 52-week high/low affects the completeness and the performance of the acquirers in 
M&A. Second, it compares the conflicting market timing effect and signalling effect in 
M&A and discusses which is the domination power in the deals. Finally, it examines 
how the choice of financial advisors affects bidders in M&A under the influence of 
payment methods and the psychological reference points at or near the dates of 52-week 
high and low. 
 
Based on the US M&As undertaken in the period between 1/1/1985 - 03/31/2015, the 
thesis finds that 1) an M&A announcement closer to the date of the 52-week peak will 
positively influence the completion of the transaction but negatively affect the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs), 
while an M&A announcement closer to the date of the 52-week low will be significantly 
associated with higher 36-month and 60-month BHARs but lower deal completion 
given stock exchange as the payment method. 2) Anti-signallers (bidders that announce 
pure cash deals close to the date of the 52-week low) have the highest short-term return, 
while timers (bidders that announce pure stock deals close to the date of the 52-week 
high) perform the worst in terms of CARs after the announcement. In the long term, 
reversals exist in all categories of bidders. The anti-signallers have the lowest reversal 
in the long term, while the timers have the highest long-term reversal. 3) When payment 
methods and the announcement timing are controlled, neither the top- nor the median-
tier financial advisors bring significant gains whatsoever; the low-tier advisors even 
incur remarkable loss to the acquirers. The in-house deal announcements are recognized 
by the market with significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns in the short term; 
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however, they are unlikely to be completed due to the lack of experience in M&A. 
Comparatively speaking, the median-tier advisors are the most cost effective in terms 
of the deal completion and consequent performances. 
 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature 1) by establishing a bidder reference 
timing point at the date of the 52-week high/low, when the announcement significantly 
impacts the M&A. 2) In addition, the contradictive recommendation for payment 
methods from market timing theory and signalling theory are reconciled and 
complemented with more details. 3) Finally, it empirically proves that the influence 
from the reference timing point of the dates of the 52-week high/low is even more 
decisive than that of the financial advisors. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 The importance of this research 
 
The research examines whether the bidder 52-week high/low affects M&A and 
discusses how other mostly straightforward elements, such as payment methods and the 
choice of financial advisor, impact the deals. Clarifying the answers would help 
businesses wisely invest in M&A. 
 
The 52-week high is the highest price at which a stock has been traded during the 
previous year. It is viewed as an important anchor in determining the shares’ current 
value and predicting future price momentum. Empirical studies have proved that the 
momentum driven by the 52-week high can bring significant median-term profits 
without reversals in the long term. Researchers attribute this finding to an anchoring 
and adjustment mechanism (Tversky and Kahneman,1974) whereby subjects are likely 
to use an easily available reference point or anchor (which may be arbitrary) as a 
starting point and adjust away from the anchor in forming their estimates. 
 
As a proper reference point in anchoring bidder performance in M&A, this price is 
expected to comprehensively cover the bidder’s profitability, liquidity, leverage, 
effectiveness and market performance.  
 
Returns, as profitability ratios representing the ability to generate profits from sales, 
assets and shareholder investments, are indeed the most important reference metrics in 
M&A. However, a firm’s liquidity ratios, leverage ratios, activity ratios and market 
performance ratios, which reflect its ability to meet short-term financial commitments, 
the extent to which debt funds are used in the business, the effectiveness of resource 
usage and how an investment is performing in financial markets, respectively, are also 
expected to be considered as referential benchmarks.  
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In comparison, in an assumed effective market, market players’ stock prices reflect both 
past and current public information and even hidden “insider” information, which 
considers profitability, liquidity, leverage, effectiveness and market performance. 
Therefore, in this thesis, rather than the returns, the 52-week high/low prices are 
employed as important and better reference points affecting M&A. 
 
In the sector of M&A, although Baker, Pan and Wurgler (2009) have proven that the 
target’s 52-week high acts as an initial anchor in M&A negotiations in the context of 
the US market, influences the offer prices and positively affects the probability of deal 
success, there are very few studies taking the 52-week high as a timing anchor in 
studying the performance of acquirers, which is a very important research gap to be 
bridged. In addition, the anchoring and momentum effects of the 52-week low have not 
been well discussed. From the bidder perspective, further documenting both the 52-
week high and the 52-week low psychological anchors in completing M&A would well 
complement the reference point theory from the target perspective, initiated by Baker, 
Pan and Wurgler (2009) . 
 
In addition, the current market timing theory and the empirical signalling effects seem 
to be contradictive in justifying the payment methods in M&A. Specifically, given that 
bid managers are rational and the share prices might fluctuate around the intrinsic value, 
market timing theory suggests that the buyer take advantage of the peak-value shares 
as payment method, while signalling effects from empirical studies indicate that the 
market players are able to receive the negative signal of timing the market at a high 
price by offering stock exchange deals and thus favouring the cash payment. The 
theoretical contradiction provides another research gap to reconcile market timing 
theory and the empirical signalling effects in the context of bidder announcements near 
the 52-week high/low, clarify the justifications of the payment methods at or near the 
52-week high/low reference points and rank the effectiveness of market timing and 
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signalling at different levels of proximity to the 52-week high/low. 
 
Third, in addition to the 52-week high/low reference points and payment methods, 
investment banks (financial advisors), with the reputation of being experts in capital 
market transactions, are widely recognized as a lubricant and one of the most influential 
factors in M&A and theoretically should act in the best interest of their clients 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)). As the 52-week high/low reference points and 
payment methods have been shown to have a significant influence on M&A, it is 
important to clarify 1) whether different tiers of advisors have a certain co-relation in 
M&A announcements near the 52-week reference points, 2) whether different tiers of 
advisors have more significant impacts on the deals than the 52-week reference points 
and payment methods have, and 3) whether acquirers waste money in hiring investment 
banks when they announce M&A near the 52-week reference points.  
 
This research sheds light on the most significant variables affecting M&A, including 
bidder reference points, payment methods and financial advisors, in an effort to help 
management simplify investment decisions in the capital market.  
 
1.2 Summary: Key findings and contributions 
 
The first part of the study finds that the timing of M&A announcement near acquirers’ 
52-week high stock price will positively affect the deal completion and lead to a 
superior short-term return measured by cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). In 
contrast, the timing of M&A announcements far from acquirers’ 52-week high stock 
price yields significant 3-5-year long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) 
for the bidders.  
 
However, due to the endogeneity of “announcement nearness to the 52-week high/low 
price” to the bidder performance, this study uses “announcement nearness to the dates 
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of the 52-week high/low” as an instrumental variable to measure the deal timing and 
documents that the nearness of an M&A announcement to the date of the 52-week high 
will positively influence the completion of the transaction but negatively affect both the 
CARs (contradictive to the result when nearness is measured by stock price) and 
BHARs. On the other hand, although less influential in short-term performance and 
deal completion, the closer the announcement of M&A is to the date of the 52-week 
low remains significantly with higher 36-month and 60-month BHARs but lower 
completion given stock exchange as payment method. 
 
In other words, acquisition near the dates of the 52-week high/low affects various 
aspects of the M&A. Therefore, the dates of the 52-week high and low as anchor 
reference points could be established, affecting the deal completeness and M&A 
performance and complementing the reference point theory from the bidder perspective. 
In addition, one other element worth mentioning is the payment method, which is found 
to be the most influential variable in all regressions of M&A in this study.   
 
Following the newly established 52-week reference point theory for bidders and 
considering the most effective payment method, the second part of the study redefines 
stock exchange bidders with their announcement close to the date of the 52-week high 
as market timers, stock exchange bidders with their announcement close to the date of 
the 52-week low as anti-timers, cash bidders with their announcement close to the date 
of the 52-week high as market signallers and cash bidders with their announcement date 
close to the 52-week low as anti-signallers. 
 
This part of the research then further studies the performances of market timer, signaller, 
anti-timer and anti-signaller and illustrates that market timers do not benefit from taking 
advantage of their high-valued equity as payment method in the short term, which is 
inconsistent with the market timing theory. On the other hand, market signallers 
perform better in the short term by sending positive signals to inform the market that 
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they are not taking profit from the current price and are expecting higher value, which 
could be concluded and documented as an important signalling effect. In the long term, 
both market timers and signallers experience a serious reversal. Surprisingly, anti-
signallers, as winners, reverse significantly less than all the other research objects in 
the long term.  
 
The third part of the study discloses that acquirers with top-tier advisors are most 
inclined to announce the transaction near the date of the 52-week high, while in-house 
bidders announce the deals significantly closer to the date of the 52-week low. Both 
signallers and timers are more likely to be connected to the top-tier advisors than are 
anti-signallers and anti-timers, while anti-signallers and anti-timers are more lowkey in 
terms of employing financial advisors, conducting in-house transactions and hiring 
low-tier advisors. Controlling payment methods and the announcement timing, neither 
the top- nor the median-tier financial advisors bring significant gains whatsoever; the 
low-tier advisors even incur remarkably loss to the acquirers. The in-house deals are 
recognized by the market with significantly positive CARs in the short term; however, 
these deals are unlikely to be completed due to the lack of experience in M&A. 
Comparatively speaking, the median-tier advisors are the most cost effective in terms 
of the deal completion and subsequent performance. In addition, payment methods and 
announcement timing have more influence on the subsequent bidder performance than 
do financial advisors. 
 
1.3 Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
 
In the first part of the study, based on the anchoring and adjustment mechanism 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), whereby the subjects are likely to use an easily 
available reference point or anchor (which may be arbitrary) as a starting point and 
adjust away from the anchor in forming their estimates, George and Hwang (2010) 
conduct an empirical study on the 52-week market momentum effect. They indicate 
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that buying winners with a high ratio of the current price to the past 52-week high and 
selling losers (with a low ratio of the current price to the past 52-week high) generates 
significant median-term profits without return reversals in the long term. On the other 
hand, in the field of M&A, reference point theory initiated by Baker, Pan and Wurgler 
(2009) proposes the target’s 52-week high as an initial anchor in M&A negotiations in 
the context of the US market. In this reference point theory, it is contended that the 52-
week high stock price of the target proportionally influences the offer prices, positively 
affects the probability of deal success and provides additional insight into why merger 
activity is associated with high market valuations and thus comes in waves. The above-
mentioned theories and the empirical studies indicate the possibility of the bidder 52-
week high as a psychological reference point in M&A that impacts the deal, thus 
representing a research gap concerning whether the acquirers' 52-week high and low 
affect the completeness and performance of the acquirers in M&A. 
 
The second part of the study is based on the contradiction of market timing theory and 
empirical signalling effects. Specifically, given that bid managers are rational and the 
share prices might fluctuate around the intrinsic value, market timing theory suggests 
the buyer to take advantage of the peak-valued shares as payment method, while 
signalling effects from empirical studies indicate that the market players can receive 
the negative signal of timing the market by offering stock exchange deals and thus 
favouring cash payment. This part of the study attempts to reconcile the contradiction 
in justifying the payment methods by studying the sub-groups of the sample with a 
relatively pure timing effect and signalling effect. Specifically, by comparing the 
performances of the sub-groups, the research can rank the effects and give pragmatic 
suggestions to bid managers in practice. 
 
The third part of the study is based on the roles and mixed effect results of financial 
advisors in M&A. Specifically, much relevant empirical literature reports a negative or 
at best nonsignificant relationship between bidder financial advisor reputation and 
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bidder returns following M&A (see, for example, McLaughlin (1992), Servaes and 
Zenner (1996), Rau (2004), Hunter and Jagtiani (2004),and Ismail (2010)). In contrast, 
Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012), along with other scholars (e.g., Bao and 
Edmans 2011; Sibilkov and McConnell 2014), argue that with their better reputation 
and ability to identify the most synergistic combinations for bidders, top-tier advisors 
deliver higher bidder returns than do their non-top-tier counterparts in public 
acquisitions; therefore, top-tier advisors charge premium fees in these transactions. 
 
The contradiction concerning the performance of financial advisors requires additional 
controlling conditions to clarify the roles of the advisors. Therefore, the most practical 
part of the study concerns how the choice of financial advisor affects bidders in M&A, 
under the influence of payment methods and with the psychological reference points of 
the 52-week high and low. 
 
1.4 Research Design 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the effects of the bidder 52-week high/low 
reference point on M&A. The research is divided into three parts. 
 
In the first part of the research, short- and long-term event studies were conducted to 
calculate US listed bidders’ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) as major dependent variables in the regression on the 
nearness of the announcement to the 52-week high/low. In addition, the premium and 
completeness of the M&A are regressed on the nearness of the announcement to the 52-
week high/low to determine whether the announcement timing anchored by the 52-
week reference points will affect different aspects of M&A. In the research, the 
endogeneity of using stock price to measure the nearness of the announcement to the 
52-week high and low is discussed, and a better measurement of the nearness is 
proposed, namely, the number of days from the date of 52-week high/low to the date of 
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announcement divided by the maximum of 254 trading days in a financial year to 
measure the deal timing.  
 
In the second part of the research, based on the payment methods and the bidder 52-
week reference points, the samples are re-categorized as follows: stock exchange 
bidders with their announcement date close to the 52-week high are redefined as market 
timers, stock exchange bidders with their announcement date close to the 52-week low 
as anti-timers, cash bidders with their announcement date close to the 52-week high as 
market signallers and cash bidders with their announcement date close to the 52-week 
low as anti-signallers. The CARs and BHARs of the four categories of bidders are 
calculated and compared to discuss the effectiveness of the market timing and 
signalling effects from the transactions. In addition, the bidder performances are also 
regressed for each bidder category to further discuss whether different categories of 
bidders would affect the short- and long-term performances. 
 
The third part of the study ranks financial advisors in different tiers. Based on the 
ranking, regressions are conducted to study whether different tiers of financial advisors 
would impact the short- and long-term performances of the bidders under the influence 
of payment methods and the psychological reference points of 52-week high and low. 
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
 
There are five chapters in this thesis. The first chapter introduces the research 
background, a brief research framework, and the research design. In the second chapter, 
the thesis discusses how the acquirers' 52-week high and low prices/dates affect the 
completeness and the performance of the acquirers in M&A. The third chapter discusses 
the reconciliation and comparison of the effects from market timing theory and 
signalling theory in M&A. The fourth chapter focuses on how the choice of financial 
advisor affects bidders in M&A under the influence of payment methods and the 
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psychological reference points of 52-week high and low. The fifth chapter provides a 
conclusion and a discussion of potential future studies.  
 
1.6 Introduction to Sample Data Set 
 
This thesis consists of three related empirical studies that use the same fundamental 
data set, which is described as follows. 
 
1.6.1 Data Set of Chapter 2 
 
To determine whether the acquirers' 52-week high and low affect the completeness and 
performance of the acquirers in M&A, chapter 2, as the first part of the research, first 
collects the sample that consists of the completed and uncompleted US M&A 
announced in the period between 1/1/1985 - 3/31/2015. The announcements and 
relevant financial indices were collected from Thomson One Banker, while stock prices 
were collected from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The samples meet the 
following criteria: 
1. Both the acquirers and the target firms are US listed firms due to the previously 
mentioned requirement for an overall efficient market. 
2. The bidders aim to acquire at least 50% of the shares of the target firms to ensure 
that the transaction has a significant influence on the stock market. 
3. The deal values are at least $1 million to ensure the significance of the acquisitions. 
4. The financing of the acquisition is either 100% in stock or 100% in cash to simplify 
the comparison of benefits between the two methods for completed deals, while for 
uncompleted deals, as they have not been finished, all of the announced deal financing 
methods, such as pure cash, pure stock exchange and combinations are included in the 
research sample. 
5. When an acquirer has more than one deal within 5 years, only the most recent deal 
remains in the sample.  
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6. Acquirers without continuous stock price records around the announcement period 
are eliminated. 
 
Eventually, there are 662 samples of completed cash acquisitions and 573 completed 
samples of stock exchange deals meeting the above criteria. In the meantime, 1131 
uncompleted deals with all different financing methods are included in the sample. 
CARs, BHARs and the nearness of the M&A announcement to the 52-week high/low 
(measured by price closeness and day distance) as well as other variables of the bidders 
are calculated and regressed to determine whether the acquirers' 52-week high and low 
affect the completeness and performance of the acquirers in M&A. 
 
1.6.2 Data Set of Chapter 3 
 
Based on the same data set from chapter 2, chapter 3 re-categorizes the samples into 
market timers, anti-timers, market signallers and anti-signallers. CARs and BHARs of 
different categorizes of samples are calculated and compared. Regressions of the 
performance are also conducted to determine whether classification in different 
categorizes of the sample would systematically affect the bidder performances. 
 
1.6.3 Data Set of Chapter 4 
 
In addition to the same data set collected from chapter 3, chapter 4 collects information 
on the relevant bidders’ use of financial advisors. According to the value of the deals 
for which they advised for a sample of M&A transactions targeting US firms during the 
period January 1, 1996, to December 31, 2009, drawn from the Thomson Financial 
SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database, the top 8 investment banks are defined as top-
tier advisors, and the top 9-25 are median-tier advisors, while the remainder are low-
tier advisors. In-house deals are transactions with no financial advisor involved. If more 
than one financial advisor is involved in a deal, the higher ranked advisor is taken into 
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the analysis of how the choice of financial advisor affects bidders in M&A under the 
influence of payment methods and the psychological reference points of 52-week high 
and low. 
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Chapter 2: How would the acquirers' 52-week high and low affect the 
completeness and the performance of the acquirers in M&A? 
2.1 Abstract 
In comparison with the reference point theory initiated by Baker, Pan and Wurgler 
(2009), which suggests that the 52-week high of the target stock price has an important 
effect on the offer price, deal completion, and deal performance in M&A, this chapter 
examines the anchoring and momentum impact of the acquirers’ 52-week high and low 
on the offer premium, deal completeness and the performance of the acquirers in M&A. 
The event study conducted in this chapter documents that the nearness of an M&A 
announcement to the acquirers’ the 52-week high price will positively affect deal 
completion and lead to a superior short-term return measured by cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR). In contrast, nearness of the M&A announcement to the acquirers’ 52-
week low stock price yields significant long-term benefits for the bidders (measured by 
buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHARs)).  
 
However, due to the endogeneity of using the variable “announcement nearness to the 
price of the 52-week high/low” in the regression of “bidder performances”, this study 
instead uses “announcement nearness to the date of 52-week high/low” as an 
instrumental variable and documents that the nearness of an M&A announcement to the 
date of the 52-week high will positively influence the completion of the transaction but 
negatively affect the CAR (contradictive to the result when nearness is measured by 
stock price) and BHAR. On the other hand, although less influential in short-term 
performance and deal completion, nearness of the M&A announcement to the date of 
52-week low is still significantly associated with higher 36-month and 60-month 
BHARs and lower deal completion given stock exchange as payment method. 
 
In other words, the dates of acquirers’ 52-week high/low affect various aspects of the 
M&A. Therefore, both of them could be established as anchor reference points, 
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whereby the deal completeness and M&A performance are affected and the reference 
point theory is complemented from the bidder perspective. 
 
In addition, another element worth mentioning is the payment method, which is found 
to be the most influential variable in all regressions of M&A in this study.   
 
2.2 Introduction 
 
The 52-week high/low price is the highest/lowest price at which a stock has been traded 
during the previous year. These prices are usually viewed as important anchors in 
determining shares’ current value and predicting future price momentum. As stock price 
fluctuates within its 52-week price range, managers and investors may become 
sensitive as the price approaches either the high or the low. 
 
George and Hwang (2004) propose an investing strategy by ranking stocks based on 
the ratio of the current price to the past 52-week high at the end of each month. They 
then construct a portfolio from purchasing the top 30 percentile (winners) and selling 
the bottom 30 percentile (losers) stocks and hold these positions for a medium term of 
6 or 12 months. They find that this trading strategy of buying winners and selling losers 
generates significant median-term profits without return reversals in the long term. 
They attribute this finding to an anchoring and adjustment mechanism (Tversky and 
Kahneman,1974) whereby the subjects are likely to use an easily available reference 
point or anchor (which may be arbitrary) as a starting point and adjust away from the 
anchor in forming their estimates. 
 
In the sector of M&A, however, very few studies take the 52-week high/low prices as 
timing anchors in studying the performance of the acquirers, although the target’s 52-
week high has been proven by Baker, Pan and Wurgler (2009) as an initial anchor in 
M&A negotiations in the context of the US market. In this reference point theory, it is 
contended that the 52-week high stock price of the target proportionally influences the 
offer prices, positively affects the probability of deal success and provides additional 
25 
 
insight into why merger activity is associated with high market valuations and thus 
comes in waves. 
 
By comparison, from the bidder perspective, the market timing theory suggests that 
bidders take advantage of their peak-valued shares and realize profit by conducting 
M&A (Shleifer and Vishny (2003)). Consistently, many empirical studies have proven 
that bidders’ market value influences their short- and long-term performance after 
transactions. However, could we further document the bidders’ 52-week high and 52-
week low as psychological anchors in completing M&A and extend their performance 
momentum as in the reference point theory mentioned above? 
 
This paper examines effect of the nearness of the deal announcements to acquirers' 52-
week high and low (measured by price and date) on the different aspects of the acquirers, 
such as premium, completeness and performance (CARs and BHARs), in M&A. 
 
Contrary to expectations, the findings show that M&A announcements at or near the 
52-week high or low prices do not significantly affect the premium of the deal, which 
indicates that the bidders near the 52-week high/low are still rational in making 
payments to the targets. 
 
In terms of deal completion, when the payment method is purely stock exchange, the 
higher premium comes with the higher probability of the deal completion, 
demonstrating that target managers are also optimistic about the stock momentum at 
the bidder 52-week high price. This finding is also consistent with the reference point 
theory developed by Baker, Pan and Wurgler (2009). 
 
In addition, the nearness of the announcement of M&A to the 52-week peak price leads 
to a higher probability of deal completion and higher CAR. In terms of the long-term 
performances, in contrast, the nearness of the announcement of M&A to the 52-week 
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peak price is associated with lower 36-month and 60-month BHARs. 
 
However, due to the endogeneity of the regressions, the proximity of the announcement 
to the price of the 52-week high/low is instrumented by the proximity of the 
announcement to the date of the 52-week high/low. With the instrumental variable in 
the regression, the proximity of the announcement of M&A to the date of the 52-week 
peak still leads to a higher probability of deal completion but also leads to lower CAR. 
On the other hand, in terms of the long-term performance measured by BHARs, the 
nearness of the announcement of M&A to the date of the 52-week high consistently 
leads to significantly lower 12-month, 36-month and 60-month BHARs, while the 
nearness of the announcement of M&A to the date of the 52-week low is significantly 
associated with higher 36-month and 60-month BHARs. 
 
In conclusion, this chapter of the study finds that the nearness of an M&A 
announcement to the date of the 52-week high will positively influence the completion 
of the transaction but negatively affect the CAR and BHAR, while the nearness of an 
M&A announcement to the date of the 52-week low will be significantly associated 
with higher 36-month and 60-month BHARs with both payment methods and lower 
deal completion given stock exchange as payment method.  
 
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. 
 
The study discloses a contradiction in CARs derived when we measure the nearness of 
the announcement to the price and date of the 52-week peak/low. Specifically, if a 
bidder announces the transaction immediately after its price reaches the 52-week high 
(announcement closer to the date of the 52-week high), the CAR is significantly lower 
as that associated with an announcement closer to the price of the 52-week high. This 
contradiction illustrates that when bidders announce the deal nearer to the 52-week peak 
after a period of fluctuation instead of announcing the deal immediately, the transaction 
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will yield a better CAR as the market reaffirms that the bidders are able to lift the share 
price close to the peak or even higher.  
 
Because the proximity of the bidder's date to the 52-week high/low (endogeneity 
excluded) has a significant influence on the short-/long-term market reaction as well as 
on the possibility of deal completion, the reference point theory could be extended to 
the acquirer perspective.  
 
The negative bidder performance in terms of CAR and BHAR derived from announcing 
the deal close to the date of the 52-week high indicates that the efficient US market can 
catch the negative signal and knock the bottom out of the timers’ attempt to take 
advantage of the one-year high. 
 
2.3 Literature Review 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document the possibility of making abnormal profit in 
the stock market by studying past stock prices. They consider medium-term periods of 
3-12 months for stock returns and state that a significant abnormal profit can be made 
by buying (short-selling) best (worst) performing stocks. Their strategy is popularly 
known as momentum strategy. A number of extensions of momentum strategy have 
been reported subsequently, most notably the 52-week high momentum returns, 
claiming superior returns and explanatory power in practice.  
 
George and Hwang (2004) document how a 52-week high momentum return generates 
a superior return when the stock selection is made based on the proximity to the 52-
week high price rather than the traditional total return approach used in pioneering 
research by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). George and Hwang (2004) show that the 
return associated with the 52-week high strategy is approximately twice as large as that 
associated with conventional momentum return (Jegadeesh and Titman,1993) and 
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industrial momentum return (Moskowitz and Grinblatt,1999). George and Hwang 
(2004) propose that the 52-week high has superior predictive power, resulting in a price 
continuation. Therefore, a 52-week high price can explain a large portion of the profits 
from momentum investing. In practice, Marshall and Cahan (2005) contribute further 
evidence by presenting an out-of-sample test for the 52-week high strategy, using 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) data to find high profitability for the strategy. Du 
(2008) tests a 52-week momentum strategy on international stock indices and 
documents a positive and statistically significant 52-week momentum return even after 
adjusting for risk and transaction cost.  
 
The foundations of studies employing the 52-week high price as an anchor are rooted 
in the anchoring and adjustment mechanism of Tversky and Kahneman (1974). In 
complex and highly uncertain decision-making situations, the subjects are likely to use 
an easily available reference point or anchor (which may be arbitrary) as a starting point 
and adjust away from the anchor in forming their estimates. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) report that when subjects in two groups were presented with different arbitrary 
initial numbers and subsequently asked to estimate the fraction of African nations 
represented in the United Nations, the estimate was significantly higher for the group 
presented with a higher initial number. More recently, in experiments involving 
university students as well as financial market professionals, Kaustia et al. (2008) 
document evidence of a significant anchoring effect in their estimates of long-term 
stock returns. Note that the role of reference points in decision-making is also 
highlighted in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1979) prospect theory, which postulates utility 
derivation from gains and losses relative to a reference point. The prospect theory 
preferences have attracted much attention in the literature, including their potential role 
in generating disposition effects (Kliger and Kudryavtsev, 2008) and stock return 
momentum (Grinblatt and Han,2005). While it is reasonable to assume that the saliency 
of the 52-week high price makes it a suitable anchor in various situations, the role of 
the timing of the 52-week high price in investors’ decision-making also warrants 
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discussion. In an earlier and highly cited study, Murdock (1962) reports that when 
subjects were presented with a list of words in a free recall experiment where the order 
of words was irrelevant, the subjects nonetheless displayed greater tendency of 
recalling words at the end of the list. A plethora of subsequent work presented 
extensions and refinements of this basic finding, with evidence of the recency effect 
being observed in diverse settings, including performance appraisals (Mohrman et 
al.,1989), auditing of financial statements (Tubbs et al.,1990), and student course 
evaluations (Dickey and Pearson,2005). In finance literature, the evidence of 
momentum in stock returns as well as the performance chasing behaviour in mutual 
funds (Gruber, 1996) is also consistent with investors’ tendency to put more weight on 
recent performance. 
 
Although the 52-week high has been documented as an anchor in an anchoring and 
adjustment mechanism with the momentum in boosting further growth, in the sector of 
M&A, very few studies discuss the bidder’s 52-week high, with an anchor’s momentum 
effect on the announcement of a deal, although the target’s 52-week high has been 
proven by Baker, Pan and Wurgler (2009) as an initial anchor in M&A negotiations in 
the context of the US market. 
 
Specifically, according to the above-mentioned reference point theory from the target 
perspective, with the 52-week target high as the reference stock price, Baker, Pan and 
Wurgler (2009) propose that the reference point can impact acquisition offer prices, 
deal success, market reaction to the deal, and even merger waves. For the offer price, 
the 52-week target high plays an anchor role in the bidding price. Specifically, a 10% 
increase in the 52-week high is associated with as much as a 3% increase in the offer 
premium. In terms of deal success, Baker, Pan and Wurgler (2009) document that given 
that the bidder makes an offer price above the target’s 52-week high, the probability of 
deal success is significantly and discontinuously increased by 3% to 4%. With regard 
to the market reaction, because bidders’ shareholders are inclined to view bids driven 
30 
 
by the target’s 52-week high as overpaying, the market reacts naturally and negatively 
to the component of the offer price driven by the target’s 52-week high. Specifically, a 
10% increase in the component of the offer premium that is explained by the 52-week 
high will lead to a 2% to 3% negative market reaction. The bidder announcement effect 
is 2% to 3% worse for each 10% increase in the component of offer premium that is 
explained by the 52-week high. The fourth dimension of merger activity influenced by 
the reference point is merger waves, which occur when high recent returns on the stock 
market and on likely targets make it easier for bidders to offer the 52-week high.  
 
From the target perspective, the 52-week high has been proven by Baker, Pan and 
Wurgler (2009) as an initial anchor in M&A negotiations in the context of the US 
market. In comparison, from the bidder angle, this research is the first of its kind to 
study the 52-week high/low prices as timing anchors in influencing the completion of 
the deal and the performance of the acquirers. Combining the momentum effect of the 
52-week high as well as the reference anchoring and adjusting mechanism, could we 
further document the bidders’ 52-week high and 52-week low as psychological anchors 
in completing M&A and extending their performance momentum, as in the reference 
point theory mentioned above? All of the reviewed theories and empirical studies have 
provided context and gaps for this research to fill.  
 
2.4 Hypotheses Development 
 
Complementing the reference point from the target perspective, to clarify whether a 
higher bidder price at or close to the 52-week high also leads to a higher offer premium, 
a higher possibility of deal success and better bidder performance according to the 
market timing and momentum theories reviewed above, the following hypotheses are 
developed and tested in this research. 
 
H1: Because bidders at or near the 52-week high are inclined to take advantage of their 
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strong financial position or high stock value to finance, announcement of M&A from 
these bidders is related to the highest premium offered to the targets. In contrast, 
announcement of M&A near the 52-week low comes with the lowest offer premium; 
 
H2: A higher premium is more likely to meet the target management expectation, thus 
leading to a higher possibility of deal completion, while a naturally lower premium 
causes more failures in M&A transactions;  
 
H3: Based on H1 and H2, announcement of M&A at or near the 52-week peak is 
associated with the highest possibility of deal completion. Announcement of M&A near 
the 52-week low comes with the lowest possibility of deal completion; 
 
H4: Due to the market timing and the 52-week high momentum effects, announcement 
of M&A at or near the 52-week peak is supposed to be associated with higher bidder 
CAR and BHAR; announcement of M&A near the 52-week low should come with the 
lowest bidder CAR and BHAR. 
 
2.5 Research Methodology  
 
2.5.1 Samples 
 
To determine whether the acquirers' 52-week high and low affect the completeness and 
performance of the acquirers in M&A, chapter 2, as the first part of the research, first 
collects the sample that consists of the completed and uncompleted US takeovers 
announced in the period from 1/1/1985 - 3/31/2015. The announcements and relevant 
financial indices were collected by Thomson One Banker, while stock prices were 
collected from WRDS. The samples meet the following criteria: 
 
⚫ Both the acquirers and the target firms are US listed firms due to the previously 
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mentioned requirement for an overall efficient market.  
⚫ The bidders aim to acquire at least 50% of the shares of the target firms to ensure 
that the transaction has a significant influence on the stock market. 
⚫ The deal values are at least $1 million to ensure the significance of the acquisitions.  
⚫ The financing of the acquisition is either 100% in stock or 100% in cash to simplify 
the comparison of benefits between the two methods for completed deals, while for 
uncompleted deals, as they have not been finished, all of the announced deal 
financing methods, such as pure cash, pure stock exchange and combinations, are 
included in the research sample.  
⚫ When an acquirer has more than one deal within 5 years, only the most recent deal 
remains in the sample. 
⚫ Acquirers without continuous stock price records around the announcement period 
are eliminated.  
 
Eventually, 662 samples of completed cash acquisitions and 573 samples of stock 
exchange deals are found to meet the above criteria. In the meantime, 1131 
uncompleted deals with all different financing sources are included in the sample. 
CARs, BHARs and the nearness of the M&A announcement to the 52-week high/low 
as well as other variables of all these bidders (measured by price closeness and day 
distance) are calculated and regressed to determine whether the acquirers' 52-week high 
and low affect the completeness and the performance of the acquirers in M&A. 
 
2.5.2 Research Method and Variables 
 
The study aimed to determine whether bidders’ 52-week high/low affects their deal 
completeness and performance in M&A. It is divided into three steps. The first step is 
an event study conducted to calculate the abnormal returns of the collected samples. 
The second step is the definition and calculation of the nearness of the announcement 
to the bidders’ 52-week high/low. The third step is a regression analysis on the merger 
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completion and abnormal returns. A detailed description of my method is provided 
below. 
 
The first step is to conduct an event study, which is a statistical method used to assess 
the impact of an event on the value of a firm. Specifically, the announcement of M&A 
closer to the 52-week high/low is analysed to see whether investors believe the deal 
will create or destroy value. The basic idea is to find the abnormal return attributable to 
the event being studied by adjusting for the return that stems from the price fluctuation 
of the market as a whole. The CAR is calculated to assess the short-term effect from 
the event, while the BHAR is used to measure the long-term influence of the event. 
 
Short-term Event Study Methodology: 
 
To evaluate the impact of M&A announcements near or at the 52-week high or low, 
abnormal returns can be calculated. An abnormal return is the difference between actual 
earnings and the normal return during the event window and is calculated as follows: 
ARit = Ait – Rit 
 
where Ait is the actual earnings of bidder i on day t, Rit is the normal return of bidder i 
on day t (derived from the capital asset pricing model - CAPM), and ARit is an 
abnormal return of the same bidder on the same day.  
 
According to the CAPM along with a 30-day estimated window, Rit = αi + βi Rmt + 
εit, where Rmt is the monthly return of the market index of the S&P 500 during the 
same period.  
 
To calculate the acquiring firms’ short-term performance, Stata 12 is employed for 
calculation of the abnormal returns using the market model as follows: 
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The CAR for the 5-day window of (-2,+2) around the announcement date is calculated 
according to the following equation: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡1
 
where CARi(t1, t2) is the CAR for the 5-day window of (-2,+2) around the 
announcement date with cross sections of the bidder i. 
 
Long-term Event Study Methodology: 
 
The BHAR approach advocated by Barber and Lyon (1997) is employed to examine 
the long-term abnormal stock returns in the study. 
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where Rit is the monthly return for company i and Rmt is the monthly return of the 
market index of S&P 500.  
 
The second step is to define and calculate the nearness of the announcement to the 
bidders’ 52-week high/low. The nearness of the announcement price to the price of 52-
week high is defined as price nearness to high (PNH), calculated according to the 
following formula: 
PNH=(Price of 52-week High - Price at Announcement)/(Price of 52-week High - Price 
of 52-week low)  
A higher PNH indicates that the bidder announcement price is further from the 52-week 
high, while a lower PNH means that the bidder announcement price is closer to the 52-
week high. 
 
The nearness of the announcement date to the date of the 52-week high is defined as 
date nearness to high (DNH), calculated as the following formula: 
DNH=Number of Workdays Since 52-week High to Date of Announcement/254 
where 254 is the maximum total number of workdays in the US. A higher DNH 
indicates that the bidder announcement is further from the 52-week high date, while a 
lower DNH indicates that the bidder announcement is closer to the 52-week high date. 
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On the other hand, the nearness of the announcement price to the price of the 52-week 
low is defined as price nearness to low (PNL), calculated as the following formula: 
PNL=(Price at Announcement - Price of 52-week Low)/(Price of 52-week High - Price 
of 52-week Low)  
A higher PNL indicates that the bidder announcement price is further from the 52-week 
low, while a lower PNL means that the bidder announcement price is closer to the 52-
week low. 
 
The nearness of the announcement date to the date of the 52-week low is defined as 
date nearness to low (DNL), calculated as the following formula: 
DNL=Number of Workdays Since 52-week Low to Date of Announcement/254 
where 254 is the maximum total number of workdays in the US. A higher DNL indicates 
that the bidder announcement is further from the date of the 52-week low, while a lower 
DNL means that the bidder announcement is closer to the date of the 52-week low. 
 
The third step is to conduct various regression analyses on the premium, completion 
and abnormal returns. Ordinary least square regressions are conducted to discuss the 
relationship among the deal completion, bidder performances, transaction premium, 
acquirer announcements near or at the 52-week high and low, and other control 
variables. The formulas are illustrated as follows: 
Premium=a+b(PNH)+c(controls)+ 𝜀  
Premium=a+b(DNH)+c(controls)+ 𝜀  
Premium=a+b(DNL)+c(controls)+ 𝜀  
Performance= a+b(PNH)+c(controls)+ 𝜀  
Performance= a+b(DNH)+c(controls)+ 𝜀  
Performance= a+b(DNL)+c(controls)+ 𝜀  
 
Probit regressions are conducted to discuss the relationship between the completeness 
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of the transactions and the acquirer announcement timing. The formula is illustrated as 
follows: 
Completeness= a+b(PNH)+c(controls)+ 𝜀 
Completeness= a+b(DNH)+c(controls)+ 𝜀 
Completeness= a+b(DNL)+c(controls)+ 𝜀 
A number of most straightforward factors in M&A are set to control variables such as 
deal attitudes, payment methods, and funding resources. 
 
2.5.3 Rigorousness and Robustness 
 
2.5.3.1 Two-stage Least Squares 
 
Two-stage least squares are conducted when the dependent variable’s error terms are 
correlated with the independent variables. This is to eliminate regression endogeneity 
to ensure the rigorousness and robustness of the study. 
 
To be a valid instrumental variable, the variable is expected to be correlated with the 
endogenous independent variable. If this correlation is strong, then the instrument is 
said to have a strong first stage. Meanwhile, the instrument should not be correlated 
with the error term in the explanatory equation.  
 
In this chapter specifically, the instrumental variable DNH is correlated with the 
explanatory variable PNH as fewer days from the 52-week high naturally lead to a 
closer price to the 52-week high due to less fluctuation opportunities in the shorter 
period. Meanwhile, no direct correlation exists between the instrumental variable DNH 
and the response variable bidder performance since the number of days away from the 
peak has no direct effect on the bidder’s M&A performance. DNH can lead to better or 
worse bidder M&A performance, but it is only associated with bidder M&A 
performance through its association with PNH.  
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On the other hand, the other instrumental variable, DNL, is assumed to be the opposite 
of DNH and therefore negatively correlated with the explanatory variable PNH as the 
number of days closer to the 52-week low naturally leads to more distance from the 
price of the 52-week high. Meanwhile, no direct correlation exists between DNL and 
bidder M&A performance. DNL can lead to better or worse bidder M&A performance, 
but it is only associated with bidder M&A performance through its association with 
PNH or PNL (disregarded for research simplicity).  
 
First-stage verification of the validity of the instrumental variables in the chapter: 
 
If the instrumental variable is completely unrelated to the endogenous explanatory 
variable, then the instrumental variable cannot be used. If it is only weakly related to 
the explanatory variable, then this instrumental variable is defined as a "weak 
instrument". In the study, the correlations among the instrumental variables, DNH 
together with DNL and the response variables are tested. The results show that the 
instrumental variables are not weak. The first-stage regression summary statistics with 
DNH and DNL as instrumental variables for PNH are shown in the following table: 
 
 
In cases of overidentification (the number of instrumental variables > the number of 
endogenous variables), a Sargan test can be performed to test the null hypothesis that 
all instrumental variables are exogenous. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then at least 
one variable is considered not exogenous, that is, relevant to the disturbance term. 
Explanatory 
Variable/ 
Instrumental 
Variable 
R-sq. Adjusted 
R-sq. 
Partial 
R-sq. 
F(1,1517) Prob > F 
(Ho: 
Instruments 
are weak) 
PNH instrumented 
by DNH 
0.3934                         0.3906 0.3863 954.808 0.0000 
PNH instrumented 
by DNL 
0.4093 0.4066 0.4024 1021.29 0.0000 
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The tests of overidentifying restrictions are listed as follows: 
Sargan (score) chi2(1) =0.01823 (p = 0.8926) 
Basmann chi2(1) =0.018122 (p = 0.8929) 
The results again confirm that both DNH and DNL are exogenous and valid 
instrumental variables. 
 
The correlation between bidder performance and the price nearness of the 
announcement price to the price of the 52-week high/low (PNH/PNL) does not 
guarantee that the nearness (PNH/PNL) causes good/bad performance because other 
variables may affect both performance and announcement timing (PNH/PNL). The 
nearness of the announcement date to the date of the 52-week high/low, defined as 
DNH/DNL, is a reasonable choice for an instrument because it is assumed that the days 
ratio can be correlated with the performances only through its effect on the price itself. 
If the days ratio and performance are correlated, this may be viewed as evidence that 
the date of the 52-week high/low causes changes in bidder performance. 
 
In this study, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (also called the Hausman specification test) 
is used to evaluate the consistency of PNH when compared to the instrumental variables 
of DNH and DNL. This helps evaluate whether the instrumental variables are 
systematically better in the regression on CAR.  
 
2.5.3.2 Ordinary Least Squares Regression and Quantile Regression  
 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates the relationship by minimizing the 
sum of the squares for the difference between the observed and predicted values of the 
dependent variable, which is configured as a straight line. In this chapter, OLS 
regressions are conducted to discuss the relationships among bidder performances, deal 
completion, transactions premiums, acquirer announcements near or at the 52-week 
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high and low price points, and other control variables. The mean provides an incomplete 
picture of the OLS. In comparison, quantile regression may be viewed as a natural 
extension of the classical least squares estimation on conditional mean models to 
estimations of various models for conditional quantile functions. 
 
For the purpose of rigorousness and robustness of the OLS, quantile regression offers 
a mechanism for estimating models for the conditional median function and the full 
range of other conditional quantile functions. It is a robust regression tool with critical 
advantages over OLS, including robustness to outliers, no normal distribution 
assumption, and quantification of relationships across the complete distribution of the 
dependent variable. 
 
Quantile regression has a more robust capability to describe the relationship at different 
points in the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. Because the 
announcement of M&A at various time points might affect the bidder returns differently 
in this study, quantile regressions with CARs and BHARs as the dependent variables 
and announcement timing along with others as independent variables are conducted to 
confirm the event studies of the intensity of the effect of the 52-week nearness on 
abnormal returns.   
  
Specifically, the quantile regression estimates the acquirer’s median (-2,+2) day CAR 
surrounding the announcement as well as the median BHARs for 12 and 36 months 
post-acquisition announcement controlling for a series of acquirer characteristics.  
 
2.5.4 Statistical Methods 
 
This thesis uses Stata 12, Special Edition, to perform all statistical analyses. Major data 
processes, such as the calculation of the CAR, BHARs and regressions, are 
programmed in Stata’s script language. The Stata program and the thesis raw data are 
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available for verification.  
 
2.6 Empirical Results 
 
Taken from Thomson One Banker according to the criteria depicted in the section on 
the sample in 2.5.1, Table 2.1 presents the total number of completed and uncompleted 
deals from January 1, 1985, to March 31, 2015. Among the transactions, 1235 deals 
were completed, wile 1126 failed; of these, 1168 and 806 were pure cash deals and 
stock exchange deals, respectively, while 387 deals were combinations. A total of 1693 
deals were conducted with a friendly attitude, while 96 were hostile transactions.  
 
(Table 2.1) 
 
Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics of the sample number, mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum for the objective variables, outcome variables and 
control variables. According to the mean of the performances demonstrated, the CARs 
and BHARs declined steadily over time, indicating an overall bidder performance 
deterioration in M&A, which is consistent with the justification of investor sentiment 
by Rosen (2006). In particular, as investors tend to be more optimistic than realistic, the 
short-term lift of confidence in the market would be reversed when the real picture is 
revealed over time in the long term. In addition, Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) 
document reasons for long-term reversal, such as over-payment, market timing and 
managerial herding. 
 
(Table 2.2) 
 
Table 2.3 illustrates that bids announced at closer prices or closer days to the acquirers’ 
52-week high do not indicate a significantly higher premium offered to targets, which 
leads to rejection of H1 (offer premium is positively influenced by the timing of the 
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deal announcement). In other words, the timing of the deals does not affect the bid 
managers’ rational judgement in terms of the payment. Likewise, the payment methods 
do not affect the premium, either. On the other hand, the attitude towards the transaction 
is a significant factor affecting the premium, which indicates that the friendly attitude 
itself could be part of the cost of the deal. According to Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1990), friendly targets are more likely to have higher management ownership than the 
average firm; therefore, it is natural to derive that concentrated management requires a 
higher premium. In addition, an internal source of funding predictably leads to a higher 
premium offered to the targets, as less is required from the shareholders in the approval 
process than there would be in the case of an external source of funding. According to 
the regressions, Adv_rank positively affects the premium, indicating that the higher-tier 
advisors tend to pay higher premiums to the targets to pursue the completeness of the 
deals, although the effect is nonsignificant. This phenomenon suggests potential agency 
issues with advisors, which will be further discussed in the following chapters of the 
study. 
 
(Table 2.3) 
 
Table 2.4 proves that for cash bidders, a higher premium does not guarantee the 
completion of the acquisition according to the regression. In contrast, for stock bidders, 
the higher premium leads to a significantly higher probability of deal completion. This 
result partly acknowledges H2 (the positive connection between higher premium and 
deal completion). 
 
Second, the closer the announcement is to the bidders’ 52-week high price and date 
indicates a significantly higher probability of the deal completions, while not 
surprisingly, the bids announced on days closer to acquirers’ 52-week low either have 
nothing to do with deal completion for cash deals or are significantly associated with 
deal failure for the stock exchange deals. This positive connection between the peak 
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announcement and the deal completion is obviously not built through premium as 
indicated in H3. Instead, the reason could be the general optimistic expectation of deal 
completion from the peak announcement. 
 
In addition, friendly transactions are more likely to be completed, again due to the 
higher concentrated target management ownership. Diversified deals are more likely to 
be completed with cash payments and friendly attitudes, while undiversified 
transactions tend to be finished through stock exchange. Internal funding, as the first 
option in financing followed by debt and raising equity documented by Myers and 
Majluf (1984) in pecking order theory, positively affects deal completeness due to its 
accessibility and information asymmetry. Consistent with the estimation in table 2.3, 
table 2.4 shows that Adv_rank significantly affects the completeness of the transactions; 
specifically, higher-rank advisors are more capable of completing the deals, which 
demonstrates that their experience and skillsets are required in M&A. The situation also 
signifies a possible agency issue in that the advisors care more about the deal 
completion than about the potential synergies in M&A. 
 
(Table 2.4) 
 
Table 2.5 discloses that friendly deals have a significantly negative influence on 5-day 
CARs, which reflects that the market worries about the over-transference of value from 
the bidders to the targets in friendly negotiation. The cash (stock) payment method 
positively (negatively) affects the bidders’ short-term performance after the acquisition 
announcements, which is consistent with Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004). 
Specifically, given that cash bids are not affected by miss-valuation, while stock offers 
trigger estimation errors, there will be more stock offers when the market is overvalued. 
In terms of internal funding, when all of the listed variables are controlled, internal 
funding has a significantly positive influence on the 5-day CARs due to its accessibility, 
information asymmetry and lower agency costs. In addition, diversified deals through 
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stock exchange are more likely to be accepted by the market in the 5-day window.  
 
In terms of the timing effect, being PNH (announcement closer to the price of acquirers’ 
52-week high) is associated with better 5-day window CAR performance. However, 
paradoxically, being DNH (announcement closer to the date of acquirers’ 52-week high) 
leads to lower CARs, while DNL (announcement closer to the date of acquirers’ 52-
week low) is associated with higher CARs. The contradictive results indicate that 
bidders with highly fluctuating stock price might obtain better speculative gains when 
they announce the acquisition closer to high stock prices after a certain number of 
trading days of rebounds. In addition, the discrepant results might indicate an 
endogeneity problem between the timing variables and the independent variable of the 
5-day CAR. Adv_rank negatively affects the bidder CAR, although the effect is not 
significant, which indicates that the market does not approve the short-term 
performance due to the concern of a potential conflict of interest, agency problems and 
even collusion with speculative targets in M&A. Further study will be carried out in 
chapter 4. 
 
(Table 2.5) 
 
Table 2.6 again suggests that the cash (stock) payment method significantly (negatively) 
affects the 12-month bidder performance after the acquisition announcements, as stock 
exchange deals are more likely to over-pay the targets due to market miss-valuation. In 
terms of the timing effect, being either PNH or not (announcement closer to the price 
of acquirers’ 52-week high or not) is not significantly associated with 12-month BHARs. 
In contrast, being DNH (announcement closer to the date of acquirers’ 52-week high) 
leads to lower 12-month BHARs. Being DNL (announcement closer to the date of 
acquirers’ 52-week low) leads to higher 12-month BHARs (the association is not 
significant). 
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Comparing to table 2.5, the results in table 2.6 show that being PNH has the opposite 
effect of achieving CAR and the 12-month BHAR, indicating that an announcement 
close to the 52-week high price has a significant short-term stimulating effect on bidder 
performance, but this effect is subject to gradual reversal over a long period. In terms 
of justification of the above situation, a bidder announcing a deal when its share price 
hits the 52-week high price or bounces back to the previous peak may indicate investor 
optimism or double-confirmed market recognition, thus leading to a better short-term 
cumulative abnormal return. As investors tend to be over-confident in such cases, the 
short-term CAR is more likely to be reversed due to reasons such as over-payment, 
market timing repulsion and managerial herding. 
 
In comparison, being DNH results in consistent negative short- and long-term 
performances. When a bidder announces a deal on the specific day with a new 52-week 
high, the market may worry about issues such as managerial hubris, over-payment and 
market timing repulsion, thus leading to the negative CAR and its continuous 
momentum in the 12-month BHAR. On the other hand, being DNL is also consistent in 
terms of a positive CAR (although not significant) and a significant 12-month BHAR, 
indicating a lasting reference point effect, which is derived at the 52-week low. 
 
Controlling certain variables, the negative short-term influence of Adv_rank on bidder 
performance becomes mixed in a longer period. Although the effect is not significant, 
it demonstrates that the advisors with better experience and skillsets are able to help the 
bidders achieve better 12-month BHARs.    
 
(Table 2.6) 
 
Table 2.7 indicates that announcement closer to both the price and date of the bidders’ 
52-week high is associated with lower 36-month BHARs. This result is different from 
the contradictive effects of the 52-week high on the CAR when announcement timing 
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is measured by closing to peak price or peak date. The results from the variable “DNH” 
(announcement closer to the date of acquirers’ 52-week high) have been consistent with 
previous regressions, which demonstrates the reliability of this instrumental variable 
for the regressions. In addition, the bids announced on days closer to the acquirers’ date 
of the 52-week low (DNL) is associated with higher 36-month BHAR, indicating the 
date of the 52-week low as another stable reference point at or near which bidders’ long-
term performance excels. 
 
In addition, the cash (stock) payment method significantly (negatively) affects the 36-
month bidder performance after the acquisition announcement, consistent with its 
influence on CAR and the 12-month bidder performance. On the other hand, internal 
financing incurs negative 36-month BHARs, which is different from its effects on deal 
completion and CAR, indicating that the convenience from the prioritized financing 
method might incur bidder long-term loss due to the information asymmetry.  
 
In addition, higher premium paid and deal completeness bring better 36-month BHARs. 
Over a longer period of 36 months, a higher advisor rank leads to positive and stable 
bidder performances in all regressions, although the effects are still not significant. This 
still demonstrates the long-term synergy orientation of better advisors. 
 
 (Table 2.7) 
 
Table 2.8 again indicates that announcement closer to both the price and date of the 
bidders’ 52-week high is associated with lower 60-month BHARs, while announcement 
closer to the date of acquirers’ 52-week low is associated with higher 60-month BHAR. 
These results are consistent with Table 2.7 and again indicate that the dates of 52-week 
high (low) are effective reference points at or near which the bidders’ long-term 
performance underperforms (outpaces) that at other times. In addition, the cash (stock) 
payment method significantly (negatively) affects the 60-month bidder performance 
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after the acquisition announcement, which is consistent with the 12/36-month bidder 
performance. In addition, the results from the variable “DNH/DNL” (announcement 
closer to the date of acquirers’ 52-week high/low) have been consistent in all 
regressions, again demonstrating the reliability of the variables for the regressions. In a 
longer period of 60 months, higher advisor rank maintains a consistently positive yet 
nonsignificant influence on the bidder performance in M&A, indicating that better 
advisors could indeed stabilize long-term synergies in the deal, but their contribution 
might not be as important as advertised in the business. 
 
(Table 2.8) 
 
The Hausman test for the two-stage least squares regressions document that DNH/DNL 
(announcement closer to the date of acquirers’ 52-week high/low) are valid instrumental 
variables for PNH (announcement closer to the price of acquirers’ 52-week high), as 
indicated in Table 2.9 and Table 2.10. 
 
(Table 2.9) 
(Table 2.10) 
 
Table 2.11 clearly shows that the median of the original timing variable PNH 
(announcement closer to the price of acquirers’ 52-week high) does not significantly 
influence the CAR. In contrast, the median DNH (announcement closer to the date of 
acquirers’ 52-week high) leads to lower CAR, while the median DNL (announcement 
closer to the date of acquirers’ 52-week low) is associated with higher CAR, which is 
consistent with the ordinary regression and proves the validity of the instrumental 
variable. Consistent with table 2.5, Adv_rank negatively affects the bidder CAR, 
although the effect is not significant. This indicates that the market does not approve of 
the short-term performance due to potential conflicts of interest leading to inefficient 
deal completion, agency problems and even collusion with speculative targets. 
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(Table 2.11) 
 
Table 2.12 illustrates the quantile regression of median bidder long-term performance 
on the instrumental variables. The results are basically consistent with the original 
regression results, but they highlight that 36- and 60-month long-term bidder 
performances measured by BHARs are significantly influenced by the timing of 
announcement near the date of the 52-week high, indicating again that announcements 
closer to the date of the 52-week high lead to lower long-term BHARs. In line with the 
results from OLS, higher advisor rank remains consistently positive but nonsignificant 
in the long terms of 36 and 60 months, indicating that higher-ranked advisors perform 
better in M&A, but their importance might be exaggerated. 
 
(Table 2.12) 
 
2.7 Conclusion and Discussion 
 
In terms of the correlation of the announcement timing and offer premium, the first 
hypothesis, H1 (offer premium is positively influenced by the timing of the deal 
announcement) is rejected. Due to the assumption of rational bidder management, while 
the announcement of M&A near the 52-week peak is not significantly associated with 
the highest offer premium, the announcement of M&A near the 52-week low does not 
come with the lowest offer premium, either. 
 
H2 (higher premium leads to higher possibility of deal completion) is rejected for cash 
bidders. A higher premium does not guarantee the completion of cash acquisition 
according to the regression. However, for stock deals, a higher premium leads to a 
significantly higher probability of deal completion due to the sellers’ continuous 
expectation of potential capital gain.  
48 
 
 
In terms of H3 (correlation between the announcement timing and the deal completion), 
announcement closer to both the price and date of the 52-week high indicates a 
significantly higher probability of deal completion, while reasonably, the bids 
announced closer to the date of the 52-week low either have nothing to do with deal 
completion controlling cash deals or are significantly associated with deal failure for 
the stock deals. Although the hypothesis is accepted, the positive relation between peak 
announcement and deal completion is not built through premium, as assumed; instead, 
the connection is probably due to an optimistic expectation of deal completion from the 
peak announcement.  
 
As for H4 (peak announcement leads to superior performance due to momentum), the 
conclusion needs to be drawn given different conditions. Specifically, the 
announcement of M&A with a bidder stock price near the 52-week peak price is 
associated with a higher bidder CAR (with an endogeneity problem). When the 
instrumental variable is used to measure the deal timing, an announcement date further 
from the peak date (announcement date closer to the 52-week low) results in higher 
CARs and BHARs. The results indicate that peak announcing bidders with fluctuating 
stock prices seem to have better speculative opportunities in the short term, although 
their short-term performance will be reversed in the long term. 
 
According to the existing reference point theory, the 52-week high stock price of the 
target proportionally influences the offer price and positively affects the probability of 
deal success. In comparison, this study seems to provide another perspective to 
complement the reference theory, whereby bidder timing at announcement plays an 
important role in affecting the completeness and performance of the M&A transaction. 
Therefore, we could further document the date of the bidder 52-week high and 52-week 
low as psychological anchors in completing M&A. 
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The study discloses that the bidder announcement near the date of the 52-week high or 
low affects the deal completion, bidder CARs and BHARs. In addition, from the 
regression, the payment methods, namely, the pure cash and stock payment, also 
significantly affect the bidder performance in different ways. In other words, payment 
method also plays an important role in M&A. Therefore, the study of the next chapter, 
contributes by combining the bidder reference point effects and the payment method 
effects on acquisition and determining the best payment method at the best transaction 
timing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
Table 2.1 Samples 
 
 
Completed Deals Form of Payments Attitude 
 Yes No Cash Stock Other Friendly Hostile 
1985 25 25 23 14 13 38 3 
1986 28 27 25 14 16 40 8 
1987 18 39 25 13 19 28 9 
1988 29 55 44 12 28 50 8 
1989 27 54 27 31 23 58 4 
1990 24 30 21 17 16 41 0 
1991 4 36 7 13 20 25 1 
1992 20 21 7 20 14 32 1 
1993 23 36 20 21 18 45 3 
1994 42 41 25 42 16 68 7 
1995 54 44 32 49 17 85 5 
1996 57 63 51 48 21 82 10 
1997 84 48 53 66 13 108 7 
1998 89 44 52 68 13 110 5 
1999 87 58 68 62 15 114 6 
2000 80 123 117 65 21 108 3 
2001 54 44 48 37 13 71 1 
2002 27 18 27 10 8 33 0 
2003 32 20 28 21 3 36 2 
2004 35 18 33 12 8 41 2 
2005 39 23 37 18 7 46 1 
2006 48 19 43 18 6 58 2 
2007 43 26 44 16 9 60 0 
2008 34 34 39 22 7 45 2 
2009 30 23 27 17 9 36 1 
2010 35 25 43 12 5 46 2 
2011 25 22 31 12 4 30 2 
2012 42 34 58 14 4 47 0 
2013 36 31 51 11 5 39 0 
2014 58 39 55 30 12 65 1 
2015 6 6 7 1 4 8 0 
Total 1235 1126 1168 806 387 1693 96 
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics. 
Table 2.2 Summary statistics. In Panel A, the variable “Premium” indicates the premium of the offer 
price to the target closing stock price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date, expressed as 
a percentage ((Price per common share - Target stock price prior to announcement date)/Target stock 
price prior to announcement date)*100. The variable “PNH”, standing for “price nearness to high”, 
indicates the nearness of the announcement price to the price of the 52-week high and is calculated 
as a percentage (Price of 52-week High - Price at Announcement)/(Price of 52-week High - Price of 
52-week low). DNH, the nearness of the announcement date to the date of the 52-week high, as an 
instrumental variable to “PNH”, is calculated as a percentage of “Number of workdays since 52-
week high to date of announcement/254”. DNL, the nearness of the announcement date to the date 
of the 52-week low and another instrumental variable to “PNH”, is calculated as a percentage of the 
“Number of workdays since 52-week low to date of announcement/254”. Panel B shows the other 
variables: whether the deals were recorded as completed by Thomson; the 5-day CAR from CRSP 
centred on the announcement date from Thomson and the long-term BHARs for 12, 36 and 60 
months. Panel C shows the control variables, including the form of payment (cash, stock) and a 
dummy variable for deal attitude, which takes the value of 1 if friendly and 0 if hostile. A dummy 
variable for diversifying deals takes the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code is 
different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise. A dummy variable for diversifying deals takes the 
value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise. 
A dummy variable for Int_fund deals takes the value of 1 when the acquiring company financed the 
transaction in some portion with its own internal resources and 0 otherwise. Adv_rank takes the 
value of 3 when the top-8 investment banks by transaction value during 1996 to 2009 (the reasons 
are provided in chapter 4) are assigned as top tier advisors, 2 when the top 9-25 median investments 
banks are assigned, 1 when the remainders as low tiers are employed, and 0 for in-house deals with 
no financial advisor involved. 
Panel A: 
Objective Variables 
N Mean SD Min Max 
Premium 1669 44.53154 166.7919 -95.76 6445.45 
PNH 2177 0.4998193 0.3324815 0 1 
DNH 2181 0.4503587 0.3534718 0 1 
DNL 2181 0.5312072 0.3517186 0 1 
Panel B: 
Outcome Variables 
N Mean SD Min Max 
Completed 2366 0.521978 0.4996223 0 1 
CAR (-2,+2) 2139 -0.0019114 0.1253743 -1.126695 1.436994 
BHAR12 1882 -0.2070893 0.4561351 -2.110995 2.849774 
BHAR36 1383 -0.5194106 0.7491756 -3.203724 8.311247 
BHAR60 1036 -0.6763112 1.048995 -3.976755 19.93834 
Panel C: 
Control Variables 
N Mean SD Min Max 
Cash 2361 0.4947056 0.5000779 0 1 
Stock 2361 0.3413808 0.4742734 0 1 
Friendly 2361 0.717069 0.4505186 0 1 
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Diversifying 2366 0.7020287 0.4574635 0 1 
Int_fund 2361 0.1126641 0.3162488 0 1 
Adv_rank 2366 0.9277261 1.172381 0 3 
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Table 2.3 Results of regressions for the offer premium on the timing of the deals as well as its 
instrumental variables. 
The dependent variable “Premium” is the premium of the offer price to the target closing stock price 
4 weeks prior to the original announcement date, expressed as a percentage ((Price per common 
share - Target stock price prior to announcement date)/Target stock price prior to announcement 
date)*100. The vector of explanatory variables includes the following direct variables and the most 
influential variables with M&A: a dummy variable for diversifying deals takes the value of 1 when 
the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise; the dummy 
variable “Friendly” takes the value of 1 when the bidder attitude is friendly, and 0 otherwise; the 
dummy variable “Hostile” takes the value of 1 when the bidder attitude is hostile, and 0 otherwise; 
the dummy variable “”Cash_only” takes the value of 1 when the bidder use only cash to complete 
the deal, and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Stock_only” takes the value of 1 when the bidder 
uses only stock exchange to complete the deal, and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Int_fund” 
takes the value of 1 when the acquiring company financed the transaction in some portion with its 
own internal resources, and 0 otherwise; the core explanatory variable “PNH”, standing for “price 
nearness to high” and indicating the nearness of the announcement price to the price of the 52-week 
high, is calculated as the a percentage (Price of 52-week High - Price at Announcement)/(Price of 
52-week High - Price of 52-week low). DNH, the nearness of the announcement date to the date of 
the 52-week high, as an instrumental variable for “PNH”, is calculated as a percentage of “Number 
of workdays since 52-week high to date of announcement/254”. DNL, the nearness of the 
announcement date to the date of the 52-week low and another instrumental variable for “PNH”, is 
calculated as a percentage of “Number of workdays since 52-week low to date of 
announcement/254”. Adv_rank takes the value of 3 when the top-8 investment banks by transaction 
value during 1996 to 2009 (the reasons are provided in chapter 4) are assigned as top tier advisors, 
2 when the top 9-25 median investments banks are assigned, 1 when the remainders as low tiers are 
employed, and 0 for in-house deals with no financial advisor involved. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Premium Premium Premium Premium Premium Premium 
       
Diversifying -1.2693 -1.1509 -0.7284 -5.6317 -5.5040 -5.0672 
 (9.6515) (9.6506) (9.6484) (9.4611) (9.4603) (9.4581) 
Friendly 23.8898* 23.8437* 23.8323*    
 (10.9005) (10.9006) (10.9264)    
Cash_only 1.0193 1.3455 1.1378    
 (9.4698) (9.4679) (9.4753)    
Int_fund 40.2977** 40.7558** 41.0563** 39.3606** 39.6666** 39.9910** 
 (13.4024) (13.3972) (13.4013) (13.2545) (13.2520) (13.2553) 
PNH -21.8183   -22.1769   
 (13.1894)   (13.2134)   
Adv_rank 2.6499 2.6924 2.9302 4.5157 4.5629 4.7756 
 (3.7116) (3.7132) (3.7107) (3.6392) (3.6407) (3.6402) 
DNH  -15.2718   -15.8538  
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  (12.3019)   (12.3215)  
DNL   4.7061   6.3575 
   (12.3541)   (12.3503) 
Hostile    2.3693 2.2633 2.3581 
    (20.8110) (20.8131) (20.8240) 
Stock_only    0.2315 -0.5118 -0.1457 
    (9.5454) (9.5398) (9.5428) 
Constant 28.4487 23.9949 14.1019 48.1464*** 44.2018*** 32.9183** 
 (16.0278) (15.5432) (15.3164) (12.2014) (11.6997) (11.7905) 
       
Observations 1,559 1,560 1,560 1,559 1,560 1,560 
R-squared 0.0136 0.0128 0.0119 0.0104 0.0097 0.0088 
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Table 2.4 Results of probit regressions for the completion of M&A on the premium of the 
deal. 
The dependent variable “Completed” is equal to 1 if a deal is completed and 0 otherwise. The vector 
of explanatory variables includes the following direct variables and the most influential variables 
with M&A: “Premium” is the premium of the offer price to the target closing stock price 4 weeks 
prior to the original announcement date, expressed as a percentage ((Price per common share - 
Target stock price prior to announcement date)/Target stock price prior to announcement date)*100. 
A dummy variable for diversifying deals takes the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code 
is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Friendly” takes the value 
of 1 when the bidder attitude is friendly, and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Hostile” takes the 
value of 1 when the bidder attitude is hostile, and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “”Cash_only” 
takes the value of 1 when the bidder uses only cash to complete the deal, and 0 otherwise; the 
dummy variable “Stock_only” takes the value of 1 when the bidder uses only stock exchange to 
complete the deal, and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Int_fund” takes the value of 1 when the 
acquiring company finances the transaction in some portion with its own internal resources, and 0 
otherwise; the core explanatory variable “PNH”, standing for “price nearness to high” and indicating 
the nearness of the announcement price to the price of the 52-week high, is calculated as a 
percentage (Price of 52-week High - Price at Announcement)/(Price of 52-week High - Price of 52-
week low). DNH, the nearness of the announcement date to the date of the 52-week high, as an 
instrumental variable for “PNH”, is calculated as a percentage of “Number of workdays since 52-
week high to date of announcement/254”. DNL, the nearness of the announcement date to the date 
of the 52-week low and another instrumental variable for “PNH”, is calculated as a percentage of 
“Number of workdays since 52-week low to date of announcement/254”. Adv_rank takes the value 
of 3 when the top-8 investment banks by transaction value during 1996 to 2009 (the reasons are 
provided in chapter 4) are assigned as top tier advisors, 2 when the top 9-25 median investments 
banks are assigned, 1 when the remainders as low tiers are employed, and 0 for in-house deals with 
no financial advisor involved. Standard errors are in parentheses. The original regression 
coefficients are listed above the parentheses in the table. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 5% 
are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Completed Completed Completed Completed Completed Completed 
       
Premium -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0017** 0.0017** 0.0017** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Diversifying 0.1893* 0.1924* 0.2011* -0.2009** -0.2001** -0.1911* 
 (0.0849) (0.0849) (0.0846) (0.0764) (0.0764) (0.0763) 
Friendly 2.2563*** 2.2617*** 2.2454***    
 (0.1125) (0.1128) (0.1124)    
Cash_only 0.7793*** 0.7864*** 0.7753***    
 (0.0891) (0.0893) (0.0890)    
Int_fund 0.3904** 0.3946** 0.3967** 0.7332*** 0.7323*** 0.7360*** 
 (0.1344) (0.1343) (0.1340) (0.1124) (0.1123) (0.1122) 
PNH -0.3357**   -0.3288**   
 (0.1166)   (0.1056)   
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Adv_rank 0.1593*** 0.1552*** 0.1591*** 0.2489*** 0.2473*** 0.2471*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0330) (0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0296) 
DNH  -0.3570**   -0.3128**  
  (0.1081)   (0.0982)  
DNL   0.1358   0.2953** 
   (0.1087)   (0.0982) 
Hostile    -1.9169*** -1.9265*** -1.9191*** 
    (0.2342) (0.2356) (0.2342) 
Stock_only    0.6098*** 0.6014*** 0.6099*** 
    (0.0754) (0.0753) (0.0753) 
Constant -2.0040*** -2.0167*** -2.2477*** 0.0184 -0.0010 -0.3132** 
 (0.1575) (0.1533) (0.1534) (0.1004) (0.0964) (0.0973) 
       
Observations 1,559 1,560 1,560 1,559 1,560 1,560 
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Table 2.5 Results of regression for cumulative abnormal return on the timing of the deals. 
The dependent variable CAR is the 5-day cumulative abnormal return from CRSP centred on the 
announcement date from Thomson. The vector of the explanatory variables includes the following 
direct variables and the most influential variables with M&A: “Premium” is the premium of the 
offer price to the target closing stock price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date, 
expressed as a percentage ((Price per common share - Target stock price prior to announcement 
date)/Target stock price prior to announcement date)*100; the dummy variable “Completed” is 
equal to 1 if a deal is completed, and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable for diversifying deals takes 
the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target and 0 
otherwise. The dummy variable “Friendly” takes the value of 1 when the bidder attitude is friendly 
and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable “Hostile” takes the value of 1 when the bidder attitude is 
hostile and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable “Cash_only” takes the value of 1 when the bidder uses 
only cash to complete the deal, and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable “Stock_only” takes the value 
of 1 when the bidder uses only stock exchange to complete the deal, and 0 otherwise. The dummy 
variable “Int_fund” takes the value of 1 when the acquiring company finances the transaction in 
some portion with its own internal resources, and 0 otherwise. The core explanatory variable “PNH”, 
standing for “price nearness to high” and indicating the nearness of the announcement price to the 
price of the 52-week high, is calculated as a percentage (Price of 52-week High - Price at 
Announcement)/(Price of 52-week High - Price of 52-week low). DNH, the nearness of the 
announcement date to the date of the 52-week high, as an instrumental variable to “PNH”, is 
calculated as a percentage of “Number of workdays since 52-week high to date of 
announcement/254”. DNL, the nearness of the announcement date to the date of the 52-week low 
and another instrumental variable to “PNH”, is calculated as a percentage of “Number of workdays 
since 52-week low to date of announcement/254”. Adv_rank takes the value of 3 when the top-8 
investment banks by transaction value during 1996 to 2009 (the reasons are provided in chapter 4) 
are assigned as top tier advisors, 2 when the top 9-25 median investments banks are assigned, 1 
when the remainders as low tiers are employed, and 0 for in-house deals with no financial advisor 
involved. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 5% are represented 
by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
       
Premium 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Completed 0.0092 0.0122 0.0114 0.0072 0.0098 0.0101 
 (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) 
Diversifying 0.0103 0.0116 0.0113 0.0152* 0.0167* 0.0163* 
 (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) 
Friendly -0.0261** -0.0277** -0.0262**    
 (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097)    
Cash_only 0.0362*** 0.0356*** 0.0363***    
 (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0071)    
Int_fund 0.0273** 0.0282** 0.0284** 0.0302** 0.0307** 0.0307** 
 (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) 
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PNH -0.0266**   -0.0255**   
 (0.0097)   (0.0097)   
Adv_rank -0.0030 -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.0047 -0.0042 -0.0042 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
DNH  0.0190*   0.0187*  
  (0.0090)   (0.0091)  
DNL   -0.0208*   -0.0229* 
   (0.0091)   (0.0091) 
Hostile    -0.0133 -0.0113 -0.0109 
    (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0156) 
Stock_only    -0.0412*** -0.0419*** -0.0425*** 
    (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) 
Constant -0.0062 -0.0303** -0.0113 0.0076 -0.0169 0.0042 
 (0.0117) (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0097) (0.0094) (0.0091) 
       
Observations 1,525 1,525 1,525 1,525 1,525 1,525 
R-squared 0.0569 0.0549 0.0555 0.0488 0.0471 0.0484 
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Table 2.6 Results of regression for 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal return on the timing of 
the deal. 
The dependent variable BHAR12 is the 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal return from CRSP. The 
vector of explanatory variables includes the following direct variables and the most influential 
variables with M&A: “Premium” is the premium of the offer price to the target closing stock price 
4 weeks prior to the original announcement date, expressed as a percentage ((Price per common 
share - Target stock price prior to announcement date)/Target stock price prior to announcement 
date)*100; the dummy variable “Completed” is equal to 1 if a deal is completed and 0 otherwise. A 
dummy variable for diversifying deals takes the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code 
is different from that of the target and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Friendly” takes the value 
of 1 when the bidder attitude is friendly and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Hostile” takes the 
value of 1 when the bidder attitude is hostile and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Cash_only” 
takes the value of 1 when the bidder uses only cash to complete the deal and 0 otherwise; the dummy 
variable “Stock_only” takes the value of 1 when the bidder uses only stock exchange to complete 
the deal, and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Int_fund” takes the value of 1 when the acquiring 
company finances the transaction in some portion with its own internal resources, and 0 otherwise; 
the core explanatory variable “PNH”, standing for “price nearness to high” indicates the nearness 
of the announcement price to the price of the 52-week high, is calculated as a percentage (Price of 
52-week High - Price at Announcement)/(Price of 52-week High - Price of 52-week low). DNH, the 
nearness of the announcement date to the date of the 52-week high and an instrumental variable for 
“PNH”, is calculated as a percentage of “Number of workdays since 52-week high to date of 
announcement/254”. DNL, the nearness of the announcement date to the date of the 52-week low 
and another instrumental variable for “PNH”, is calculated as a percentage of “Number of workdays 
since 52-week low to date of announcement/254”. Adv_rank takes the value of 3 when the top-8 
investment banks by transaction value during 1996 to 2009 (the reasons are provided in chapter 4) 
are assigned as top tier advisors, 2 when the top 9-25 median investments banks are assigned, 1 
when the remainders as low tiers are employed, and 0 for in-house deals with no financial advisor 
involved. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 5% are represented 
by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BHAR12 BHAR12 BHAR12 BHAR12 BHAR12 BHAR12 
       
Premium -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Completed 0.0325 0.0371 0.0287 0.0566* 0.0592* 0.0539 
 (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0281) 
Diversifying 0.0106 0.0113 0.0086 0.0178 0.0188 0.0153 
 (0.0274) (0.0273) (0.0274) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) 
Friendly -0.0323 -0.0353 -0.0297    
 (0.0391) (0.0390) (0.0392)    
Cash_only 0.1510*** 0.1483*** 0.1524***    
 (0.0276) (0.0275) (0.0276)    
Int_fund -0.0366 -0.0356 -0.0379 -0.0293 -0.0283 -0.0302 
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 (0.0384) (0.0383) (0.0384) (0.0385) (0.0384) (0.0385) 
PNH 0.0639   0.0684   
 (0.0380)   (0.0380)   
Adv_rank 0.0026 0.0038 0.0028 -0.0008 0.0004 -0.0005 
 (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) 
DNH  0.1075**   0.1078**  
  (0.0352)   (0.0353)  
DNL   -0.0263   -0.0310 
   (0.0353)   (0.0354) 
Hostile    -0.0636 -0.0604 -0.0648 
    (0.0595) (0.0594) (0.0596) 
Stock_only    -0.1592*** -0.1564*** -0.1592*** 
    (0.0278) (0.0277) (0.0278) 
Constant -0.3061*** -0.3236*** -0.2586*** -0.2057*** -0.2248*** -0.1512*** 
 (0.0467) (0.0450) (0.0447) (0.0391) (0.0376) (0.0370) 
       
Observations 1,345 1,346 1,346 1,345 1,346 1,346 
R-squared 0.0321 0.0369 0.0306 0.0296 0.0342 0.0280 
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Table 2.7 Results of regression for 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal return on the timing of 
the deal. 
The dependent variable BHAR36 is the 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal return from CRSP. The 
vector of the explanatory variables includes the following direct variables and the most influential 
variables with M&A: “Premium” is the premium of the offer price to the target closing stock price 
4 weeks prior to the original announcement date, expressed as a percentage ((Price per common 
share - Target stock price prior to announcement date)/Target stock price prior to announcement 
date)*100; the dummy variable “Completed” is equal to 1 if a deal is completed and 0 otherwise. A 
dummy variable for diversifying deals takes the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code 
is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Friendly” takes the value 
of 1 when the bidder attitude is friendly, and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Hostile” takes the 
value of 1 when the bidder attitude is hostile, and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Cash_only” 
takes the value of 1 when the bidder use only cash to complete the deal, and 0 otherwise; the dummy 
variable “Stock_only” takes the value of 1 when the bidder uses only stock exchange to complete 
the deal, and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Int_fund” takes the value of 1 when the acquiring 
company finances the transaction in some portion with its own internal resources, and 0 otherwise; 
the core explanatory variable “PNH”, standing for “price nearness to high” and indicating the 
nearness of the announcement price to the price of the 52-week high, is calculated as a percentage 
(Price of 52-week High - Price at Announcement)/(Price of 52-week High - Price of 52-week low). 
DNH, the nearness of the announcement date to the date of the 52-week high and an instrumental 
variable for “PNH”, is calculated as a percentage of “Number of workdays since 52 weeks high to 
date of announcement/254”. DNL, the nearness of the announcement date to the date of the 52-week 
low and another instrumental variable for “PNH”, is calculated as a percentage of “Number of 
workdays since 52-week low to date of announcement/254”. Adv_rank takes the value of 3 when 
the top-8 investment banks by transaction value during 1996 to 2009 (the reasons are provided in 
chapter 4) are assigned as top tier advisors, 2 when the top 9-25 median investments banks are 
assigned, 1 when the remainders as low tiers are employed, and 0 for in-house deals with no 
financial advisor involved. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 
5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BHAR36 BHAR36 BHAR36 BHAR36 BHAR36 BHAR36 
       
Premium 0.0011* 0.0011* 0.0011* 0.0010* 0.0010* 0.0010* 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Completed 0.1077 0.1136 0.0869 0.1108* 0.1104* 0.1007 
 (0.0593) (0.0592) (0.0593) (0.0521) (0.0519) (0.0522) 
Diversifying 0.0751 0.0734 0.0743 0.0993* 0.0985* 0.0955 
 (0.0495) (0.0493) (0.0497) (0.0487) (0.0486) (0.0489) 
Friendly -0.1334 -0.1407* -0.1099    
 (0.0700) (0.0699) (0.0703)    
Cash_only 0.2270*** 0.2211*** 0.2388***    
 (0.0501) (0.0500) (0.0502)    
Int_fund -0.1707* -0.1747* -0.1817* -0.1522* -0.1545* -0.1611* 
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 (0.0710) (0.0707) (0.0712) (0.0715) (0.0713) (0.0717) 
PNH 0.2878***   0.2922***   
 (0.0698)   (0.0700)   
Adv_rank 0.0318 0.0345 0.0328 0.0253 0.0277 0.0267 
 (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0194) 
DNH  0.3058***   0.3017***  
  (0.0647)   (0.0649)  
DNL   -0.1833**   -0.1900** 
   (0.0641)   (0.0643) 
Hostile    -0.0668 -0.0668 -0.0784 
    (0.1010) (0.1007) (0.1013) 
Stock_only    -0.2449*** -0.2364*** -0.2471*** 
    (0.0509) (0.0508) (0.0511) 
Constant -0.8449*** -0.8297*** -0.6049*** -0.7454*** -0.7345*** -0.4797*** 
 (0.0841) (0.0807) (0.0813) (0.0728) (0.0692) (0.0674) 
       
Observations 1,009 1,009 1,009 1,009 1,009 1,009 
R-squared 0.0565 0.0614 0.0483 0.0492 0.0531 0.0410 
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Table 2.8 Results of regression for 60-month buy-and-hold abnormal return on the timing of 
the deals. 
The dependent variable BHAR60 is the 60-month buy-and-hold abnormal return from CRSP. The 
vector of the explanatory variables includes the following direct variables and the most influential 
variables with M&A: “Premium” is the premium of the offer price to the target closing stock price 
4 weeks prior to the original announcement date, expressed as a percentage ((Price per common 
share - Target stock price prior to announcement date)/Target stock price prior to announcement 
date)*100; the dummy variable “Completed” is equal to 1 if a deal is completed, and 0 otherwise. 
A dummy variable for diversifying deals takes the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code 
is different from that of the target and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Friendly” takes the value 
of 1 when the bidder attitude is friendly, and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Hostile” takes the 
value of 1 when the bidder attitude is hostile, and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Cash_only” 
takes the value of 1 when the bidder uses only cash to complete the deal, and 0 otherwise; the 
dummy variable “Stock_only” takes the value of 1 when the bidder uses only stock exchange to 
complete the deal, and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Int_fund” takes the value of 1 when the 
acquiring company finances the transaction in some portion with its own internal resources, and 0 
otherwise; the core explanatory variable “PNH”, standing for “price nearness to high” and indicating 
the nearness of the announcement price to the price of the 52-week high, is calculated as a 
percentage (Price of 52-week High - Price at Announcement)/(Price of 52-week High - Price of 52-
week low). DNH, the nearness of the announcement date to the date of the 52-week high and an 
instrumental variable for “PNH”, is calculated as a percentage of “Number of workdays since 52 
weeks high to date of announcement/254”. DNL, the nearness of the announcement date to the date 
of the 52-week low and another instrumental variable for “PNH”, is calculated as a percentage of 
“Number of workdays since 52-week low to date of announcement/254”. Adv_rank takes the value 
of 3 when the top-8 investment banks by transaction value during 1996 to 2009 (the reasons are 
provided in chapter 4) are assigned as top tier advisors, 2 when the top 9-25 median investments 
banks are assigned, 1 when the remainders as low tiers are employed, and 0 for in-house deals with 
no financial advisor involved. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% 
and 5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BHAR60 BHAR60 BHAR60 BHAR60 BHAR60 BHAR60 
       
Premium 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Completed 0.1484 0.1554 0.1190 0.1497 0.1507 0.1352 
 (0.0996) (0.0996) (0.0998) (0.0874) (0.0873) (0.0877) 
Diversifying 0.0597 0.0499 0.0554 0.0825 0.0737 0.0744 
 (0.0845) (0.0843) (0.0848) (0.0823) (0.0821) (0.0826) 
Friendly -0.0508 -0.0566 -0.0194    
 (0.1174) (0.1173) (0.1178)    
Cash_only 0.2132* 0.2048* 0.2345**    
 (0.0853) (0.0853) (0.0854)    
Int_fund -0.2041 -0.2086 -0.2268 -0.1685 -0.1710 -0.1864 
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 (0.1219) (0.1216) (0.1222) (0.1229) (0.1226) (0.1233) 
PNH 0.3997**   0.3927**   
 (0.1182)   (0.1183)   
Adv_rank 0.0315 0.0338 0.0327 0.0318 0.0340 0.0336 
 (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0326) (0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0327) 
DNH  0.4101***   0.4015***  
  (0.1110)   (0.1110)  
DNL   -0.2213*   -0.2104 
   (0.1088)   (0.1091) 
Hostile    -0.2579 -0.2570 -0.2824 
    (0.1676) (0.1673) (0.1682) 
Stock_only    -0.1973* -0.1858* -0.2061* 
    (0.0863) (0.0864) (0.0867) 
Constant -1.0988*** -1.0655*** -0.7809*** -0.9566*** -0.9331*** -0.6166*** 
 (0.1411) (0.1353) (0.1382) (0.1212) (0.1144) (0.1128) 
       
Observations 778 778 778 778 778 778 
R-squared 0.0334 0.0362 0.0243 0.0327 0.0353 0.0236 
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Table 2.9 Results of the Hausman test for the two-stage least squares regression to show 
whether “DNH” is a valid instrument of “PNH” to regress the cumulative abnormal return. 
Hausman test     
 Coefficients    
 
Coefficients of 
IV regression 
with CAR as the 
dependent 
variable (A) 
Coefficients of 
OLS regression 
with CAR as the 
dependent 
variable (B) 
(A-B) 
sqrt(diag(V_A-
V_B) 
 A B Difference S.E. 
PNH 
(Instrumented by 
DNH in A) 
0. 0328189 -0. 026637 0. 0594559 0. 0124127 
Premium 0. 0000226 0. 0000178 4.78e-06 2.71e-06 
Completed 0. 0127654 0. 0091536 0. 0036117 0. 0013501 
Diversifying 0. 0119118 0. 0103421 0. 0015697   0. 0010247 
Friendly -0. 0280211 -0. 0260636 -0. 0019575   0. 0013888 
Cash_only 0. 0359271 0. 0362357 -0. 0003085 0. 0009776 
Int_fund 0. 0289792 0. 0272583 0. 0017209 0. 0014047 
Adv_rank -0.0024658 -0.0030476 0.0005818 0.0003947 
A = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from IV regression 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regression 
Test:  Ho: the difference in coefficients is not systematic 
chi2(7) = (A-B)'[(V_A-V_B)^(-1)](A-B) 
= 22.94 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0034*** 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
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Table 2.10 Results of the Hausman test for the two-stage least squares regression of the 
cumulative abnormal return on another possible instrument, “DNL”. 
Hausman test     
 Coefficients    
 
Coefficients of 
IV regression 
with CAR as the 
dependent 
variable (A) 
Coefficients of 
OLS regression 
with CAR as 
the dependent 
variable (B) 
(A-B) sqrt(diag(V_A-V_B) 
 A B Difference S.E. 
PNH 
(Instrumented by 
DNL in A) 
0.0351714 -0.026637 0.0618084 0.0120211 
Premium 0.0000228 0.0000178 4.97e-06 2.82e-06 
Completed 0.0129083 0.0091536 0.0037546 0.0013858 
Diversifying 0.0119739 0.0103421 0.0016318 0.0010692 
Friendly -0.0280985 -0.0260636 -0.002035 0.0014509 
Cash_only 0.0359149 0.0362357 -0.0003207 0.0010278 
Int_fund 0.0290473 0.0272583  0.001789 0.00147 
Adv_rank -0.0024428 -0.0030476   0.0006048 0.0004121 
A = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from IV regression 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regression 
Test:  Ho: the difference in coefficients is not systematic 
chi2(7) = (A-B)'[(V_A-V_B)^(-1)](A-B) 
= 26.44 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0009*** 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
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Table 2.11 Results of the quantile regression for the median bidder short-term performance 
on the timing of the deal measured by the valid variable “DNH” and “DNL” without 
endogeneity problems. 
The dependent variable CAR is the 5-day cumulative abnormal return from CRSP centred on the 
announcement date from Thomson. The vector of the explanatory variables includes the following 
direct variables and the most influential variables with M&A: “Premium” is the premium of the 
offer price to the target closing stock price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date, 
expressed as a percentage ((Price per common share - Target stock price prior to announcement 
date)/Target stock price prior to announcement date)*100; the dummy variable “Completed” is 
equal to 1 if a deal is completed, and 0 otherwise. A dummy variable for diversifying deals takes the 
value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise; 
the dummy variable “Friendly” takes the value of 1 when the bidder attitude is friendly, and 0 
otherwise; the dummy variable “Hostile” takes the value of 1 when the bidder attitude is hostile, 
and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Cash_only” takes the value of 1 when the bidder uses only 
cash to complete the deal, and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Stock_only” takes the value of 1 
when the bidder uses only stock exchange to complete the deal, and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable 
“Int_fund” takes the value of 1 when the acquiring company finance the transaction in some portion 
with its own internal resources, and 0 otherwise; the core explanatory variable “PNH”, standing for 
“price nearness to high” and indicating the nearness of the announcement price to the price of the 
52-week high, is calculated as a percentage (Price of 52-week High - Price at Announcement)/(Price 
of 52-week High - Price of 52-week low). DNH, the nearness of the announcement date to the date 
of the 52-week high, as an instrumental variable for “PNH”, is calculated as a percentage of 
“Number of workdays since 52-week high to date of announcement/254”. DNL, the nearness of the 
announcement date to the date of the 52-week low and another instrumental variable for “PNH”, is 
calculated as a percentage of “Number of workdays since 52-week low to date of 
announcement/254”. Adv_rank takes the value of 3 when the top-8 investment banks by transaction 
value during 1996 to 2009 (the reasons are provided in chapter 4) are assigned as top tier advisors, 
2 when the top 9-25 median investments banks are assigned, 1 when the remainders as low tiers are 
employed, and 0 for in-house deals with no financial advisor involved. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
       
Premium 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Completed 0.0034 0.0035 0.0045 0.0003 0.0011 0.0022 
 (0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0046) 
Diversifying 0.0032 0.0030 0.0030 0.0059 0.0061 0.0049 
 (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0045) 
Friendly -0.0152** -0.0122* -0.0129**    
 (0.0059) (0.0055) (0.0049)    
Cash_only 0.0232*** 0.0234*** 0.0242***    
 (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0036)    
68 
 
Int_fund 0.0134* 0.0162** 0.0149** 0.0177** 0.0148* 0.0168** 
 (0.0060) (0.0056) (0.0050) (0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0064) 
PNH -0.0059   -0.0092   
 (0.0059)   (0.0062)   
Adv_rank -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0034 
 (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
DNH  0.0135**   0.0139*  
  (0.0051)   (0.0060)  
DNL   -0.0110*   -0.0133* 
   (0.0046)   (0.0058) 
Hostile    -0.0135 -0.0155 -0.0136 
    (0.0099) (0.0103) (0.0100) 
Stock_only    -0.0279*** -0.0288*** -0.0299*** 
    (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0046) 
Constant -0.0082 -0.0203** -0.0086 0.0050 -0.0055 0.0103 
 (0.0071) (0.0065) (0.0057) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0058) 
       
Observations 1,525 1,525 1,525 1,525 1,525 1,525 
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Table 2.12 Results of the quantile regression for median bidder long-term performance on 
the timing of the deal measured by the valid variable “PNH” without the endogeneity 
problem. 
The dependent variable BHAR36/60 is the buy-and-hold abnormal return 36/60 months from CRSP. 
The vector of the explanatory variables includes the following direct variables and the most 
influential variables with M&A: “Premium” is the premium of the offer price to the target closing 
stock price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date, expressed as a percentage ((Price per 
common share - Target stock price prior to announcement date)/Target stock price prior to 
announcement date)*100; a dummy variable “Completed” is equal to 1 if a deal is completed, and 
0 otherwise. A dummy variable for diversifying deals takes the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-
digit SIC code is different from that of the target and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable “Friendly” 
takes the value of 1 when the bidder attitude is friendly and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable 
“Hostile” takes the value of 1 when the bidder attitude is hostile and 0 otherwise. The dummy 
variable “Cash_only” takes the value of 1 when the bidder uses only cash to complete the deal, and 
0 otherwise. The dummy variable “Stock_only” takes the value of 1 when the bidder uses only stock 
exchange to complete the deal, and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable “Int_fund” takes the value of 
1 when the acquiring company finances the transaction in some portion with its own internal 
resources, and 0 otherwise. The core explanatory variable “PNH”, standing for “price nearness to 
high” and indicating the nearness of the announcement price to the price of the 52-week high, is 
calculated as a percentage (Price of 52-week High - Price at Announcement)/(Price of 52-week High 
- Price of 52-week low). DNH, the nearness of the announcement date to the date of the 52-week 
high and an instrumental variable for “PNH”, is calculated as a percentage of “Number of workdays 
since the 52-week high to date of announcement/254”. DNL, the nearness of the announcement date 
to the date of the 52-week low and another instrumental variable for “PNH”, is calculated as a 
percentage of “Number of workdays since 52-week low to date of announcement/254”. Adv_rank 
takes the value of 3 when the top-8 investment banks by transaction value during 1996 to 2009 (the 
reasons are provided in chapter 4) are assigned as top tier advisors, 2 when the top 9-25 median 
investments banks are assigned, 1 when the remainders as low tiers are employed, and 0 for in-
house deals with no financial advisor involved. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance 
levels at 0.1%, 1% and 5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BHAR36 BHAR36 BHAR36 BHAR36 BHAR36 BHAR36 
       
Premium 0.0007 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0002 0.0004 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Completed 0.0798 0.0872 0.0654 0.0867 0.0876* 0.0766 
 (0.0490) (0.0489) (0.0467) (0.0443) (0.0426) (0.0427) 
Diversifying -0.0035 -0.0080 -0.0101 0.0315 0.0443 0.0169 
 (0.0407) (0.0407) (0.0390) (0.0414) (0.0397) (0.0398) 
Friendly -0.1122 -0.1220* -0.1043    
 (0.0575) (0.0575) (0.0551)    
Cash_only 0.2665*** 0.2605*** 0.2466***    
 (0.0413) (0.0412) (0.0395)    
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Int_fund -0.1966** -0.1921** -0.1712** -0.1663** -0.1530** -0.1706** 
 (0.0584) (0.0581) (0.0559) (0.0606) (0.0585) (0.0585) 
PNH 0.1399*   0.1294*   
 (0.0576)   (0.0597)   
Adv_rank 0.0299 0.0307 0.0282 0.0228 0.0163 0.0188 
 (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0151) (0.0165) (0.0158) (0.0159) 
DNH  0.1780**   0.1966***  
  (0.0533)   (0.0531)  
DNL   -0.0947   -0.0878 
   (0.0503)   (0.0526) 
Hostile    -0.1498 -0.1870* -0.1474* 
    (0.0857) (0.0822) (0.0825) 
Stock_only    -0.2617*** -0.2328*** -0.2608*** 
    (0.0434) (0.0416) (0.0417) 
Constant -0.7370*** -0.7251*** -0.5993*** -0.5947*** -0.5970*** -0.4550*** 
 (0.0690) (0.0664) (0.0638) (0.0620) (0.0565) (0.0551) 
       
Observations 1,009 1,009 1,009 1,009 1,009 1,009 
 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BHAR60 BHAR60 BHAR60 BHAR60 BHAR60 BHAR60 
       
Premium 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
Completed 0.0978 0.1144 0.0284 0.1073 0.1302* 0.0631 
 (0.0689) (0.0636) (0.0848) (0.0631) (0.0606) (0.0749) 
Diversifying -0.0002 0.0096 -0.0098 -0.0003 0.0071 -0.0152 
 (0.0587) (0.0540) (0.0724) (0.0594) (0.0569) (0.0707) 
Friendly -0.0310 -0.0770 -0.0153    
 (0.0812) (0.0751) (0.1000)    
Cash_only 0.2130*** 0.2106*** 0.2343**    
 (0.0594) (0.0546) (0.0728)    
Int_fund -0.0372 -0.0632 -0.0997 -0.0031 -0.0301 -0.0844 
 (0.0847) (0.0778) (0.1039) (0.0882) (0.0849) (0.1054) 
PNH 0.2061*   0.2015*   
 (0.0822)   (0.0853)   
Adv_rank 0.0265 0.0411* 0.0344 0.0236 0.0203 0.0340 
 (0.0225) (0.0207) (0.0278) (0.0234) (0.0225) (0.0279) 
DNH  0.2570***   0.2447**  
  (0.0710)   (0.0769)  
DNL   -0.0222   -0.0120 
   (0.0927)   (0.0932) 
Hostile    -0.1691 -0.2597* -0.2004 
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    (0.1202) (0.1154) (0.1432) 
Stock_only    -0.2064** -0.2256*** -0.2609*** 
    (0.0624) (0.0600) (0.0742) 
Constant -0.9591*** -0.9754*** -0.8348*** -0.7772*** -0.7890*** -0.6282*** 
 (0.0983) (0.0867) (0.1179) (0.0875) (0.0796) (0.0963) 
       
Observations 778 778 778 778 778 778 
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Chapter 3: Comparison of the Contradictive Effects from the Market Timing 
Theory and Signalling Theory in M&A 
3.1 Abstract 
Market timing theory argues that high-valued bidders should take advantage of their 
share prices to acquire, while the signalling theory suggests that cash payment is good 
in that the stock exchange in M&A is actually a negative signal showing the market that 
the bidder is overvalued. This chapter compares and clarifies the dominant effect in 
M&A when the bidders announce M&A at or near the 52-week high or low. 
 
This chapter first categorizes the research objects. Because pure stock exchange is 
considered a fundamental tool to time the market, while announcement nearness to the 
date of the 52-week high is used to measure the timing intensity, such equity-financed 
bidders with their announcement date close to the 52-week high are defined as market 
timers. In comparison, as cash payment could be taken as a basic signal sent from the 
buyer showing their optimism of the future value and ability to supply cash financing, 
such cash bidders with their announcement date close to the 52-week high are defined 
as market signallers. Similarly, equity-financed bidders with their announcement date 
close to the 52-week low are defined as anti-timers; cash bidders with their 
announcement date close to the 52-week low are established as anti-signallers. 
 
The study then further discusses the performance of the market timer, signaller, anti-
timer and anti-signaller and illustrates that market timers benefit from taking advantage 
of their high-valued equity as payment method in neither the short nor the long term, 
which is inconsistent with the market timing theory. Similarly, market signallers do not 
gain significantly in either the short or the long term, although positive signals are sent 
that they are not taking profit from the current price and are expecting higher value. In 
the long term, both market timers and signallers experience a serious reversal. In 
comparison, anti-signallers, as winners, reverse significantly less than all the other 
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research objects.  
 
3.2 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 has analysed the anchoring and momentum impact of the acquirers’ M&A 
announcement at or near the 52-week high and low on the offer premium, deal 
completeness and the performance of the acquirers. It has pointed out that 
announcement fewer days away from the 52-week high date (the bids announced nearer 
to the acquirers’ 52-week high date) leads to a higher probability of deal completion but 
lower cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), while announcement closer to acquirers’ 
52-week low date is associated with higher CARs for all bidders but a lower probability 
of deal completion for stock exchange deals or no significant effect when cash payment 
is used. In terms of long-term performance, the bids announced closer to the acquirers’ 
52-week high date are associated with lower 12-, 36- and 60-month buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns, while announcement closer to the acquirers’ 52-week low date is 
associated with higher buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for 36 and 60 months. 
In conclusion, the 52-week high and low dates could be taken as effective reference 
points in completing the deal and affecting both the 5-day short-term CAR and the 3-5 
year long-term BHARs. 
 
In addition, in chapter 2, the payment method, namely, pure cash and stock payments, 
has been found to affect the bidder performance significantly and differently in all 
regressions. According to the current market timing theory, given that bid managers are 
rational and the share prices might fluctuate around the intrinsic value, the theory 
suggests the buyer to take advantage of the overvalued shares as a payment method. On 
the other hand, signalling effects from empirical studies indicate that the market players 
can receive the negative signal of timing the market by offering stock exchange deals 
and thus favouring cash payment. 
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The theoretical contradiction provides a research gap to reconcile market timing theory 
and the empirical signalling effects. This chapter clarifies the justifications of the 
payment methods at or near different reference points and ranks the effectiveness of 
market timing and signalling at different levels of proximity to the 52-week high or low. 
 
In addition, as most current signalling theories are read from the target point of view, 
target signals being studied, this chapter contributes to the study of the signals sent from 
the bidder. In addition, the intensities of the market timing effect and the signalling 
effect on maximizing shareholder interest in both the short and long terms are yet to be 
compared. 
 
Answering these questions will help investors use the correct investment theories and 
help acquirers correctly predict the market reaction to their acquisition plan.  
 
To sort out the problems just outlined, for the first time, this research uses the payment 
method and the proximity of the takeover announcement to the 52-week high/low date 
(no endogeneity, as discussed in chapter 2), the two most significant elements affecting 
bidder performance, to define market timers, signallers, anti-timers and anti-signallers, 
which have not been considered in previous studies. Compared to the extant studies on 
market timing theory, in which book-to-market ratio and price earnings ratio are most 
commonly used to measure acquirers’ valuation, the 52-week high and low are more 
straightforward and widely taken as important psychological investment reference 
points.  
 
Specifically, if the bidder announces stock exchange acquisition near the 52-week high 
date, the bidder in this chapter is categorized as a market timer, who takes advantage of 
the 52-week peak value. If the bidder announces cash acquisition near the 52-week high 
date, the bidder is classified as a market signaller, as it sends purely optimistic signals 
75 
 
showing the expectation of a better future performance by ruling out the advantage from 
the market timing effect. In contrast to the market timer, if the bidder announces stock 
exchange acquisition near the 52-week low date, the bidder is categorized as anti-timer. 
If the bidder announces pure cash acquisition near the 52-week low date, the bidder is 
classified as an anti-signaller. 
 
By analysing the performance of market timers and signallers, for the first time, we 
could determine the dominant power from the contradicting market timing and 
signalling effects. On the other hand, by comparing the performances of the different 
types of market players, we could rank the intensity or the efficiency of the market 
timing and the market-signalling effects.  
 
The short- and long-term performance for market signallers, anti-signallers, market 
timers and anti-timers is investigated in this study. The 5-day event window of CARs 
for the short term as well as the 12-month, 36-month and 60-month BHARs for the long 
term are calculated and compared as the benefits of different categories of bidders.  
 
The findings suggest that anti-signallers, as winners, have the highest short-term return, 
while timers perform the worst according to CARs after the announcement. In the long 
term, reversals exist in all categories of bidders. The anti-signallers experience the 
lowest reversal in the long term, and the timers have the highest reversal. 
 
The reversal phenomenon is consistent with Rosen (2006), who employs investor 
sentiment to explain the long-term reversal. In particular, when investors are more 
optimistic than realistic, the short-term lift of the confidence in the market would be 
reversed when the real picture is revealed over time in the long term. Antoniou, Guo 
and Petmezas (2008) also found that short-term returns stimulated from the hot market 
would be significantly reversed in the long term.  
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This chapter contributes to the literature in the following ways.  
 
The definition of market timers in the current literature ignores payment methods, 
which results in a contradiction of market timing theory and empirical signalling effects. 
This chapter creatively re-defines the market timer and signaller, providing an 
opportunity to reconcile the contradiction.  
 
Signalling theory in the current literature is applied mainly in analysing the benefits of 
signals conveyed by target firms; this chapter analyses and compares the efficiency 
implications of acquirers’ signals in the M&A market. 
 
Market timers, signallers and anti-timers/signallers perform differently in the short and 
long terms after the announcement and acquisition, offering guidance to stakeholders 
in M&A. 
 
The contradictive recommendations for payment methods from market timing theory 
and signalling theory are reconciled and complemented with more details. Generally, 
cash transactions outperform stock-financed deals in all categories: 
a. Anti-signallers have higher CARs than signallers, anti-timers and timers; 
b. Anti-timers have higher CARs than timers; 
c. Anti-signallers experience the least reversal, while timers experience greatest reversal 
in terms of BHARs in the long term. 
 
As anti-signallers and anti-timers are found to be the least losers in M&A, the influence 
of proximity to the 52-week low date announcement could be reaffirmed as another 
“reference point” on top of proximity to the 52-week high date discovered in chapter 
two. This “reference point” is also in contrast to that from the perspective of the target, 
which answers how listed targets’ 52-week high price affects the purchase price. In 
conclusion, the new reference points, including the 52-week high date and the 52-week 
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low date, from the perspective of the acquiring firms, would supplement the target 
reference point theory.  
 
3.3 Literature Review 
 
3.3.1 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is a theory in financial economics that argues 
that all available information in the financial market will exert full influence on assets. 
In other words, it is impossible to outstrip the market consistently on a risk-adjusted 
basis because market prices should change only with new information on discount rates. 
 
Eugene (1965) argued that there is no such thing as unfair value of stocks, as investors 
are never able to either purchase undervalued stocks or sell stocks at inflated prices. As 
a result, investors have no opportunities to outperform the overall market through expert 
stock selection or market timing. Consistently, Eugene’s later studies disclose that even 
if fund managers had no skill, there still would be a very similar distribution of 
abnormal returns in US mutual funds.  
 
The EMH has three different forms: the "weak", "semi-strong", and "strong" forms. The 
weak form of the EMH claims that prices on traded assets reflect all past publicly 
available information. The semi-strong form of the EMH claims that prices reflect both 
past publicly available information and new public information. The strong form of the 
EMH claims that prices on traded assets reflect both the past and current public 
information along with even hidden "insider" information. 
 
In this chapter, the EMF provides a theoretical basis and justification for the momentum 
of the 52-week high or low of the bidders. Signalling theory is also based on the EMF 
and indicates that the market would automatically absorb new signals sent from the 
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market players and reflect the information to their share prices.  
 
In contrast to the EMF, several serious financial crises in history along with behavioural 
finance led to renewed scrutiny and criticism of the EMH. Behavioural 
economists attribute imperfections in financial markets to a combination of cognitive 
biases, such as overconfidence, overreaction, representative bias, information bias, and 
various other predictable human errors in reasoning and information processing 
(Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Bondt and Thaler (1985), Slovic and Weber (2002)). 
 
3.3.2 Hubris Hypothesis 
 
Modern economics and market theories heavily rely on the hypothesis of human 
rationality. However, psychologists’ findings have endorsed human beings’ unrealistic 
positive views of the self, illusion of control and unrealistic optimism.  
 
Current psychology literature has shown that human beings are inclined to be confident 
that they are better than others and that they have unrealistic positive beliefs about 
themselves and more optimistic elements than average. They overestimate their features 
and attribute more positive than negative descriptions to themselves (Greenwald (1980), 
Taylor and Brown (1988), Svenson (1981)). In addition, people attach more importance 
to things at which they are good at than to those at which they lack expertise 
(Harackiewicz, Sansone and Manderlink (1985), Lewicki (1984), Rosenberg (1979)). 
 
Empirical experiments, in which mutual ratings are carried out and compared, 
document that self-ratings were significantly more positive than an observer’s 
assessment (Taylor and Brown (1988)). 
 
In the context of finance, based on psychological evidence, DeBondt and Thaler (1985) 
document that psychological elements could help to better explain individuals’ 
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behaviour. As one of the most common human bias and most important value 
destructive effects, overconfidence has been modelled to help explain a number of 
financial anomalies. M&A is a particular type of corporate decision related to 
overconfidence, as proposed by psychologists. 
 
An early work on the phenomenon of overconfidence in M&A by Roll (1986) proposes 
the hubris hypothesis of corporate takeover as a possible explanation for the takeover 
phenomenon of mergers and tender offers. He contends that bidding firms infected by 
hubris simply pay too much for their targets. The strong, efficient markets are proposed 
as the assumption for his hubris hypothesis. According to the assumption, asset prices 
account for all information about individual firms, which means that product and labour 
markets are believed to be efficient in the sense that (a) industrial reorganization can 
bring no more gains in aggregate output and (b) management talent is employed in its 
best alternative use. He concludes that under the assumption of the strong, efficient 
capital market, if any valuation of the equity for the target is higher than the market 
price, it is inclined to be a bidder mistake.  
 
Roll believed that the hubris decision makers failed to take lessons from previous 
mistakes and are overconfident about their variation of the equity for the target. 
Therefore, if there are no gains in takeovers, hubris is necessary to explain why 
managers do not abandon these bids. 
 
As evidence of the hubris hypothesis, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) document that in 
assessing a potential acquisition decision from the full sample of 3169 mergers and 348 
tender offers in the US between January 1980 and December 1991, the market, the 
management itself, the board of directors and large shareholders are inclined to 
overestimate the historical performance of the bidder management and subsequently be 
overconfident about the transaction. In other words, glamour firm bidders with lower 
book-to-market ratios overestimate their own abilities and their managerial skills, 
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resulting in the over-payment of targets. Consistent with the US case, Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003) provide the same evidence for the UK market, showing that value firms 
(high book-to-market ratios) outperform glamour firms. 
 
In a study with worldwide objects, by investigating Forbes 500 CEOs, Malmendier and 
Tate (2005) also document that corporate investments could be distorted by managerial 
overconfidence. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment 
projects especially when they have abundant internal funds and particularly in equity-
dependent firms. 
 
From the perspective of multiple bids, Billett and Qian (2008) contend that first-order 
acquisitions’ abnormal returns outperform those of the higher order deals since the past 
successful performance on the part of the firm leads to the creation of overconfident 
managers. 
 
There are three major types of measures for overconfidence, namely, stock option proxy, 
business press proxy and multiple acquisitions.  
 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) constructed three stock option proxies of overconfidence, 
including whenever the CEO holds his options beyond a theoretically calibrated 
benchmark for exercise, holds his options even until the last year before expiration, and 
habitually buys stock of his company during the first five sample years. In other words, 
CEOs are classified as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal 
exposure to company-specific risk.  
 
As for business press proxy, Malmendier and Tate (2008) propose to take advantage of 
the comments from articles to determine whether managers are overconfident.  
 
In addition, since overconfident managers are inclined to underestimate the risks and 
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overestimate the synergies from takeovers, Doukas and Petmezas (2010) document that 
overconfident managers are more likely to acquire targets quickly and frequently.  
 
The irrational assumption of managers from the hubris theory provides justification for 
the players to think that they can time or signal the market. 
 
The hubris hypothesis is based on strong market efficiency in terms of the capital, 
product and labour markets. However, concerning criticism of the theory, as Roll 
mentioned himself, a frequent objection is that if some market participants make 
systematic mistakes, the assumption of the hubris theory does not seem tenable. 
Actually, modern theories of economics and management have proven that markets 
have frictions and failures, such as information asymmetry and transaction costs. In 
other words, the assumptions of the hubris hypothesis, “markets are efficient while 
managers are affected by hubris”, is not always correct. The reality is that share value 
could be overestimated by the markets, while managers with asymmetric inside 
information may not be affected by hubris.  
 
As documented above, share value could be overestimated by the markets, and bid 
managers providing the market with asymmetric inside information may not experience 
hubris. In other words, we are not sure whether these managers are truly overconfident. 
What if they made the right decision? Does that mean they are properly confident 
instead of overconfident? In the existing literature, there is no investigation on rational 
confidence in M&A whatsoever. In this study, the assumption of rational managerial 
confidence could help determine the motivation of M&A. Under this new assumption, 
rational managers of the acquirers would use shares to acquire targets if their share 
prices were high or announce cash payment as a signal to clarify the market 
misperception, providing justification for market timing theory and signalling theory, 
respectively. 
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3.3.3 Overreaction Theory 
 
Overreaction is caused by systematic psychological cognitive bias when investment 
decisions are made in uncertain conditions. Investors tend to pay excessive attention to 
the current information and ignore the previous information when they face a sudden 
or unexpected event, causing the share price to overshoot or undershoot. After the 
investors absorb the actual meaning of the events, the stock price will reverse, 
eventually returning to the intrinsic value. 
 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) found that investors would be more pessimistic about 
losing stocks and become more optimistic about profitable stocks. They show 
overreaction to both good and bad news. When a bull market is coming, the share price 
will continue to rise to what is considered an unacceptable level far beyond the 
investment value of the listed company. When a bear market is coming, the share price 
will continue to fall to a level investors cannot accept. The reasons include herd 
mentality, human emotion-driven irrationality and the resulting cognitive bias. As the 
market continues to rise, investors tend to become more optimistic. Because the actual 
operation has generated profits, such successful investment behaviour will enhance the 
mood of optimism and cause selective cognitive bias in information processing; that is, 
investors will be over sensitive to good news and insensitive to bad news. This 
emotional and cognitive state will strengthen the buying behaviour and form a 
reinforcing effect. When the market falls continuously, the opposite is true. Investors 
then become more pessimistic. Because the actual operation has resulted in a loss, such 
a failed investment operation will strengthen pessimism and cause selective cognitive 
bias; that is, investors will be over sensitive to bad news and insensitive to good news. 
Therefore, the market also forms a so-called overreaction. 
 
In the book of Irrational Exuberance, Robert Shiller (2005) considered that human 
irrational factors play a major role in overreaction. Historical lessons are not enough to 
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make people rational. Irrationality is the deep-rooted limitation of human beings. 
Professor Shiller once found in a study that when the Japanese stock market reached 
the top, only 14% of investors thought the stock market would plummet. However, 
when the stock market crashed, 32% of the investors thought the stock market would 
fall. Investors usually place too much consideration on recent experience and derive the 
latest trend from it, with little consideration for their deviations from the long-term 
average. In other words, the market is always overreactive. 
 
The overreaction theory provides justification of long-term reversal after certain events 
that affect the share price in the short term.  
 
3.3.4 Regret Theory 
 
Simultaneously developed by Loomes and Sugden (1982), Bell (1982), regret theory 
models choice under uncertainty, considering the effect of anticipated regret in 
decision-making. The human emotional response of regret is often experienced. The 
theory of regret aversion or anticipated regret proposes that when facing a decision, 
individuals might anticipate regret and thus incorporate in their choice their desire to 
eliminate or reduce this possibility. Regret is a negative emotion with a powerful social 
and reputational component and is central to the way humans learn from experience 
and to the human psychology of risk aversion. People are prone to mistakes in 
investment judgement and decision-making. They often feel very sad when this 
misoperation occurs. Therefore, in the process of investment, investors often show 
indecision to avoid regret. When deciding whether to sell a stock, investors are often 
influenced by the cost of buying at a higher or lower level than the current price. 
Because they are afraid of regret, they try their best to avoid it. 
 
In the investment process, pursuing pride is another motivation in addition to avoiding 
regret. Fear of regret and pursuit of pride result in short-term holding of profit-making 
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stocks and long-term holding of losing stock, which is called a selling effect. 
 
Assume that an investor holds two stocks. Stock A gains 20%, and stock B loses 20%; 
in the meantime, there is a new investment opportunity, and investors have to sell a 
stock for the investment. In this case, most investors tend to sell stock A rather than 
stock B because selling stock B will lead to regret in the previous buying decision, and 
selling stock A will give investors a sense of pride in making the right investment.  
 
Regret theory has a strong normative meaning. It violates the axiom of expected utility, 
which assumes that investment actions are strictly rational. Along with the hubris theory, 
the regret theory again suggests that market participants might not be as rational as 
assumed by the axiom of utility theory.  
 
3.3.5 Payment Methods 
 
The method of payment used in M&A is the most significant element explaining 
acquirer abnormal returns around the announcement of a takeover. The methods of 
payment that can be used to finance a takeover include cash, stock or a combination of 
the two. Different justifications are provided to explain the market reaction around the 
announcement of an acquisition. Information asymmetries between managers and 
investors, managerial ownership of the acquirer and the target firm and taxation 
considerations are the main explanations for the effect of the various methods of 
payments on bidder gains. Some studies include the method of payment as a 
determinant factor. In addition, target firm listing status has an important role impact 
on transactions.  
 
Carleton et al. (1983) give very good reasons for acquirers to use cash over stock 
exchange in M&A. First, mergers financed with cash are tax deductible, which is worth 
consideration in the decision of the method of payment. Market imperfections and 
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agency considerations urge managers to use cash to reduce uncertainties. In the case of 
hostile deals, cash can be more attractive to the target firm’s management.  
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) construct a model suggesting that in cases of high information 
asymmetry, firms are advised to use debt to finance their investment decisions rather 
than issuing equity and conclude that the firm is always better off issuing low-risk debt 
to finance its investments. 
 
Based on Myers and Majluf’s (1984) model, Travlos (1987) reported that mergers are 
usually common stock exchange offers, while tender offers are usually cash offers. His 
findings suggest that bidding firms suffer significant losses (-2.09%) when the 
exchange takes place using common stocks (merger), while they experience neutral 
abnormal returns (0.31%) when they offer cash (tender offer). He attributes the 
discrepancy to the information asymmetry hypothesis, different tax implications and 
the co-insurance effect of the combination of the two firms after the acquisition. 
 
Furthermore, Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990) argue that in addition to corporate 
control and tax implications, managerial ownership affects the choice of M&A 
financing. Specifically, the higher the managerial ownership fraction of the acquiring 
firm, the greater the probability of the acquisition being financed using cash rather than 
equity. 
 
Consistently, Blackburn, Dark and Hanson (1997) also report that the way the company 
is controlled has an impact on the gain or loss from M&A. Specifically, due to agency 
costs, manager-controlled companies suffer significant losses when they make mixed 
offers, while in the same case, owner-controlled companies enjoy significant profits.  
 
From the perspective of receiving payment, Fishman (1989) constructs a model and 
reports that cash offers serve as a deterrent to equity offer competition, and the targeted 
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company is more likely to reject a stock offer than a cash one.  
 
Based on an investigation of European bidders, both public and private, for the period 
1997-2000, Faccio and Masulis (2005) study the factors and determinants of payment 
choices between cash, equity or a combination of the two in M&A and report that bidder 
corporate control threats discourage stock financing, while bidder financial constraints 
encourage stock financing. Other reasons, such as excess liquidity and too many 
tangible assets as well as little unused debt capacity, also make stock more attractive 
than cash. When the target can be easily influenced by the bidder, stock is again 
preferred over cash. On the other hand, cash offers are preferable to the target when 
there are regulatory costs of stock offers and a bidder has special access to bank 
borrowing. In addition, cash is preferred when the bidder believes that its stock is 
undervalued. From the sellers’ perspective, stock offers do not involve tax payments, 
while cash financing enables the targets to minimize the risk faced, provides them with 
liquidity benefits and helps them avoid becoming a minority shareholder in a bidder 
with concentrated ownership. In addition, other factors, such as prior stock price run-
up and the market to book value of a bidder’s assets, can also influence the bidder’s 
choice of payment method. 
 
Martin (1996) also examines the trade-off of a company’s choice between cash and 
stock offers. His findings show that cash tender offers are usually completed faster than 
mergers, as according to Fishman’s proposition (1989), bidders tend to choose cash to 
avoid competition. In contrast, Martin (1996) argues that bidders with high growth 
opportunities are more likely to choose equity as a means of financing a takeover 
because managers are more flexible with stock offers, which better serve their own 
long-term investment plans. 
 
In terms of performance, the majority of empirical evidence has documented short-term 
negative abnormal returns for equity acquisitions. Based on the US samples engaged in 
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successful takeovers in the period 1972 to 1981, pure stock exchange bidding firms are 
documented by Travlos (1987) with significant losses at the announcement of the 
takeover proposal, while cash financing bidding firms show that their stockholders earn 
"normal" rates of return in the announcement period.  
 
Consistently, there is bountiful evidence supporting that cash acquisitions outperform 
stock acquisitions. Based on 161 successful cash offers, Bradley (1980) documents an 
average 9% increase in the market value for the bidding firms on their own shares. 
Consistently, in a sample of 199 acquisitions with 64 cash transactions and 118 
securities exchanges between 1970 and 1978, Wansley et al. (1983) show significant 
positive CARs of 6.17% for the bidding firms using cash payment. With a sample of 
167 acquiring firms, Travlos (1987) documents significant loss on pure stock exchanges 
and normal rate of returns on cash offers for acquirers. By comparing the short- and 
long-term performance of US bidders, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) report significant 
losses for the overall sample (with both stock and cash deals) in the three-year period 
after the acquisition. Stock acquisitions are found to significantly underperform cash 
deals. 
 
From a long-term perspective, the evidence about equity M&A performance is mixed. 
Using 947 US acquisitions during the period 1970-1989, Loughran and Vijh (1997) find 
a significantly negative excess return of -25% from complete stock mergers, whereas 
completed cash tender offers earn positive and significant excess returns of 61.7%. In 
addition, it is contended that the significant gain from acquisitions announced during 
high valuation periods reverses over time. (e.g., Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009); 
Rosen (2006)). Inconsistent with the long-term benefit of reversal, Savor and Lu (2009) 
find evidence that overvalued firms create value for long-term shareholders by using 
their equity as currency when the deal is completed. Consistent with Savor and Lu 
(2009), E. Vagenas-Nanos (2012) documents that market timers who take advantage of 
equity financing for the acquisition outperform those who do not time the market in 
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both the short and the long term.  
 
In conclusion, different payment methods have different influences on M&A. Moreover, 
when payment methods are considered in the context of market timing theory and 
signalling theory from the acquirers’ perspective, it seems contradictive to suggest 
proper payments, as overvalued acquirers are supposed to use stock exchange to 
conduct the deals, while others argue that timing the market would reveal the 
overvaluation of the bidder shares, thus leading to a reduction of the bidder value. The 
contradiction concerning the choice of payment method in the context of market timing 
theory and signalling theory represents a research gap.  
 
3.3.6 Market Timing Theory 
 
Equity market timing proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2002) following Stein (1996) 
plays very important roles in corporate financing decisions. Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
propose that capital structure is a cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity 
market and try to apply the theory to answer the question. The market timing (or 
windows of opportunity) theory argues that companies tend to finance from external 
equity when the cost of equity is low and prefer cash or debt otherwise. According to 
market timing theory, bid managers sometimes perceive their share price as mispriced 
by the market. When firms need to finance a particular project, they take advantage of 
overvalued equity and use internal funds or issue debt when they perceive that the cost 
of equity is high. How do they judge the valuation of bidder equity? On the one hand, 
due to information asymmetry, buyer managers may know themselves or the industry 
better. On the other hand, they may follow certain psychological or market patterns. For 
example, as suggested in chapter one, the 52-week high and low could be taken as 
useful reference points in measuring the buyer values.  
 
Market timing theory provides important justifications as well as specific tactics to 
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conduct M&A. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) present a model in which transactions are 
driven by the stock market valuations of the merging firms. In other words, corporate 
policies, such as debt and equity issuance, share repurchases, dividends and investments, 
are taken as responses to market mispricing. They propose that overvalued bidders take 
advantage of their overvalued equity to acquire less overvalued targets. However, 
opponents of the theory argue that the target along with the efficient market can detect 
the timer’s trick and thus give a negative feedback to the buyers.  
 
To explain why target managers are willing to take the overvalued shares, Rhodes-
Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) assume that even rational target managers also make 
mistakes, especially in an overall overvalued market. In particular, the complexity of 
the components of the miss-valuation, including market-wide and firm-specific effects, 
makes the target managers overestimate their firm-specific overvaluation when the 
market is overvalued. Therefore, target managers are more willing to make deals in an 
overheated market environment.  
 
Based on the miss-valuation hypothesis, which holds that market inefficiency has 
important effects on takeover activity, and the Q theory, which contends that takeovers 
of bad targets by good bidders tend to improve efficiency more than takeovers of good 
targets by bad bidders, Dong et. (2006) find significant evidence that highly valued 
bidders are more likely to use stock and less likely to use cash as a consideration, are 
willing to pay more relative to the target market price and earn lower announcement 
period returns.  
 
Consistently, Ang and Cheng (2006) provide evidence that overvalued firms are more 
likely to use equity in the acquisition process as the medium of payment. Ang and 
Cheng (2006) also document that a more overvalued bidder is positively associated 
with a higher probability of success for a takeover offer. Bouwman, Fuller and Nain 
(2009) demonstrate that acquisitions announced during hot market periods yield 
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significantly higher abnormal returns than those announced during depressed periods, 
although followed by a reversal. Rosen (2006) obtains a similar conclusion. Takeovers 
announced during high valuation merger periods outperform those announced during 
“cold” merger periods. Reversal is also observed in the long term. Managerial herding 
and investor sentiment are the driving forces for the long-term reversal documented by 
Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) and Rosen (2006), respectively. 
 
E. Vagenas-Nanos (2012) investigates both short- and long-term abnormal returns for 
the market timer and non-market timer and documents that acquirers who time the 
market and employ equity as a means of financing the acquisition perform better than 
those who do not. Vagenas-Nano provides direct evidence to support the market timing 
theory, suggesting that it is worthwhile for managers to time the market and undertake 
acquisitions.  
 
In addition, market timing theory has been tested with evidence from the G-7 countries 
(Mahajan and Tartaroglu 2008), Dutch firms (Bie and Haan 2007), and further evidence 
from US firms (Elliott, et al.;2007). The finding shows consistent and positive short-
term market timing effects. However, the long-term persistence differs considerably. 
 
Market timing theory claims that the overvalued bidders should take advantage of the 
value as the medium to acquire. This suggestion has been criticized, as the market might 
be able to catch the signal of bidders being overvalued. This contradiction between the 
two theories provides a research gap to be filled.  
 
3.3.7 Signalling theory 
 
In the context of M&A, research on the effectiveness of signals to reduce adverse 
uncertainty has been increasing. Evidence has indicated that a higher acquisition price 
does not guarantee the seller’s acceptance of an offer (e.g., Graebner and Eisenhardt, 
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2004) because a target firm may prefer a more credible and trustworthy buyer, just as 
an acquirer may want to choose targets with less valuation uncertainty (e.g., Graebner 
and Eisenhardt, 2004; Graebner, 2009). This is particularly true when stock is used as 
payment in the deals due to the impact of information asymmetry on the value of the 
acquirer’s resources and prospects.  
 
Signals can reduce the acquirers’ costs of searching for targets and assessing their value 
(e.g., Pollock and Gulati, 2007; Ragozzino and Reuer,2007) since targets with signals 
are more salient with less valuation uncertainty in the market. In addition, clear signals 
can increase target gains by reducing premium discounts that would arise from 
asymmetric information between buyers and sellers (e.g., Reuer, Tong, and Wu, 2012). 
Thus, the presence of clear signals promotes the success of worthwhile acquisitions in 
the M&A market, even when information asymmetries exist. 
 
In addition, targets’ signals can help acquirers distinguish high-quality targets from 
lower-quality ones, while it remains unknown whether signals conveyed by acquirers 
can have similar effects in facilitating M&A transactions. Similarly, targets’ signals on 
their resources and prospects clearly illustrate the potential synergies, while signals 
from an acquirer might be able to both directly and indirectly help facilitate M&A deals.  
 
The current literature reviews on the signalling effect are mainly interpreted from the 
target perspectives. From the buyer perspective, external investors must be convinced 
to finance M&A transactions. Acquirers with signals are more likely to access the 
financing for acquisitions on good terms, particularly when information asymmetries 
exist between the acquirer and its external investors in capital markets. Thus, acquirers’ 
signals may directly or indirectly help them engage in M&A deals. However, only a 
few studies have indirectly shed light on the effectiveness and efficiency of the signals 
delivered by the acquirers.  
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For example, the asymmetric information model developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) 
suggests that the method of payment may reflect bidders’ operational performance. 
Consistently, Tavlos (1987) contends that management will take advantage of the most 
beneficial payment method to signal the bidders’ intrinsic value. According to the theory, 
stock acquisitions are usually believed to occur when management takes advantage of 
the overvalued stock price, and the market is supposed to act negatively to the deals. 
On the other hand, cash financing occurs when the acquiring company has a favourable 
valuation for its future stock performance, thus representing a positive sign.  
 
In conclusion, signalling theory in the current literature is mainly applied in analysing 
the benefits of signals conveyed by target firms, yet little is known about the consistent 
efficiency implications of acquirers’ signals. This research analyses and compares the 
effectiveness and intensity of the bidders’ signals in the M&A market. 
 
3.3.8 Research Gap – The Contradiction of Payment Methods Derived from 
Market Timing Theory and the Signalling Effect 
 
Inspired by the target 52-week reference point theory initiated by Baker, Pan and 
Wurgler (2009), the second chapter discusses the impact of the dates of the bidder 52-
week high and low prices on M&A. The conclusion is that the dates have a significant 
impact on the completion and performances of the M&A, but conflicts exist in the 
internal logic of the impact, namely, the conflicting market timing and signalling 
theories behind these effects. Then, the third chapter mainly provides insight into the 
conflict behind these effects and the significance of the impact.  
 
Specifically, given that share prices fluctuate around the intrinsic value, market timing 
theory suggests that rational managers’ of bidders take advantage of the over-valued 
shares as a payment method to acquire fewer over-valued targets, while empirical 
studies reveal that market participants treat stock-exchange deals as a negative signal 
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of bidder over-valuation and thus promote cash payment. In existing literature, this 
empirical anti-stock exchange proposal (the signalling effect) has not been 
systematically discussed and analysed, providing chapter 3 with an opportunity to 
propose and enrich a signalling theory compared to market timing theory.  
 
Additionally, in chapter 3, based on the payment methods of stock exchanges and cash 
in M&A, bidders are categorized as market timers and signallers, respectively. 
Meanwhile, the timing of deal announcements (close to the 52-week high/low) is used 
to reflect the intensities of the market timing effect and signalling effect. By comparing 
the performances of market timers and signallers with different intensities, the chapter 
ranks the effects and provides pragmatic suggestions to bidder managers in practice. 
Through the discussion and comparison of these theoretical effects, the third chapter 
not only provides a very different angle to explain bidder CAR and BHAR from chapter 
2 but also proposes signalling effects, reconciles the conflicting timing theory and 
signalling effects, and provides suggestions regarding appropriate timing and payment 
methods. 
 
In conclusion, chapter 2 clarifies the timing, namely, “when” to acquire, and its 
influence on M&A, while chapter 3 considers “how” in terms of payment methods and 
systematically analyses the combined influence of “when” and “how” in a deal. In 
chapter 4, the most important participants in M&A – financial advisors as “who”, are 
more specifically discussed in terms of their effects on deals. In short, the three 
empirical chapters represent progressive and integrated research on “when”, “how” and 
“who” to conduct M&A and their impacts on a deal. 
 
As current signalling theories mainly concern the target signal efficiency on the 
performances of M&A, signals delivered by the acquirers should also be detected and 
studied. 
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Payment methods have been shown to significantly influence M&A differently. In line 
with market timing theory, overvalued acquirers are suggested to use stock exchange to 
conduct the deals, while opponents claim that the market takes stock exchange at high 
value as a bad signal of acquirers being overvalued, thus leading to a reduction of the 
bidder value. Therefore, the market timing theory and the negative signalling effects 
from the acquirers’ perspective are in conflict, proving a research gap for us to 
complement the signalling theory from the buyer perspective and reconcile the 
contradiction between the two sides.  
 
To reconcile the contradiction, we could divide the research subjects into market timers 
and signallers according to the payment methods and take the announcement proximity 
to the 52-week high or low as measures of the intensity of the timers and signallers. 
With the comparison, we can reconcile the contradiction and determine the most 
appropriate payment methods for different acquirers at different values. 
 
As market signallers, anti-signallers, market timers and anti-timers are newly defined, 
short- and long-term performance for market players has never been investigated. This 
study will calculate the 5-day event window of CARs as short-term performance and 
12 months, 36 months and 60 months of BHARs as the long-term performance. In the 
meantime, the performances are also compared to rank different categories of bidders.  
 
3.4 Hypotheses Development 
 
Different categories of bidders are influenced by different effects from market timing 
and signalling theories. Based on logic and current literature, the following hypotheses 
on bidder performances are developed: 
 
H1: Taking advantage of superior equity valuation, psychologically momentum and 
asymmetry information, as market timers, stock-financed bidders announcing the deals 
near the 52-week peak date are expected to achieve positive performance in the short 
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term (timing effect). In the long term, the synergies created from the deal might not be 
as good as expected; therefore, the value of the timer shares is expected to gradually 
reverse.  
 
H2: When deal announcement is at or near the 52-week high date in an efficient market, 
if a bidder deliberately refuses to take advantage of its superior equity value, it sends a 
clear positive signal of its confidence in future performance in the short-term window, 
which will bring positive feedback from the market (signalling effect). Meanwhile, in 
the long term, once the signaller performance does not reach the market’s optimistic 
expectation, the bidders’ BHAR would be reversed. 
 
H3: In the comparison between the market timers and market signallers, the market 
timers’ timing effects are hedged by the negative market perception that the bidder is 
taking advantage of overvaluation. On the other hand, the signaller’s positive signal 
itself is based on giving up a relatively weaker potential positive timing effect. 
Therefore, signallers are expected to outperform timers in the short term. In the long 
term, as the signallers’ high bidder share prices would not be considered as overvalued 
as the prices of the timers, the performance of these bidders is expected to reverse less 
than that of stock-financed M&A bidders announced near the 52-week peak (signalling 
effect outstrips timing effect). 
 
H4: Since anti-timers (acquiring by shares near the 52-week low) have no value 
advantage, no favourable momentum and are not admired by the market in the most 
recent year, the poorest short-term performance would be expected given their 
momentum. In the long term, since the market does not have overestimated 
expectations for performance, the anti-timers’ performance would experience a lower 
reversal than market timers’ performance.  
 
H5: When anti-signallers announce acquisition by cash at or near the 52-week low, 
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although the announcement might arouse expectation for bidders’ future synergies, the 
52-week low might still exert a negative influence on the bidder due to the low 
momentum. Therefore, they are expected to have poorer short-term performance than 
the highly approved market signallers with the 52-week high momentum. In the long 
term, because there is no reversal due to overvaluation or high profile signals with 
superior expectation, the anti-signallers should experience the lowest reversals.  
 
3.5 Research Methodology  
3.5.1 Samples 
 
The sample consists of US takeovers in the period between 1/1/1985 and 03/31/2015. 
The announcements and relevant financial indices were collected by Thomson One 
Banker, while stock prices were collected from WRDS. For a deal to be included in the 
sample, it needs to meet the following criteria: 
 
Both the acquirers and the target firms are US listed firms due to the previously 
mentioned requirement for an overall efficient market; 
The bidders acquire at least 50% of the shares of the target firms to ensure that the 
transaction has a significant influence on the stock market; 
The deal values are at least $1 million to ensure the significance of the acquisitions; 
The financing of the acquisition is either 100% in stock or 100% in cash to simplify the 
comparison of benefits between the two methods for completed deals, while for 
uncompleted deals, as they have not been finished, all of the announced deal financing 
methods, such as pure cash, pure stock exchange and combinations, are included in the 
research sample； 
When an acquirer has more than one deal within 5 years, only the most recent deal 
remains in the sample； 
Acquirers without continuous stock price records around the announcement period are 
eliminated; 
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In total, 1168 samples of cash acquisitions and 806 samples of stock exchange deals 
meet the above criteria.  
 
3.5.2 Research Method and Variables 
 
To identify market signals and anti-signallers, the following procedures are adopted:  
a. Determine the announcement date of the M&A;  
b. Identify the date of the historical high and low during the previous year (52 weeks) 
from the announcement date; 
c. Calculate how many trading days the announcement is from the previous 52-week 
high and low; 
d. Since there are approximately 254 trading days in a year, calculate the number of 
days the announcement is from the previous 52-week high and low as a percentage of 
the average of 254 trading days to measure the distance;  
e. For cash bidders, if the result from step d is below a specific percentage, the deal is 
classified as market signaller (anti-signaller) deal. The following specific formulas are 
used to classify market signallers and anti-signallers. 
If α%
254
_52____
=
highwfromntannouncemeofDays
DNH , then the cash bidder 
is classified as a market signaller. 
If α%
254
_52____
=
lowwfromntannouncemeofDays
DNL  , then the acquirer is 
classified as an anti-signaller. 
f. Similar formulas are used to classify market timer and anti-timer for stock exchange 
acquisitions, as follows: 
If α%
254
_52____
=
highwfromntannouncemeofDays
DNH , then the stock bidder 
is classified as a market timer. 
If α%
254
_52____
=
lowwfromntannouncemeofDays
DNL  , then the stock 
acquirer is classified as an anti-timer. 
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To obtain enough samples and be consistent with the 5% significance level, α is also 
determined to be 5%. In addition, as a rigorous and robust complement, 20% is a 
meaningful measurement due to the 80/20 rule. 
 
When hypothesis testing is conducted, the null hypothesis is usually assumed to be true, 
and the probability of a difference is computed, which is compared to the significance 
level. If the probability is less than or equal to the significance level, then the null 
hypothesis is rejected, and the outcome is said to be statistically significant. 
Traditionally, experimenters have used the 0.1 level, 0.05 level, 0.01 level, although the 
choice of levels is largely subjective. On the other hand, two kinds of errors can be 
made in significance testing: type (1), a true null hypothesis can be incorrectly rejected, 
and type (2), a false null hypothesis can fail to be rejected. Choosing the 0.1 level will 
increase the risk of making a type 2 error, while choosing the 0.01 level will lead to a 
higher risk of a type 1 error. The significance level of 0.05 is a reasonable level to 
balance the risk of both type 1 and type 2 errors.  
 
In this study, for consistency with E. Vagenas-Nanos (2012), the first scholar who 
proposed a clear definition of a market timer when a bidder announces a deal at 5%/15% 
close to the 52-week high, this chapter categorizes the market timer and signaller at the 
5%/20% level close to the bidder 52-week high. As the 5% significance level is 
reasonable to balance the risk of both type 1 and type 2 errors, it can allow maintenance 
of a sufficient number of sample cases in the research. 
 
Short-term Event Study Methodology: 
 
To evaluate the impact of M&A announcements near or at the 52-week high or low, 
abnormal returns can be calculated. An abnormal return is the difference between actual 
earnings and the normal return during the event window and is calculated as follows: 
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ARit = Ait – Rit 
 
where Ait is the actual earnings of bidder i on day t, Rit is the normal return of bidder i 
on day t (derived from the capital asset pricing model - CAPM), and ARit is an 
abnormal return of the same bidder on the same day.  
 
According to the CAPM along with a 30-day estimated window, Rit = αi + βi Rmt + 
εit, where Rmt is the monthly return of the market index of the S&P 500 during the 
same period.  
 
To calculate the acquiring firms’ short-term performance, Stata 12 is employed for 
calculation of the abnormal returns using the market model as follows: 
 
The CAR for the 5-day window of (-2,+2) around the announcement date is calculated 
according to the following equation: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡1
 
where CARi(t1, t2) is the CAR for the 5-day window of (-2,+2) around the 
announcement date with cross sections of the bidder i. 
 
Long-term Event Study Methodology: 
 
The 12-month BHAR approach advocated by Barber and Lyon (1997) is employed to 
examine the long-term abnormal stock returns in the study. The BHAR is computed as: 
 +−+=
T
mt
T
iti RRBHAR
11
)1()1(
 
where Rit is the monthly return for company i and Rmt is the monthly return of the 
market index of S&P 500. According to Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999), the skewness-
adjusted bootstrap t-statistics procedure is employed to compute the statistical 
significance of the abnormal returns.  
 
Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test: 
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Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which is also known as the Mann-Whitney two-sample 
statistic (Wilcoxon 1945; Mann and Whitney 1947), is used in this chapter to compare 
the short- and long-term performances of the market timers, signallers, anti-timers and 
anti-signallers in groups. The test is a method corresponding to the t-test of independent 
samples. When normal distribution, homogeneity of variance and other aspects cannot 
meet the requirements of the t-test, the rank-sum test can be used. The assumption is 
that if the two samples are different, their central position will be different.  
 
Multivariate Analysis: 
Ordinary least square regressions are conducted to discuss the relationship among the 
bidder performances, signaller, anti-signallers, timers, anti-timer and other control 
variables. The formulas are illustrated as follows: 
Performance= a+b(Signaller)+c(controls)+ ε 
Performance= a+b(Anti-signaller)+c(controls)+ ε 
Performance= a+b(Timer)+c(controls)+ ε 
Performance= a+b(Anti-timer)+c(controls)+ ε 
 
A number of factors, such as acquirers’ book-to-market ratio, relative size, acquirer size, 
and industry diversification, have been documented to affect the performance of 
acquiring firms. (Rau and Vermaelen1998, Fuller at al., 2002, Asquith at al., 1983, 
Moeller et al., 2004, Doukas and Kan, 2004). To compare the effect of the newly 
considered stock price level at announcement and other documented acquirer 
characteristics on CARs and BHARs, multivariate regression analyses are conducted to 
regress announcement abnormal returns (CARs) and BHARs against the explanatory 
variables that have been proven to affect bidder performance. In all of the regressions, 
the vector of the explanatory variables includes signallers with a attributed the value of 
1, which announce pure cash acquisition with 5% (20%) away from the date of the 52-
week high, 0 otherwise. Market timers, which announce pure stock acquisition with 5% 
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(20%) away from the date of the 52-week high, are attributed the value of 1, 0 otherwise. 
Anti-signallers, which announce pure cash acquisition with 5% (20%) away from the 
date of the 52-week low, are attributed the value of 1, 0 otherwise. Anti-timers, which 
announce pure stock acquisition with 5% (20%) away from the date of the 52-week low, 
are attributed the value of 1, 0 otherwise. A dummy variable for diversifying deals takes 
the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the 
target’s, and 0 otherwise. The size of acquirers is measured by the log of the market 
value a month before the deal’s announcement. Bidder’s book-to-market is measured 
by the bidder’s net book value of assets divided by its market value a month before the 
announcement of the deal; a deal’s relative size is the ratio between the deal value and 
the market value of the bidder firm.  
 
Rigorousness and Robustness – Two-stage Least Squares Regressions 
 
As determined in chapter 2, the explanatory variable PNH is an endogenous variable to 
bidder performances in M&A, while in chapter 3, as the definitions of signallers and 
timers are derived from a combination of announcement timing and payment methods; 
therefore, signallers and timers may also have an endogenous problem if the timing is 
measured by PNH/PNL. Naturally, in this chapter, instead of PNH/PNL, signallers and 
timers should be constructed by PNH’s valid instrumental variables DNH and DNL as 
they have been confirmed to be valid instrumental variables to the endogenous variable 
of PNH. Specifically, while a signaller (p) is defined as a cash bidder with PNH less 
than 5% or 20%, the signaller, defined as a cash bidder with DNH less than 5% or 20%, 
should be the signaller (p)’s instrumental variable. While a timer (p) is defined as a 
stock bidder with PNH less than 5% or 20%, the timer, defined as a stock bidder with 
DNH less than 5% or 20%, should be the timer (p)’s instrumental variable.    
 
In this chapter, Two-stage Least Squares regressions and Hausman tests are conducted 
to discuss the potential endogeneity of the key variables of the signaller (p) and timer 
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(p). Surprisingly, the results in the following table from the Hausman test for the two-
stage least squares regression show that basically no endogenous issues exist with the 
regression using signaller (p)/timer (p), reflecting no systematic difference in hiring a 
signaller (p)/timer (p) or using their instrumental variables signaller/timer in the 
regressions. The phenomenon indicates that the combination of payment methods and 
announcement timing is another useful tool to relieve the endogenous influence of 
bidder timing on performance. For the purpose of consistency and simplicity, chapter 3 
still uses DHN/DNL to construct the variables of signaller/timer in the analysis.  
 
Hausman test to show whether “signaller” is a valid instrument of “signaller (p)” at 
the level of 5% to regress bidder performances. (H0: the difference in coefficients is 
not systematic) 
 CAR BHAR12 BHAR36 BHAR60 
Prob>chi2 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 0.993 
Hausman test to show whether “signaller” is a valid instrument of “signaller (p)” at 
the level of 20% to regress bidder performances. (H0: the difference in coefficients 
is not systematic) 
 CAR BHAR12 BHAR36 BHAR60 
Prob>chi2 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
Hausman test to show whether “timer” is a valid instrument of “timer (p)” at the level 
of 5% to regress bidder performances. (H0: the difference in coefficients is not 
systematic) 
 CAR BHAR12 BHAR36 BHAR60 
Prob>chi2 0.1346 0.9998 0.9999 1.0000 
Hausman test to show whether “timer” is a valid instrument of “timer (p)” at the level 
of 20% to regress bidder performances. (H0: the difference in coefficients is not 
systematic) 
 CAR BHAR12 BHAR36 BHAR60 
Prob>chi2 0.9956 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
3.6 Empirical Results 
 
Table 3.1 presents the time series distribution of takeovers by market signallers and 
anti-signallers. The summary statistics provide information on the acquisitions from 
January 1985 to March 2015. Signallers are classified as follows: among the 1168 cash 
103 
 
deals (both completed and failed), if the days of the announcement date away from the 
52-week peak (low) as a percentage of 254, the average number of trading days in one 
year, is below a specific percentage (5% and 20% in this research), this deal is classified 
as a market signaller (anti-signaller) deal. The following formulas are used to classify 
market signallers and anti-signallers. 
If DNH (Number of Workdays From 52-week High to Date of Announcement/254) <α, 
then the cash deal acquirer is classified as a market signaller. 
If DNL (Number of Workdays From 52-week Low to Date of Announcement/254) < α, 
then the cash deal acquirer is classified as an anti-signaller. There are 208, 141, 363, 
and 288 total market signallers (α at 5%), market signallers (α at 20%), anti-signallers 
(α at 5%) and anti-signallers (α at 20%), respectively. 
 
(Table 3.1) 
 
Table 3.2 presents the time series distribution of takeovers by market timers and anti-
timers each year. The summary statistics provide acquisitions from January 1985 to 
March 2015. Market timers are classified as follows: among the 806 equity-financed 
deals (both completed and failed), if the days of the announcement date away from the 
52-week peak (low) as a percentage of 254, the average number of trading days in one 
year, is below a specific percentage (α at 5% and 20% in this research), this deal is 
classified as market timer (anti-timer) deal. The following formulas are used to classify 
market timers and anti-timers. 
 
If DNH (Number of Workdays From 52-week High to Date of Announcement/254) < 
α, then the equity-financed acquirer is classified as a market timer. 
If DNL (Number of Workdays From 52-week Low to Date of Announcement/254) < α, 
then the equity-financed acquirer is classified as an anti-timer. There are 142, 93, 276, 
and 198 market timer (α at 5%), market timer (α at 20%), anti-timer (α at 5%) and anti-
timer (α at 20%) deals, respectively.  
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(Table 3.2) 
 
Table 3.3 summarizes CARs (-2,+2) and BHARs for 12, 36 and 60 months post-
acquisition announcement for the overall completed and failed samples.  
 
As the normal distribution and homogeneity of variance for the CARs and BHARs 
cannot meet the requirements of the t-test, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are conducted in 
this chapter to determine whether the cash bidders and stock exchange bidders have 
significant differences in terms of CARs and BHARs.  
 
The results document that cash-financed deals perform significantly better than equity-
financed transactions in the short term measured by CAR and in the long term measured 
by 12-month, 36-month and 60-month BHARs. The results are consistent with those of 
Bradley (1980), Travlos (1987), Wansley et. (1987), Loughran and Vijh (1997), and 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000): cash deals outperform stock exchange deals. The results 
indicate the market preference of cash payment and thus document a negative signalling 
effect from the stock exchange deal and an optimistic signal from the cash payment. 
 
Overtime, all acquirers’ gains would reverse or deteriorate. The reasons for the long-
term reversals could include the gradual process of digesting the negative signal and 
unrealized superior expectation, according to the concepts of managerial herding and 
investor sentiment from Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) and Rosen (2006), 
respectively. 
 
(Table 3.3) 
 
Table 3.4 presents and compares short-term abnormal returns (CARs; -2,+2) for market 
timers, anti-timers, signallers, and anti-signallers. 
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The results disclose a negative mean of CARs for market timers, denying the market 
timing effect proposed in H1 (stock-financed bidders announcing the deals near the 52-
week peak date are expected to achieve positive performance due to superior equity 
price and run-up momentum in the short term) and indicating that the efficient US 
market does not seem to approve of bidders’ attempt to take advantage of the equity 
with announcement timing near the 52-week high date. For this reason, in an efficient 
market, Eugene (1965) argued that there is no such thing as unfair value for stocks 
because investors are never able to purchase undervalued stocks or sell stocks at inflated 
prices. As a result, investors have no opportunity to outperform the overall market 
through expert stock selection or market timing.  
 
In comparison, the results show a positive mean of CARs for market signallers, which 
is consistent with H2 (when M&A announcement is near the date of the 52-week high 
in an efficient market, if a bidder deliberately refuses to take advantage of its high share 
value, it clearly sends a positive signal of its confidence in the future performance in a 
short-term window, which will bring positive feedback from the market.  
 
According to panel B, market signallers outperform timers in terms of CAR, which 
supports H3 (signallers are expected to perform better than timers in the short term 
because the market timers’ timing effects are hedged by the negative market perception 
that they are taking advantage of overvaluation, while the signaller’s positive signal 
itself is based on giving up a relatively weaker potential positive timing effect).  
 
Anti-signallers perform the best in terms of CAR, even significantly better than 
signallers. This conclusion is inconsistent with H5, in which anti-signallers are expected 
to have lower short-term performance than the highly approved market signallers with 
52-week high momentum. This could be because when the cash bidder share prices are 
close to the 52-week low, the expectation of resilience is greater than the 52-week high 
lifting momentum. This justification could also be used to explain that anti-timers 
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perform significantly better than timers in terms of CAR (also rejecting H4: since anti-
timers have no value advantage and were not admired by the market in the most recent 
year, with the unfavourable momentum, the poorest short-term performance would be 
expected). 
 
(Table 3.4) 
 
Table 3.5 unfolds 12-month BHARs for market signallers, anti-signallers, market timers 
and anti-timers.  
 
All categories of the samples have negative and reversed 12-month BHARs after the 
announcement of the transactions, which is consistent with H1 for timers (in the long 
term, after the overvaluation is perceived by the market, the value of the timer shares 
are expected to be gradually reversed) and H2 (once the signaller performance does not 
reach the market’s superior expectation, the bidders’ BHARs would be reversed). 
 
The performance of signallers reverses significantly less (perform better) than that of 
timers in the 12-month period. As predicted in H3, signallers’ high bidder share prices 
are not taken as overvalued as timers’, and the performance of these bidders is expected 
to reverse less than that of stock-financed M&A announced near the 52-week peak in a 
longer term. 
 
Anti-signallers reverse the least, while market timers perform the worst measured by 
the 12-month BHAR; this conclusion is consistent with H5 (in the long term, because 
there is no reversal from overvaluation or from high profile signals with superior 
expectation, the anti-signallers should experience the lowest reversal). Anti-timers 
reverse less than timers, although the difference is not significant, consistent with H4, 
which proposes that in the long term, since the market does not have overestimated 
expectations for the performance, anti-timers would experience lower reversal than 
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market timers would. 
 
In table 3.5, the results show that although signallers’ 12-month BHARs reversed from 
the positive CARs (table 3.4), they consistently achieve either better CARs or less 
deteriorated 12-month BHARs than the timers, demonstrating their superior 
performances in both the short and long term.  
 
In terms of the comparison between anti-signallers and anti-timers over time, both of 
their 12-month BHARs reverse significantly from positive CARs. Meanwhile, similar 
to signallers and timers, anti-signallers also have either better CARs or less deteriorated 
12-month BHARs than anti-timers. 
 
(Table 3.5) 
 
Table 3.6 shows and compares 36-month BHARs for market signallers, anti-signallers, 
market timers and anti-timers. Consistent with the 12-month BHARs, the effects are 
even more obvious, as all categories of the samples again have negative and reversed 
36-month BHARs after the announcement of the transaction. General timers (α at the 
20% level) perform significantly worse than general signallers (α at the 20% level), 
while general anti-signallers (α at the 20% level) lose less than anti-timers measured by 
36-month BHAR. All anti-signallers are better off than signallers, while all anti-timers 
are better off than timers in terms of 36-month BHARs. All of the hypotheses from H1 
to H5 involving reversals in the long term are empirically proven correct according to 
this table. To summarize, 
 
A. All signallers, timers, anti-signallers, and anti-timers experience reversal in terms of 
36-month BHARs. 
 
B. Ranked in terms of decreasing performance measured by the 36-month BHARs, 
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anti-signallers outperform anti-timers, followed by signallers and timers.  
 
(Table 3.6) 
 
Table 3.7 presents the results of the market-signalling effect on the acquirers’ short- and 
long-term performance. The table depicts regression estimates of the acquirer’s (-2,+2) 
day CAR surrounding the announcement as well as regression estimates of BHARs for 
12 and 36 months post-acquisition announcement, controlling for market-signalling 
effects and other deal and acquirer characteristics. Being a market signaller (α at both 
5% and 20% levels) positively affects an acquirer’s CAR (short-term performance) and 
12-month BHAR, while it is negatively associated with the 36-month BHAR; however, 
the influences are not significant. Controlling the other major variables and categorizing 
the bidders as signallers, Adv_rank does not seem to significantly affect the bidder 
performances, leaving further room for discussion about whether investors are wasting 
money by hiring top-tier advisors. 
 
(Table 3.7) 
 
Table 3.8 presents the results of the market timing effect on acquirers’ short- and long-
term performance. The table depicts regression estimates of the acquirers’ (-2,+2) day 
CAR surrounding the announcement as well as regression estimates of BHARs for 12 
and 36 months post-acquisition announcement, controlling for market timing effects 
and other deal and acquirer characteristics. Being a market timer (α at the 5% level) 
negatively and significantly affects an acquirer’s 12-month BHAR, while being a 
market timer (α at the 20% level) negatively and significantly affects an acquirer’s CAR, 
12-month BHAR, and 36-month BHAR, which again proves that the market is fully 
aware that the bid managers are taking advantage of their peak stock price in the 
transactions. Because signallers from Table 3.7 do not obviously affect bidder 
performance, market timers are expected to perform significantly worse than signallers 
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at all times. This result is in line with the results obtained from Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 
as well as with hypothesis H3 concerning the performance comparison between market 
signallers and timers. Consistent with table 3.7, Adv_rank has a mixed and 
nonsignificant effect on all levels of bidder performances given that bidders are timers 
and other variables are controlled, indicating an over-estimation of the advisors’ 
contribution in M&A. 
 
(Table 3.8) 
 
Table 3.9 presents the results of the anti-signalling effect on acquirers’ short- and long-
term performance. It depicts regression estimates of the acquirers’ (-2,+2) day CAR 
surrounding the announcement as well as regression estimates of BHARs for 12 and 36 
months post-acquisition announcement, controlling for anti-signalling effects and other 
deal and acquirer characteristics. Anti-signallers (α at the 5% level) have significantly 
positive long-term 36-mont BHAR, while anti-signallers (α at the 20% level) generally 
have significantly positive CAR and long-term 36-month BHAR. However, in the 
medium term measured by 12-month BHAR, being an anti-signaller does not 
significantly affect performance. This result is consistent with Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6, 
in which the anti-signallers experience negative long-term results, but their 
performance is much better than that of signallers, anti-timers and timers, indicating 
that anti-signallers reverse the least in the long term. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, 
when the bidder’s price is at or close to the 52-week low and announced as a cash deal, 
the expected resilience at the important psychological reference point is higher than the 
52-week high lifting momentum in the short term, while in the long term, anti-signallers 
do not have much room to experience deteriorating performance, as the price was at the 
52-week low before announcement, and naturally, such bidders would experience lower 
reversal than market signallers. Controlling the other major variables and categorizing 
the bidders as anti-signallers, Adv_rank has a positive but nonsignificant effect on the 
bidder performances, demonstrating mild synergies created by better advisors when the 
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cash bidder price is close to the 52-week low. 
 
(Table 3.9) 
 
Table 3.10 presents the results of the anti-timing effect on acquirers’ short- and long-
term performance. It depicts regression estimates of the acquirers’ (-2,+2) day CAR 
surrounding the announcement as well as regression estimates of BHARs for 12 and 36 
months post-acquisition announcement, controlling for anti-timing effects and other 
deal and acquirer characteristics. Being an anti-timer (α at the 5% level) is associated 
with positive performance as measured by CAR, 12-month and 36-month BHAR, 
especially the significant 36-month BHAR. This result is also consistent with the 
previous analysis, in which the anti-timers experience negative long-term results, but 
their performance is still better than that of the timers, indicating that anti-timers 
experience less reversal than timers in the long term, as the market does not have 
overestimated expectations for the performance; therefore, they would experience 
lower reversal than market timers. Controlling the other major variables and 
categorizing the bidders as anti-timers, in general, Adv_rank also has a nonsignificant 
positive effect on the bidder performances, demonstrating very weak synergies created 
by better advisors when the stock exchange bidder price is close to the 52-week low. 
 
(Table 3.10) 
3.7 Conclusion and Discussion 
 
Market timing theory argues that high-valued bidders should use stock exchange to 
acquire in order to take advantage of their share prices, while the signalling theory 
suggests that stock exchange is actually a negative signal to the market expressing that 
the bidder is overvalued. This chapter seeks to determine which is the dominant effect 
in M&A when the bidder announces M&A at or near the 52-week high or low.  
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Specifically, this chapter uses payment method as a fundamental criterion to categorize 
market timers and signallers, while it uses the nearness of bidders’ M&A announcement 
date to the 52-week high or low as an effective intensity measurement for the market 
timing and signalling effects in both the short and long terms. The market players are 
divided mainly into 4 categories: market timers, signallers, anti-timers and anti-
signallers. Each player performs differently due to different intensive timing or 
signalling effects. Comparison of the performances of the four categories of market 
players clarifies the dominant power from market timing and signalling from the bidder 
perspective. 
 
In the short term, being a market timer entails a significantly negative CAR, which is 
not consistent with the traditional market timing theory. The result shows that the 
market takes a bidder announcement date close to the peak as an immediate negative 
signal in the transaction. In the long term, market timers’ performance experiences the 
most reversal; thus, the theory is not applicable. 
 
For a signaller, announcing the cash deal at or near the 52-week high date entails a 
positive CAR, which is in line with signalling theory. In the long term, similar to the 
market timers, signallers’ performance also reverses, but the reversal is significantly 
less than market timers.  
  
Anti-timers and anti-signallers have better and more stable performance than timers and 
signallers, respectively. They also experience significantly less performance reversal 
than market timers and signallers.  
 
Among the four categories of market players, anti-signallers have the best possible 
CAR and BHARs, while the timers have the worst CAR and BHARs. 
 
In addition, under the influence of the proximity of the announcement to the 52-week 
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low, anti-signallers and anti-timers lose the least in M&A, and the “psychological 
reference point” established from the perspective of the acquiring firms can be 
reaffirmed.   
 
This “reference point” is in contrast to that from the perspective of the target, which 
considers how listed targets’ 52-week high price affects purchase price. From this point 
of view, the new reference point from the perspective of the acquiring firms would 
supplement the target reference point theory, traditional market timing theory and 
signalling theory.  
 
Since the long-term gains of all acquirers have reversed, is it a vain effort to conduct 
M&A at all? What are the most important factors affecting long-term success? 
Identification of these factors would enhance the efficiency of M&A transactions. 
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Table 3.1 Sample tabulates of market signallers and anti-signallers. 
The research objects include signallers, which announce pure cash acquisition a certain number of 
days away from the 52-week high as a percentage of 254 (5% and 20% in this research), the average 
number of trading days, and receive the value of 1, 0 otherwise. Anti-signallers, which announce 
pure cash acquisitions a certain number of days away from the 52-week low as a percentage of 254 
(5% and 20% in this research), the average number of trading days, receive the value of 1, 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
Year 
Market-Signaler - 
5% 
Anti-Signaler - 5% 
Market-Signaler - 
20% 
Anti-Signaler - 20% 
1985 8 1 11 3 
1986 6 4 12 6 
1987 3 5 7 11 
1988 3 1 4 7 
1989 8 4 12 6 
1990 2 7 3 11 
1991 0 0 2 1 
1992 2 1 3 1 
1993 6 2 11 6 
1994 3 5 3 10 
1995 10 0 18 5 
1996 11 4 18 12 
1997 17 4 24 8 
1998 9 10 18 20 
1999 9 10 11 20 
2000 7 31 11 58 
2001 5 6 16 10 
2002 1 2 9 5 
2003 8 1 11 1 
2004 5 3 12 8 
2005 7 7 9 13 
2006 8 3 14 5 
2007 9 4 17 8 
2008 1 11 5 15 
2009 2 2 4 5 
2010 7 2 11 5 
2011 5 2 15 6 
2012 6 3 16 5 
2013 24 2 28 4 
2014 16 4 28 13 
2015 0 0 0 0 
Total 208 141 363 288 
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Table 3.2 Sample tabulates of market timers and anti-timers. 
The research objects include timers, which announce pure stock exchange acquisitions a certain 
number of days away from the 52-week high as a percentage of 254 (5% and 20% in this research), 
the average number of trading days, receive the value of 1, 0 otherwise. Anti-timers, which announce 
pure stock exchange acquisitions a certain number of days away from the 52-week low as a 
percentage of 254 (5% and 20% in this research), the average number of trading days, receive the 
value of 1, 0 otherwise. 
Year Market-Timer - 5% Anti-Timer - 5% Market-Timer - 20% Anti-Timer - 20% 
1985 3 2 5 4 
1986 3 2 9 4 
1987 0 4 1 5 
1988 1 0 2 0 
1989 8 4 15 7 
1990 2 6 2 6 
1991 4 1 8 1 
1992 4 0 6 6 
1993 5 1 9 2 
1994 4 6 12 9 
1995 14 5 22 10 
1996 11 4 16 9 
1997 16 3 33 9 
1998 5 7 20 25 
1999 10 11 16 19 
2000 9 11 21 24 
2001 2 7 6 16 
2002 1 1 3 4 
2003 1 3 8 4 
2004 1 1 4 1 
2005 4 2 5 2 
2006 5 1 8 3 
2007 3 4 7 5 
2008 2 5 2 8 
2009 1 0 2 7 
2010 4 0 7 0 
2011 3 0 4 1 
2012 2 0 3 1 
2013 4 0 6 1 
2014 10 2 14 5 
2015 0 0 0 0 
Total 142 93 276 198 
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Table 3.3 Summary of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs; -2,+2) and buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) for 12, 36 and 60 months post-acquisition announcement for the 
overall completed and failed samples with different payment methods. 
The variable CAR is the 5-day CAR from CRSP centred on the announcement date from Thomson. 
BHAR12/36/60 is the 12-month, 36-month and 60-month BHARs from CRSP. Significance levels 
at 0.1%, 1% and 5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cash 
CARs  
(-2,+2) 
Stock 
CARs  
(-2,+2) 
Cash 
BHARs 
12 Months 
Stock 
BHARs 
12 Months 
Cash 
BHARs 
36 Months 
Stock 
BHARs 
36 Months 
Cash 
BHARs 
60 Months 
Stock 
BHARs 
60 Months 
Mean .0159619 -.0258591 -.1234283 -.303903 -.3918087 -.6607655 -.5632729 -.7448956 
Std. 
Dev. 
.1016474 .1477947 .4243346 .4757357 .7018792 .7713196 .8184602 1.3613 
N 1058 735 931 661 676 480 506 354 
P-Value 
(Wilcox
on rank-
sum test 
diff=0) 
0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
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Table 3.4 Results of comparisons of short-term abnormal returns (CARs; -2,+2) for market 
signallers, anti-signallers, market timers and anti-timers. 
The variable CAR is the 5-day CAR from CRSP centred on the announcement date from Thomson. 
The research objects include variable signallers, which announce pure cash acquisitions a certain 
number of days away from the 52-week peak as a percentage of 254 (5% and 20% in this research), 
the average number of trading days, receive the value of 1, 0 otherwise. Anti-signallers, which 
announce pure cash acquisitions a certain number of days away from the 52-week low as a 
percentage of 254 (5% and 20% in this research), the average number of trading days, receive the 
value of 1, 0 otherwise. Anti-timers, which announce pure stock exchange acquisitions a certain 
number of days away from the 52-week low as a percentage of 254 (5% and 20% in this research), 
the average number of trading days, receive the value of 1, 0 otherwise. Significance levels at 0.1%, 
1% and 5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Signaler 
- 5% 
Timer  
- 5% 
Anti-
Signaler 
 - 5% 
Anti-Timer 
- 5% 
Signaler 
 - 20% 
Timer  
- 20% 
Anti-
Signaler - 
20% 
Anti-Timer  
- 20% 
 
CARs 
(-2,+2) 
CARs  
(-2,+2) 
CARs  
(-2,+2) 
CARs  
(-2,+2) 
CARs  
(-2,+2) 
CARs  
(-2,+2) 
CARs  
(-2,+2) 
CARs  
(-2,+2) 
Mean .0161594 -.029888 .0204752 .0133333 .0085464 -.0451911 .031444 .0011402 
Std. Dev. .0060522 .0118846 .0134357 .0267709 .0048386 .008006 .0079383 .014739 
N 204 135 137 92 352 265 282 190 
Panel B 
Signaler - 
5% 
Timer 
 - 5% 
Anti-
Signaler 
- 5% 
Anti-Timer  
- 5% 
Signaler 
- 20% 
Timer - 
20% 
Anti-
Signalr - 
20% 
Anti-Timer 
 - 20% 
P-Value 
(Wilcoxo
n rank-
sum test 
H0: 
diff=0) 
0.0011** 0.1703 0.0000*** 0.0036** 
 
Signaler 
- 5% 
Anti-
Signaler - 
5% 
Timer 
- 5% 
Anti-Timer  
- 5% 
Signaler 
 - 20% 
Anti-
Signaler - 
20% 
Timer - 
20% 
Anti-Timer 
 - 20% 
P-Value 
(Wilcoxo
n rank-
sum test 
H0: 
diff=0) 
0.3176 0.1256 0.0001*** 0.0005*** 
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Table 3.5 Results of comparisons of 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for 
market signallers, anti-signallers, market timers and anti-timers. 
The variable BHAR12 is the 12-month BHAR from CRSP. The research objects include variable 
signallers, which announce pure cash acquisitions a certain number of days away from the 52-week 
peak as a percentage of 254 (5% and 20% in this research), the average number of trading days, 
receive the value of 1,  0 otherwise. Anti-signallers, which announce pure cash acquisitions a 
certain number of days away from the 52-week low as a percentage of 254 (5% and 20% in this 
research), the average number of trading days, receive the value of 1, 0 otherwise. Anti-timers, 
which announce pure stock exchange acquisitions a certain number of days away from the 52-week 
low as a percentage of 254 (5% and 20% in this research), the average number of trading days, 
receive the value of 1, 0 otherwise. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 5% are represented by 
***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Signaler  
- 5% 
Timer 
 - 5% 
Anti-
Signaler - 
5% 
Anti-Timer 
 - 5% 
Signaler 
 - 20% 
Timer 
 - 20% 
Anti-
Signaler - 
20% 
Anti-Timer  
- 20% 
 
BHAR12 
(-2,+2) 
BHAR12  
(-2,+2) 
BHAR12  
(-2,+2) 
BHAR12  
(-2,+2) 
BHAR12 
(-2,+2) 
BHAR12  
(-2,+2) 
BHAR12  
(-2,+2) 
BHAR12  
(-2,+2) 
Mean -.2029025 -.327378 -.1096287 -.2736797 -.1673387 -.3356642 -.1110828 -.328386 
Std. 
Dev. 
.028602 .0421148 .0397514 .061229 .0238705 .0289491 .0286063 .0405847 
N 174 121 124 79 308 242 245 165 
Panel B 
Signaler 
 - 5% 
Timer 
 - 5% 
Anti-
Signaler - 
5% 
Anti-Timer 
 - 5% 
Signaler - 
20% 
Timer - 
20% 
Anti-
Signaler - 
20% 
Anti-Timer 
- 20% 
P-Value 
(Wilcoxon 
rank-sum 
test H0: 
diff=0) 
0.0032** 0.0039** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
Signaler 
- 5% 
Anti-
Signaler - 
5% 
Timer 
- 5% 
Anti-Timer 
 - 5% 
Signale
r - 20% 
Anti-Signaler 
 - 20% 
Timer - 
20% 
Anti-
Timer - 
20% 
P-Value 
(Wilcoxon 
rank-sum 
test H0: 
diff=0) 
0.1222 0.6447 0.2340 0.5025 
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Table 3.6 Results of comparisons of 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for 
market signallers, anti-signallers, market timers and anti-timers. 
The variable BHAR36 is the 36-month BHAR from CRSP. The research objects include variable 
signallers, which announce pure cash acquisitions a certain number of days away from the 52-week 
peak as a percentage of 254 (5% and 20% in this research), the average number of trading days, 
receive the value of 1, 0 otherwise. Anti-signallers, which announce pure cash acquisitions a certain 
number of days away from the 52-week low as a percentage of 254 (5% and 20% in this research), 
the average number of trading days, receive the value of 1, 0 otherwise. Anti-timers, which announce 
pure stock exchange acquisitions a certain number of days away from the 52-week low as a 
percentage of 254 (5% and 20% in this research), the average number of trading days, receive the 
value of 1, 0 otherwise. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 5% are represented by ***,**, and *, 
respectively. 
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Mean -.6643038 -.7602348 -.2785354 -.3020789 -.5317178 -.7703221 -.3010827 -.5141448 
Std.Dev. .0608024 .0645268 .0892114 .1853194 .0437707 .0427964 .0556015 .0984301 
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0.0013** 0.0126* 0.0056** 0.0405* 
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Table 3.7 Results of regressions for the market-signalling effect on the acquirers’ short- and 
long-term performance. 
The vector of the dependent variables includes CAR, the 5-day cumulative abnormal return from 
CRSP centred on the announcement date from Thomson, and BHAR12/36, the 12-month and 36-
month BHARs from CRSP. The vector of explanatory variables includes signallers, which announce 
pure cash acquisitions a certain number of days away from the 52-week peak as a percentage of 254 
(5% and 20% in this research), the average number of trading days, receive the value of 1, 0 
otherwise. The dummy variable “Completed” is equal to 1 if the deal is completed, and 0 otherwise. 
A dummy variable for diversifying deals takes the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code 
is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise. The size of acquirers is measured by the log of 
the market value one month before the deal’s announcement. Acquirer book to market (AcqB2M) 
is measured by the bidder’s net book value of assets divided by its market value a month before the 
announcement of the deal; a deal’s relative size is the ratio between the deal value and the market 
value of the bidder firm. Friendly deals take the value of 1, while hostile deals take the value 0. 
Int_fund deals take the value of 1 when the acquiring company finances the transaction in some 
portion with its own internal resources and 0 otherwise. Adv_rank takes the value of 3 when the 
top-8 investment banks by transaction value during 1996 to 2009 (the reasons are provided in 
chapter 4) are assigned as top tier advisors, 2 when the top 9-25 median investments banks are 
assigned, 1 when the remainders as low tiers are employed, and 0 for in-house deals with no 
financial advisor involved. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 
5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAR BHAR12 BHAR36 CAR BHAR12 BHAR36 
       
Signaler-5% 0.0460 0.0247 -0.0698    
 (0.0243) (0.0893) (0.2074)    
Completed 0.0194 0.0651 0.1415 0.0193 0.0627 0.1437 
 (0.0135) (0.0509) (0.1091) (0.0136) (0.0512) (0.1097) 
LogMV -0.0120* 0.0045 -0.1084* -0.0123* 0.0041 -0.1077* 
 (0.0055) (0.0213) (0.0446) (0.0055) (0.0214) (0.0447) 
AcqB2M 0.0286 0.2620*** -0.0281 0.0287 0.2622*** -0.0288 
 (0.0193) (0.0694) (0.1325) (0.0193) (0.0693) (0.1325) 
Relative_size -0.0088* -0.0092 -0.0489 -0.0090* -0.0096 -0.0484* 
 (0.0036) (0.0136) (0.0256) (0.0036) (0.0136) (0.0257) 
Diversifying 0.0154 0.0535 0.0822 0.0154 0.0537 0.0836 
 (0.0124) (0.0461) (0.0960) (0.0124) (0.0461) (0.0959) 
Friendly -0.0237 -0.0841 -0.4864** -0.0251 -0.0823 -0.4847** 
 (0.0227) (0.0831) (0.1714) (0.0228) (0.0831) (0.1707) 
Int_fund 0.0408 0.0376 0.0469 0.0426* 0.0340 0.0509 
 (0.0214) (0.0765) (0.1635) (0.0214) (0.0767) (0.1650) 
Adv_rank 0.0054 -0.0014 0.0415 0.0053 -0.0018 0.0418 
 (0.0059) (0.0220) (0.0467) (0.0060) (0.0220) (0.0467) 
Signaler-20%    0.0262 0.0348 -0.0544 
    (0.0188) (0.0683) (0.1479) 
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Constant 0.0395 -0.2721* 0.3591 0.0423 -0.2714* 0.3535 
 (0.0363) (0.1380) (0.2837) (0.0363) (0.1379) (0.2833) 
       
Observations 621 564 410 621 564 410 
R-squared 0.0396 0.0337 0.0416 0.0370 0.0340 0.0416 
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Table 3.8 Results of regressions for the market timing effect on the acquirers’ short- and 
long-term performance. 
The vector of the dependent variables includes CAR, the 5-day CAR from CRSP centred on the 
announcement date from Thomson, and BHAR12/36, the 12-month and 36-month BHARs from 
CRSP. The vector of the explanatory variables includes timers, which announce pure stock exchange 
acquisitions a certain number of days away from the 52-week peak as a percentage of 254 (5% and 
20% in this research), the average number of trading days, and receive the value of 1, 0 otherwise. 
A dummy variable for diversifying deals takes the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code 
is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise. The size of acquirers is measured by the log of 
the market value one month before the deal’s announcement. Acquirer book to market (AcqB2M) 
is measured by the bidder’s net book value of assets divided by its market value a month before the 
announcement of the deal; a deal’s relative size is the ratio between the deal value and the market 
value of the bidder firm. Friendly deals take the value of 1, while hostile deals take the value 0. 
Int_fund deals take the value of 1 when the acquiring company finances the transaction in some 
portion with its own internal resources and 0 otherwise. Adv_rank takes the value of 3 when the 
top-8 investment banks by transaction value during 1996 to 2009 (the reasons are provided in 
chapter 4) are assigned as top tier advisors, 2 when the top 9-25 median investments banks are 
assigned, 1 when the remainders as low tiers are employed, and 0 for in-house deals with no 
financial advisor involved. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 
5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAR BHAR12 BHAR36 CAR BHAR12 BHAR36 
       
Timer-5% -0.0328 -0.1835* -0.2046    
 (0.0208) (0.0764) (0.1702)    
Completed 0.0227 0.0758 0.1464 0.0253 0.0836 0.1621 
 (0.0135) (0.0506) (0.1085) (0.0135) (0.0505) (0.1084) 
LogMV -0.0118* 0.0039 -0.1088* -0.0110* 0.0064 -0.1029* 
 (0.0055) (0.0212) (0.0445) (0.0055) (0.0211) (0.0444) 
AcqB2M 0.0275 0.2544*** -0.0359 0.0252 0.2474*** -0.0434 
 (0.0193) (0.0691) (0.1324) (0.0192) (0.0688) (0.1320) 
Relative_size -0.0087* -0.0088 -0.0494 -0.0086* -0.0088 -0.0486 
 (0.0036) (0.0135) (0.0256) (0.0035) (0.0134) (0.0255) 
Diversifying 0.0150 0.0518 0.0745 0.0160 0.0543 0.0731 
 (0.0124) (0.0459) (0.0961) (0.0124) (0.0457) (0.0955) 
Friendly -0.0268 -0.0797 -0.4753** -0.0239 -0.0713 -0.4714** 
 (0.0227) (0.0823) (0.1698) (0.0225) (0.0820) (0.1692) 
Int_fund 0.0432* 0.0229 0.0197 0.0379 0.0076 -0.0110 
 (0.0213) (0.0754) (0.1623) (0.0213) (0.0754) (0.1625) 
Adv_rank 0.0057 -0.0011 0.0412 0.0053 -0.0024 0.0394 
 (0.0060) (0.0218) (0.0465) (0.0059) (0.0217) (0.0463) 
Timer-20%    -0.0487** -0.1897** -0.2871* 
    (0.0156) (0.0575) (0.1328) 
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Constant 0.0441 -0.2604* 0.3693 0.0411 -0.2697* 0.3525 
 (0.0363) (0.1373) (0.2831) (0.0361) (0.1366) (0.2817) 
       
Observations 621 564 410 621 564 410 
R-squared 0.0379 0.0435 0.0447 0.0491 0.0522 0.0524 
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Table 3.9 Results of regressions for the anti-signalling effect on acquirers’ short- and long-
term performance. 
The vector of the dependent variables includes CAR, the 5-day CAR from CRSP centred on the 
announcement date from Thomson, and BHAR12/36, 12-month and 36-month BHARs from CRSP. 
The vector of the explanatory variables includes anti-signallers, which announce pure cash 
acquisitions a certain number of days away from the 52-week low as a percentage of 254 (5% and 
20% in this research), the average number of trading days, and receive the value of 1, 0 otherwise. 
A dummy variable for diversifying deals takes the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code 
is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise. The size of acquirers is measured by the log of 
the market value a month before the deal’s announcement. Acquirer book to market (AcqB2M) is 
measured by the bidder’s net book value of assets divided by its market value a month before the 
announcement of the deal; a deal’s relative size is the ratio between the deal value and the market 
value of the bidder firm. Friendly deals take the value of 1, while hostile deals that the value of 0. 
Int_fund deals take the value of 1 when the acquiring company finances the transaction in some 
portion with its own internal resources and 0 otherwise. Adv_rank takes the value of 3 when the 
top-8 investment banks by transaction value during 1996 to 2009 (the reasons are provided in 
chapter 4) are assigned as top tier advisors, 2 when the top 9-25 median investments banks are 
assigned, 1 when the remainders as low tiers are employed, and 0 for in-house deals with no 
financial advisor involved. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 
5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAR BHAR12 BHAR36 CAR BHAR12 BHAR36 
       
Anti-signaler-
5% 
0.0368 0.1786 0.6910**    
 (0.0280) (0.1055) (0.2075)    
Completed 0.0205 0.0600 0.0988 0.0175 0.0541 0.0849 
 (0.0135) (0.0508) (0.1076) (0.0136) (0.0510) (0.1084) 
LogMV -0.0117* 0.0054 -0.1072* -0.0124* 0.0037 -0.1128* 
 (0.0055) (0.0213) (0.0440) (0.0055) (0.0213) (0.0441) 
AcqB2M 0.0288 0.2637*** -0.0235 0.0284 0.2628*** -0.0269 
 (0.0193) (0.0692) (0.1308) (0.0193) (0.0691) (0.1310) 
Relative_size -0.0088* -0.0090 -0.0493 -0.0088* -0.0091 -0.0491 
 (0.0036) (0.0135) (0.0253) (0.0035) (0.0135) (0.0253) 
Diversifying 0.0143 0.0499 0.0660 0.0157 0.0544 0.0827 
 (0.0125) (0.0460) (0.0948) (0.0124) (0.0460) (0.0948) 
Friendly -0.0264 -0.0791 -0.4571** -0.0247 -0.0765 -0.4594** 
 (0.0227) (0.0826) (0.1679) (0.0226) (0.0826) (0.1682) 
Int_fund 0.0432* 0.0215 -0.0266 0.0416 0.0250 -0.0143 
 (0.0214) (0.0761) (0.1608) (0.0213) (0.0756) (0.1607) 
Adv_rank 0.0060 0.0006 0.0498 0.0065 0.0009 0.0482 
 (0.0060) (0.0219) (0.0460) (0.0059) (0.0219) (0.0461) 
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Anti-signaler-
20% 
   0.0475* 0.1433 0.4651** 
    (0.0193) (0.0742) (0.1482) 
Constant 0.0406 -0.2820* 0.3274 0.0406 -0.2800* 0.3436 
 (0.0364) (0.1377) (0.2796) (0.0362) (0.1375) (0.2799) 
       
Observations 621 564 410 621 564 410 
R-squared 0.0367 0.0385 0.0672 0.0434 0.0400 0.0643 
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Table 3.10 Results of regressions for the anti-timing effect on the acquirers’ short- and long-
term performance. 
The vector of the dependent variables includes CAR, the 5-day CAR from CRSP centred on the 
announcement date from Thomson, and BHAR12/36, the 12-month and 36-month BHARs from 
CRSP. The vector of the explanatory variables includes anti-timers, which announce pure stock 
exchange acquisitions a certain number of days away from the 52-week low as a percentage of 254 
(5% and 20% in this research), the average number of trading days, and receive the value of 1, 0 
otherwise. A dummy variable for diversifying deals takes the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-
digit SIC code is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise. The size of acquirers is measured 
by the log of the market value a month before the deal’s announcement. Acquirer book to market 
(AcqB2M) is measured by the bidder’s net book value of assets divided by its market value a month 
before the announcement of the deal; a deal’s relative size is the ratio between the deal value and 
the market value of the bidder firm. Friendly deals take the value of 1, while hostile deals take the 
value 0. Int_fund deals take the value of 1 when the acquiring company finances the transaction in 
some portion with its own internal resources and 0 otherwise. Adv_rank takes the value of 3 when 
the top-8 investment banks by transaction value during 1996 to 2009 (the reasons are provided in 
chapter 4) are assigned as top tier advisors, 2 when the top 9-25 median investments banks are 
assigned, 1 when the remainders as low tiers are employed, and 0 for in-house deals with no 
financial advisor involved. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 
5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAR BHAR12 BHAR36 CAR BHAR12 BHAR36 
       
Anti-timer-5% 0.0180 0.0288 0.4607**    
 (0.0225) (0.0856) (0.1750)    
Completed 0.0211 0.0660 0.1305 0.0211 0.0689 0.1305 
 (0.0135) (0.0508) (0.1075) (0.0135) (0.0507) (0.1084) 
LogMV -0.0112* 0.0057 -0.0937* -0.0112* 0.0021 -0.1037* 
 (0.0056) (0.0216) (0.0446) (0.0056) (0.0214) (0.0447) 
AcqB2M 0.0280 0.2611*** -0.0300 0.0276 0.2685*** -0.0379 
 (0.0194) (0.0694) (0.1314) (0.0194) (0.0694) (0.1326) 
Relative_size -0.0085* -0.0088 -0.0453 -0.0085* -0.0102 -0.0472 
 (0.0036) (0.0136) (0.0254) (0.0036) (0.0136) (0.0256) 
Diversifying 0.0152 0.0540 0.0974 0.0147 0.0545 0.0832 
 (0.0125) (0.0462) (0.0952) (0.0125) (0.0461) (0.0958) 
Friendly -0.0289 -0.0873 -0.4958** -0.0296 -0.0804 -0.4875** 
 (0.0227) (0.0828) (0.1688) (0.0227) (0.0827) (0.1700) 
Int_fund 0.0475* 0.0429 0.0700 0.0484* 0.0299 0.0621 
 (0.0213) (0.0756) (0.1608) (0.0214) (0.0758) (0.1628) 
Adv_rank 0.0056 -0.0013 0.0396 0.0056 0.0007 0.0364 
 (0.0060) (0.0219) (0.0462) (0.0060) (0.0219) (0.0467) 
Anti-timer-20%    0.0145 -0.0784 0.1508 
    (0.0163) (0.0622) (0.1305) 
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Constant 0.0393 -0.2773* 0.2491 0.0396 -0.2550 0.3211 
 (0.0367) (0.1394) (0.2837) (0.0366) (0.1383) (0.2843) 
       
Observations 621 564 410 621 564 410 
R-squared 0.0349 0.0338 0.0576 0.0352 0.0363 0.0445 
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Chapter 4 How would the choice of financial advisors affect bidders in M&A 
under the influence of payment methods and the psychological reference points 
of the 52-week high and low? 
 
4.1 Abstract 
 
The second and third chapters analyse the two most influential effects, including the 
timing of announcements and the payment methods on deal completion and short- and 
long-term performances in M&A. This study analyses the influence of another 
important element, the choice and the effectiveness of financial advisors, on the M&A 
performance and considers whether financial advisors have certain preferences 
concerning payment method, market timing and signalling. Do financial advisors act in 
the best interest of the bidders' shareholders when payment method and timing of the 
announcement are controlled? Are financial advisors more decisive in achieving 
success than are the previously confirmed elements in M&A? 
 
The results disclose that in-house acquirers would most likely use cash to complete 
M&A transactions, while low-tier advisors would most likely conduct stock exchange 
deals. Acquirers with top-tier advisors are most inclined to announce the transaction 
near the 52-week peak, while in-house bidders announce the deals significantly closer 
to the 52-week low than do top-tier advisors. Both signallers and timers are more likely 
to be connected to the top-tier advisors, while anti-signallers and anti-timers are more 
lowkey in terms of employing financial advisors, instead conducting in-house 
transactions and hiring low-tier advisors, respectively. Controlling payment method and 
announcement timing, neither the top nor the median-tier financial advisors bring 
significant gains whatsoever. The low-tier advisors even incur remarkable loss to the 
acquirers. The in-house deals are recognized by the market with significantly positive 
CARs in the short term; however, they are unlikely to be completed due to the lack of 
experience in M&A. Comparatively speaking, the median-tier advisors are the most 
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cost effective in terms of the deal completion and consequent performances. In addition, 
payment method and announcement timing have more influence on the later bidder 
performance than financial advisors have. 
 
4.2 Introduction  
 
From the second and third chapters, two of the most straightforward aspects of M&A, 
namely, the announcement of the deal timing and the payment method, have been 
proven to be significant elements affecting deal success and performance in different 
ways. Investment banks, with reputation as experts in capital market transactions, are 
widely recognized as a lubricant in M&A and theoretically should act in the best interest 
for their clients (Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)). Surprisingly, however, much of the 
relevant empirical literature reports a negative or at best nonsignificant relationship 
between bidder financial advisor reputation and bidder returns in M&A (see, for 
example, McLaughlin (1992), Servaes and Zenner (1996), Rau (2004), Hunter and 
Jagtiani (2004), and Ismail (2010)). 
 
In contrast, Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012), along with other scholars (e.g., Bao 
and Edmans 2011; Sibilkov and McConnell 2014), argue that with better reputation and 
stronger ability to identify more synergistic combinations for bidders, top-tier advisors 
deliver higher bidder returns than their non-top-tier counterparts in public acquisitions; 
therefore, top-tier advisors charge premium fees in these transactions.  
 
The contradiction concerning advisor performance raises several interesting questions. 
Compared to the significant anti-timing and anti-signalling effects newly discovered in 
chapters 2 and 3, do different tiers of advisors have certain preferences in selecting 
payment method and timing the market? Are they also influential in M&A completion 
and performance? Do they more significantly affect the deals than the previously 
discovered effects do? Is it a waste of money for bidders to hire top-tier advisors or any 
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advisors at all? 
 
The findings suggest that different tiers of advisors are connected to certain payment 
methods and timing status. Specifically, top-tier advisors and in-house bidders are more 
inclined to use cash payment for M&A, while low-tier advisors prefer stock exchange. 
Bidders with top-tier advisors announce M&A more often near the 52-week high, while 
in comparison, in-house bidders and bidders with low-tier advisors announce the deals 
closer to the 52-week low. All tiers of advisors seek deal completeness more than 
superior performance. In contrast, bidders conducting in-house deals are obviously less 
competent in completing the deals. In terms of performance measured by cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs), top and 
median-tier advisors do not guarantee either short- or long-term performance, while 
low-tier advisors entail undesired results for the transactions. Because top-tier advisors 
cannot deliver significant short- or long-term abnormal returns to the bidders, they are 
obviously less influential than the payment method and the timing effect of the 
announcement in M&A. 
 
This study contributes in the following ways:  
 
The connection between the choices of financial advisors and payment method as well 
as market timing and signalling has never been studied. Based on the new definition of 
market timer and signaller, for the first time, this chapter discussed the effectiveness of 
different tiers of advisors.  
 
Now that the bidders' 52-week high and low significantly influence the completion of 
the deal and the performance, the effects are even more decisive than the effect of 
financial advisors; therefore, again, we can reaffirm that the bidders' 52-week high and 
low are important psychological reference points in M&A. 
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4.3 Literature Review 
 
4.3.1 The Influence of Payment Methods and Announcement Timing on Deal 
Completion and Performance 
 
From the second and third chapters, both the proximity of bidders’ M&A announcement 
date to the 52-week high or low and the payment method are effective benchmarks 
affecting the deal completion and the bidder performance in both the short and long 
terms.  
 
For stock deals, a higher premium leads to a significantly higher probability of deal 
completion due to sellers’ continuous expectation of potential capital gain. 
 
In terms of correlation between the announcement timing and the deal completion, bids 
announced closer to the acquirer’s 52-week high in terms of day or price have a 
significantly higher probability of deal completion, while the bids announced closer to 
the date of acquirer’s 52-week low either do not affect deal completion for cash deals 
or are significantly associated with deal failure for stock deals.  
 
Announcement of M&A with the bidder stock price near the 52-week peak price is 
associated with higher bidder CAR (with endogeneity problem). When the instrumental 
variable (proximity of the announcement date to the 52-week peak date) is used to 
measure the deal timing, an announcement date further from the peak date 
(announcement date closer to the 52-week low) results in higher CAR and higher 
BHARs. The contradictive results from different announcement timing variables 
indicate that bidders with fluctuating stock prices seem to have better speculative 
opportunities in the short term, although their short-term performance will be reversed 
in the long term. 
 
In conclusion, bidder timing (measured by both variables of announcement closer to 
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the 52-week high/low price or the 52-week high/low date) has an important effect on 
the completeness and performance of the M&A transaction. Considering the 
announcement near the 52-week high/low date as a valid instrumental variable for the 
announcement near the 52-week high/low price, we could document the bidder’s 52-
week high/low dates as psychological anchors in completing M&A.  
 
In chapter 3, the payment method is used as a classification criterion for market timers 
and signallers, while the nearness of bidders’ M&A announcement to the 52-week 
high/low dates are taken as effective intensity measurements for the market timing and 
signalling effects in both the short and long terms.  
 
In the short term, being a market timer entails an average negative CAR, which is not 
consistent with the traditional market timing theory. The result shows that the market 
takes the bidder announcement date close to the peak as a negative signal in the 
transaction. In the long term, market timers’ performance reverses the most; thus, 
timing theory is not applicable in this research. 
 
In terms of the signaller, announcing the cash deal at or near the 52-week high date 
entails a positive mean CAR, which is in line with signalling theory. In the long term, 
similarly to the market timers, signallers’ performance also reverses, but the reversal is 
significantly less than that of market timers.  
  
Anti-timers and anti-signallers have better and more stable performance than timers and 
signallers, respectively. At the same time, they also reverse significantly less than 
market timers and signallers.  
 
Generally, anti-signallers rank first, while timers perform the worst in both the short 
and long terms as measured by CAR, 12-month BHAR and 36-month BHAR.   
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4.3.2 The Role of Investment Banks in M&A 
 
In addition to the most influential payment method and announcement timing, 
investment banks as consultants also play a very important role in achieving better 
strategic synergies in M&A, according to the current literature. As financial advisors, 
investment banks can reduce the information asymmetry of both acquirers and targets 
and promote the financing of deals. Throughout the history of M&A and especially for 
large deals, investment banks have been involved in almost every successful M&A 
transaction. In fact, investment banks are important factors that guide the rapid 
development of M&A. 
 
As an important part of modern economic activities, investment banks have knowledge, 
information, talent and technology advantages that allow them to understand the 
allocation of social resources, the macroeconomic situation and the international 
economic situation and therefore help enterprises solve problems in M&A. The 
investment bank plays an important role in M&A in areas such as enterprise system 
restriction, asset evaluation, asset transfer design and enterprise organization, as 
described below. 
 
Investment banks can reduce the cost of information in M&A. There are two types of 
transaction models: direct contact and investment banks. Investment banks are 
commonly hired mainly because the invitation of investment banks can reduce the risk 
of M&A due to information asymmetry and reduce some unnecessary information 
collection costs. In many M&As, most enterprises are non-listed companies that have 
difficulty accessing information. Therefore, acquirers can achieve M&A through 
investment banks to save corporate capital. In addition, as the information between 
buyers and sellers is not equally distributed, investment banks as third-party agents can 
integrate information resources to provide reliable information for the two parties and 
promote the deals. 
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As a financial advisor, an investment bank can help enterprises manage their business 
funds and fully understand their own development strengths and weaknesses to choose 
the right means of achieving M&A, save costs, and complete the deal. The main role of 
the investment bank as an enterprise's financial advisor is reflected in the following 
aspects. 1. An investment bank predicts the probability of successful M&A. M&A 
relates to a wide range of behaviours with many complicated procedures, so the whole 
process of M&A needs to have certain supporting facilities; otherwise, there will be a 
high risk of failure. The participation of an investment bank can allow the prediction of 
the success or failure of M&A based on the understanding of the current situation and 
ensure the smooth progress of a deal. 2. An investment bank can rationally design the 
organizational structure after the deal. After M&A, the organizational structure must be 
re-designed because of the difficulty to combine new, unfamiliar management and 
different corporate culture. The intervention of investment banks can help enterprises 
rationally restructure enterprises, thereby reducing the contradiction between various 
businesses, personnel and corporate culture brought about by M&A. 
 
Investment banks can help companies choose the proper means of financing. In M&A, 
some acquirers have difficulty obtaining enough money in a short time. At this point, 
investment banks can help them raise funds and solve financing problems. 
 
Investment banks reduce M&A transaction costs. 1. An investment bank reduces the 
cost of searching for information before the deal. In M&A, the buyer and seller have 
unequal information. The buyer has a greater risk in the transaction because of the 
incomplete information obtained. At this time, the involvement of an investment bank 
can provide buyers with information support from the bank’s own information 
resources to solve the problem of information asymmetry. 2. An investment bank 
promotes the specialization of the collection process. The buyers and sellers do not have 
the ability to identify information themselves. Therefore, the data collected are 
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unreliable. An investment bank can make use of its advantages in collecting information 
to provide professional information, such as manpower and material resources for 
buyers and sellers, thereby reducing unnecessary costs due to information unreliability. 
 
There are friendly and hostile M&As in the market. In a hostile M&A, the target does 
not intend to be acquired by the acquirer. This type of malicious acquisition is not 
conducive to the benign development of the market and therefore requires the 
involvement of an investment bank. The intervention of the investment bank can 
provide strategies and plans to prevent the deal, thus protecting the will of target. 
 
An investment bank can integrate enterprise resources after M&A. Effective integration 
is not only controlling the target. To realize the continuous development of both 
acquirer and target, attention must be paid to asset allocation, personnel adjustment, 
cultural integration, etc. With rich experience in long-term planning, investment banks 
can provide effective strategies and arrangements for enterprises after a deal to truly 
realize the functions of M&A. 
 
4.3.3 Financial Advisor Fees 
 
Fee Structure 
 
The standard M&A advisor fee structure consists of a work fee and a success fee. As a 
competitive industry, financial advisor fee structure is very consistent between firms of 
similar quality. Some firms undertake engagements with no work fee, and others 
structure their fees entirely on an hourly basis with no success fee. 
 
The Lehman Formula 
 
Some M&A firms still use the Lehman formula to calculate the advisor fee. The formula 
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was originally designed for financing purposes, but it also came to be applied to M&A 
transactions.  
 
The formula usually addresses deal amounts greater than one million dollars. Brokerage 
services and investment banks usually offer a set of tiered fees or set-rate trading prices. 
 
The original version of the formula (called the Lehman scale) was as follows: 
 
5% of the first $1 million is raised from investors (worth of transaction); 4% of the 
second $1 million is raised from investors (worth of transaction); 3% of the third $1 
million is raised from investors (worth of transaction); 2% of the fourth $1 million is 
raised from investors (worth of transaction); 1% of everything above $4 million is 
raised from investors (worth of transaction). 
 
Inflation has altered the Lehman formula. Currently, most large banks do not consider 
a $5 million deal as significant as it was when the formula was designed in the 1960s. 
Rather than indexing the formula for inflation, most investment services have altered 
the formula to pursue fee maximization. 
 
M&A Advisor Work Fees, Retainers or Engagement Fees 
 
Selling companies sometimes commit to a work fee at the beginning of the engagement. 
Some advisors send monthly invoices over the first four to twelve months, which is 
called a retainer, engagement fee or upfront fee and covers the M&A advisor’s direct 
costs during the initial stages, as well as a fixed amount for the early work in preparation 
of the selling documents and due diligence materials.  
 
Advisors charge lower work fees when their staff is not completely busy and the M&A 
market is not very active. Interestingly, “business brokers”, namely, firms that work on 
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transactions valued under $5 million, usually do not charge a work fee. 
 
The work fee is set fairly and reasonably by professionals to protect their investments 
and helps facilitate the transaction. It also acts as a test to determine whether the seller 
intends to actually sell the company.  
 
M&A Advisor Success Fees 
 
The success fee for selling a business is typically a proportion (usually up to 5%) of the 
final value.  
 
Interestingly, the success fees of smaller transactions become more challenging to 
calculate because the amount of work required to sell a small business is not 
significantly less than the effort required for to sell a large business because the buyers 
for smaller targets tend to be less experienced in the legal and accounting aspects; 
therefore, smaller transactions often require significantly more time and effort from the 
M&A advisor. 
 
Even the smaller boutique M&A advisors are reluctant to undertake a transaction worth 
less than $5 million. Even at a 10% success fee, a $5 million transaction will bring only 
a $500,000 success fee. Therefore, transactions below the $5 million threshold are often 
conducted by business brokers or individuals who have developed expertise in this area. 
 
If a company is sold to a certain buyer or has narrowed down the acquirers to a few 
prospects, then the success fee should be lower than the fee for a fully marketed 
transaction. Based on the quality level, the success fees are typically categorized as gold, 
silver and bronze quality services. Bronze quality success fees amount to approximately 
half the value of a silver quality success fee, while a silver fee is less than a gold quality 
success fee.  
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4.3.4 Reputation of Financial Advisor 
 
With the emergence of imperfect market theory, the reputation of financial advisors has 
become a research topic for economists. Game theory provides a variety of strategies 
for the study of reputation theory and is an explanatory analysis tool. Information 
asymmetry theory provides a theoretical premise for reputation theory, for only if 
information is asymmetric can the reputation of financial advisors and the relevant 
mechanism work. The theory of transaction cost also provides a theoretical basis for 
the study of reputation because the differences in transaction cost and efficiency lead 
to different reputations. 
 
Roberts, Wilson, Kreps and Milgrom (1982) establish a reputation model and draw a 
very important conclusion: if every party holds its promise in a transaction, considering 
the long-term common interests, they will restrain their behaviour to win long-term 
cooperative benefits. This conclusion is built on the KMRW model, which has had great 
influence on reputation theory.  
 
Booth and Smith (1986) point out that the reputation of the underwriter is an important 
asset of the underwriter itself and represents non-salvageable reputation capital. 
Reputation is the precondition allowing the underwriter as a third party to transmit 
internal information about the issuing enterprise to the investor. Reputation is also the 
basis on which security underwriters, as the intelligent certification intermediary, can 
alleviate the asymmetry of information in the securities market. 
 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) designed a classical model to study the role of the 
underwriter's reputation. According to the model, the underwriter can establish its 
reputation through a long-term process. An investor can judge the stock status of the 
new listed company through the trust of the underwriter. The underwriter's reputation 
can act as an information intermediary. 
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Puri (1996) establishes a model about the role and influence of the securities 
underwriter's reputation and points out that a good securities underwriter’s reputation 
will not be reduced because of its efforts to maintain its reputation. When evaluating 
the value of the securities issuing company, an underwriter with a better reputation will 
adopt more stringent evaluation criteria to ensure that it can assume the role of 
information producer. Reputable underwriters will be very concerned about the value 
of underwriting initial offerings and complete the deals. Therefore, the reputation of 
securities underwriters can be used as an important index to help investors judge the 
quality of issuing enterprises.  
 
4.3.5 Measurement of Financial Advisor Reputation 
 
Hayes (1972) believes that all financial advisors in the United States have a strict 
hierarchy, divided into senior advisors and lower-level advisors. As the name implies, 
senior advisors are highly reputable and have relatively higher profits. Low-level 
advisors are those with low reputations. Advisor rankings appear in newspaper 
advertisements. Therefore, to hold a good position in newspaper advertisements, 
advisors work hard to maintain their positions, giving up some of the proceeds or 
pursuing rent-seeking activities. 
 
Miller and Johnson (1988) put forward the JM rules for the classification of financial 
advisors into four levels according to reputation, namely, the special class (bulge 
bracket), the main class (main bracket), the quasi-major class (sub-major bracket) and 
the other class. The special bulge bracket includes the advisors of leading class in the 
advising of high-quality securities; advisors in the main bracket have less market share 
but are still relatively better than the other advisors; advisors in the sub-major bracket 
also have important market competencies; and advisors in the last level have relatively 
poor reputations. 
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Carter and Manster (1990) set up the ranking system of the advisors’ reputation 
according to the rank of each securities advisor in the newspaper advertisement, which 
is also called the CM ranking system. Dark, Carter and Singh (1998) further improve 
the ranking rules on the basis of the CM ranking system. 
 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) propose to build a securities advisor reputation ranking 
system based on the market share of each securities advisor (MW ranking system). The 
ranking obtained by this method can clearly reveal the advantages and disadvantages 
of any two advisors and the size of the gap. This is better than the ordinal ranking used 
by the CM rules. 
 
Carter and Manaster (1990) propose that the reputation of investment banks can attract 
issuing companies with high quality and low risk. By choosing an investment bank with 
good reputation, an issuing company sends a signal to the market about its own quality 
so that the reputation of the investment bank can play a role in endorsement 
(certification). From the perspective of information production, Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri (1994) emphasize that the reputation of an investment bank is built up by 
setting up a stricter mechanism to review the issuing company. Carter and Manaster 
(1990) argue that advisor reputation is the history of the information and is therefore 
exogenous. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) establish the reputation of investment 
banks as endogenous variables. Investment banks have a reputation because they spend 
more on exploring real information about issuing companies, so on average, they can 
choose high-quality and low-risk issuing companies as customers. 
 
Although there are still some points to be discussed, the CM rule and the MW rule are 
widely cited in the relevant research and are the dominant ranking methods worldwide. 
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4.3.6 Investment Banks Act Positively in Empirical Study 
 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) suggest that as intermediaries in the financial markets, 
depending on their equity marketing history, investment banks with high reputation 
provide higher quality services and charge higher fees. 
 
Bowers and Miller (1990) show that investment banks with enhanced reputation 
perform better than lower tier bankers in the marketplace, thus allowing superior 
bankers to charge higher fees. Consistently, Michel, Shaked, and Lee (1991) find that 
deals advised by bulge bracket investment banks outperform those advised by relatively 
less prestigious advisors in terms of bidder CARs. 
 
With a different measure of the relative reputation of the merging parties’ advisors in 
390 US tender offers over the period 1981 to 1994, Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) contend 
that bidder gains, total synergy gains, and the share of total synergies accruing to the 
bidder increase with the bidder advisor’s reputation. 
 
At the individual bank level, Chang et al. (2008) study the choice of advisors in M&A 
and show that the choice of advisor for a given transaction relies on three elements, 
namely, prior relationships with the bank, the industry expertise of the advisor, and the 
relationship with the merging partner. In another bank-level study, Bao and Edmans 
(2011) document the significant bank-level fixed effects and further show that advisors 
in the bottom quintile are associated with disappointing acquirer performance for 
several years, while advisors in the top quintile maintain excellent acquirer performance. 
 
Finally, Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012) argue that with better reputation and the 
required skillsets, top-tier advisors deliver higher bidder returns than their non-top-tier 
counterparts in public acquisitions. This result is consistent with the premium price-
premium quality equilibrium, whereby top-tier advisors charge premium fees in these 
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transactions. 
 
4.3.7 Financial Advisor Act Negatively in Empirical Study 
 
McLaughlin (1990) focuses on investment banker advisor fees from 195 tender offers 
between 1978 and 1985. Advisor fees of the investment bank for the bidder account for 
0.56% of the deal value on average, while target firm advisor fees average 0.77% of 
acquisition value. Basically, most of the advisor fee is paid only if the deal is completed, 
and the fee is not dependent on whether the transaction creates value for the acquirer. 
Such a rule creates a potential conflict of interest between the advisor and the client. 
 
McLaughlin (1992) finds that bidders hiring lower tier bankers may need to pay a 
greater amount in advisor fees for different fee contract types and have higher 
announcement period gains. 
 
Servaes and Zenner (1996) argue that neither the general advisor nor the top-tier advisor 
affects the announcement abnormal returns in the largest US acquisition samples over 
the period 1981 to 1992. Only when bidders with less prior acquisition experience are 
involved in complex transactions are they more likely to use advisors.  
 
Rau (2004) demonstrates that first-tier investment banks cannot guarantee higher bidder 
abnormal returns, apart from the tender offers sub-sample. In addition, he finds that the 
proportion of contingent fees in the contract is negatively correlated with the post-
acquisition performance of the bidding firm. Consistently, Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) 
and Ismail (2010) also fail to provide evidence of a positive relationship between bidder 
advisor reputation and bidder returns. 
 
In addition, the role of the other classifications of financial advisors has been discussed 
in the literature. For example, Allen et al. (2004) fail to find a connection between the 
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bidding firm returns and the use of the firm’s own commercial bank as a merger advisor. 
Furthermore, Song et al. (2010) compare the role of “boutique” financial advisors to 
regular full-service investment banks. They find that completion rates are not affected 
by the use of boutique advisors for the acquiring firm. Boutique advisors do not charge 
higher fees, either. However, boutique advisors are more likely to be hired for smaller 
transactions. Controlling for advisor reputation, acquirers hiring boutique advisors in 
public acquisitions pay lower premiums. 
 
From the perspective of corporate control, Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009) 
disclose that as insiders in the market, investment banks affiliate with financial 
conglomerates to build up a stake in the target prior to the announcement and earn 
substantial profits. They also provide evidence that a larger size of this stake indicates 
a higher probability of larger announcement period losses for the bidding firm. 
 
Overall, current studies provide mixed evidence on the relationship between advisor 
reputation and abnormal returns associated with M&A. This study attempts to clarify 
the contribution of advisors to payment methods and announcement timing control. 
 
4.4 Hypotheses Development 
 
Based on current literature and logic, the following hypotheses on the correlation 
between the choice of financial advisor and payment method, timing intensity and 
bidder performance are developed. 
 
H1: As in-house bidders lack M&A experience, to complete the transaction, they are 
more likely to use cash as the payment method, which is much more straightforward 
and involves simpler processes. Low-tier advisors are expected to use more stock 
exchange or less cash payment than top-tier advisors, as they are usually hired by less 
financially capable bidders who have less access to cash funding. 
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H2: Acquirers with top-tier advisors are most likely to announce transactions near the 
52-week peak than low-tier advisors and in-house bidders are because low-tier advisors 
and in-house bidders might be less sophisticated in taking advantage of the market 
timing and signalling effects. On the other hand, because in-house bidders do not have 
agency problems associated with hiring advisors and have less pressure to complete the 
deals, they are expected to announce the deals more in accordance with their natural 
tendency or further from the 52-week peak than bidders working with advisors. 
 
H3: Because both signallers and timers (defined in chapter 3) announce the deals closer 
to the 52-week high, as assumed by H2, both types of bidders are expected to be 
connected to the employment of top-tier advisors. 
 
H4: As both anti-signallers and anti-timers (defined in chapter 3) announce the deals 
closer to the 52-week low (opposite to H3), both are more likely to be in-house bidders 
or employ lowkey financial advisors. 
 
H5: According to the premium price-premium quality equilibrium (Servaes and Zenner 
1996), advisor fees should be positively correlated with advisor rank. 
 
H6: Advisor rankings are expected to positively affect deal completion when 
announcement timing and payment method are controlled because higher tier advisors 
have more experience and better required skillsets. 
 
H7: Advisor rankings should be associated with higher bidder CARs and BHARs when 
announcement timing and payment method are controlled, as better advisors have 
higher reputation exposure along with more experience and better required skillsets. 
 
H8: Advisor fees positively affect the bidders’ CARs, BHARs and deal completion 
when announcement timing and payment method are controlled, as advisor fees are 
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positively correlated with advisor rank.  
4.5 Research Methodology  
 
4.5.1 Samples 
 
To determine whether the choice of financial advisor affects the completeness and 
performance of the acquirers in M&A, chapter 4, as the third part of the research, first 
collects the sample that consists of the completed and uncompleted US takeovers 
announced in the period between 1/1/1985 and 3/31/2015. The announcements and 
relevant financial indices were collected by Thomson One Banker, while stock prices 
were collected from WRDS. The samples meet the following criteria: 
 
⚫ Both the acquirers and the target firms are US listed firms due to the previously 
mentioned requirement for an overall efficient market.  
⚫ The bidders aim to acquire at least 50% of the shares of the target firms to ensure 
that the transaction has a significant influence on the stock market. 
⚫ The deal values amount to at least $1 million to ensure the significance of the 
acquisitions.  
⚫ The financing of the acquisition is either 100% in stock or 100% in cash to simplify 
the comparison of benefits between the two methods for completed deals, while for 
uncompleted deals, as they have not been finished, all of the announced deal 
financing, such as pure cash, pure stock exchange and combinations are included 
in the research sample.  
⚫ When an acquirer has more than one deal within 5 years, only the most recent deal 
remains in the sample. 
⚫ Acquirers without continuous stock price records around the announcement period 
are eliminated.  
 
Eventually, 662 samples of completed cash acquisitions and 573 samples of completed 
stock exchange deals meet the above criteria, as in the first and second chapters of this 
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study. Since this chapter of the study considers M&A success and failure, 1131 
uncompleted deals are also included in the sample. 
 
4.5.2 Research Method and Variables 
 
The Measurement of the Deal Timing: 
 
To identify the proximity of announcement to the date of the 52-week high/low, the 
procedures presented below are adopted:  
 
The nearness of the date of announcement to the date of the 52-week high is defined as 
date nearness to high (DNH), calculated as the following formula: 
DNH=Number of Workdays From the 52-week High to the Date of Announcement/254 
where 254 is the maximum total number of workdays in the US. A higher DNH 
indicates that the bidder announcement is further from the date of the 52-week high. 
 
DNL=Number of Workdays From the 52-week Low to the Date of Announcement/254 
where 254 is the maximum total number of workdays in the US. A higher DNL indicates 
that the bidder announcement is further from the date of the 52-week low. 
 
Measure of Advisor Reputation: 
 
The chapter presents the top 25 investment banks as top and median-tier financial 
advisors according to the value of the deals on which they advised for M&A 
transactions targeting US firms during the period from January 1, 1996, to December 
31, 2009, drawn from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
This period covers the 2000 dot-com bubble and 2008 subprime mortgage crisis, when 
the landscape of the finance industry experienced significant changes. Transaction 
value is in US$ million. The number of deals advised by each advisor is also presented. 
Equity carve-outs, exchange offers and open market repurchases are excluded. 
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Top- 25 U.S. Financial Advisor Ranking by Transaction Value 
The top-8 investment banks are assigned as top tier advisors, same as those in Fang 
(2005), indicating that this top-tier specification is stable across investment banking 
services. These banks also appear in the bulge bracket specifications of earlier M&A 
studies (Servaes and Zenner (1996) and Rau (2004)). Thus, there is a great deal of 
stability in the reputation of these advisors over time. In the case of multiple advisors, 
the deal is classified as advised by a top-tier advisor if at least one of the advisors 
belongs to the top-8 group; this approach is standard in the literature (see, for example, 
Servaes and Zenner (1996) and Rau (2000)). Median tier advisors are the top 9-25 
investments banks while the remainders are low tiers. In-house deals are transactions 
with no financial advisor involved. 
 
Rank 
Financial Advisor 
Transaction 
Value 
Number of 
Deals 
Top-tier    
1 Goldman Sachs 5,875,818 2,567 
2 Merrill Lynch (now Bank of America Merrill Lynch) 4,505,156 3,224 
3 Morgan Stanley 4,315,578 2,072 
4 JP Morgan 4,111,013 2,831 
5 Citi/Salomon Smith Barney 3,407,442 2,304 
6 Credit Suisse First Boston 3,026,933 2,878 
7 Lehman Brothers (now Barclays Capital) 2,374,155 1,444 
8 Lazard 1,447,960 1,125 
Median-
Tier 
   
9 UBS 1,428,585 1,368 
10 Deutsche Bank 1,185,674 1,139 
11 Evercore Partners 746,074 175 
12 Commerzbank 523,988 332 
13 Houlihan Lokey 434,593 1,668 
14 Sagent Advisors 429,722 367 
15 Wells Fargo 397,746 582 
16 Blackstone Group 353,597 203 
17 Greenhill 301,084 146 
18 Rothschild 229,334 289 
19 Jefferies 214,554 1,189 
20 BNP Paribas 177,777 53 
21 RBS 176,675 324 
22 Duff and Phelps 175,336 416 
23 Centerview Partners 169,950 29 
24 Keefe Bruyette&Woods 164,843 591 
25 CIBC World Markets 160,040 468 
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Short-term Event Study Methodology: 
 
To evaluate the impact of M&A announcements near or at the 52-week high or low, 
abnormal returns can be calculated. An abnormal return is the difference between actual 
earnings and the normal return during the event window and is calculated as follows: 
ARit = Ait – Rit 
 
where Ait is the actual earnings of bidder i on day t, Rit is the normal return of bidder i 
on day t (derived from the capital asset pricing model - CAPM), and ARit is an 
abnormal return of the same bidder on the same day.  
 
According to the CAPM along with a 30-day estimated window, Rit = αi + βi Rmt + 
εit, where Rmt is the monthly return of the market index of the S&P 500 during the 
same period.  
 
To calculate the acquiring firms’ short-term performance, Stata 12 is employed for 
calculation of the abnormal returns using the market model as follows: 
 
The CAR for the 5-day window of (-2,+2) around the announcement date is calculated 
according to the following equation: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡1
 
where CARi(t1, t2) is the CAR for the 5-day window of (-2,+2) around the 
announcement date with cross sections of the bidder i. 
 
The p-value provides a sense of the strength of the evidence against the null hypothesis, 
in which the mean CAR is equal to zero for a sample of n firms. The lower the p-value 
is, the stronger the evidence is that the mean CAR is statistically significantly either 
positive or negative.  
 
Long-term Event Study Methodology: 
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The 12-month BHAR approach advocated by Barber and Lyon (1997) is employed to 
examine the long-term abnormal stock returns in the study. The BHAR is computed as: 
 +−+=
T
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where Rit is the monthly return for company i and Rmt is the monthly return of the 
market index of S&P 500. According to Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999), the skewness 
adjusted bootstrap t-statistics procedure is employed to compute the statistical 
significance of the abnormal returns.  
 
Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test and Multivariate Analysis: 
 
A number of variables, such as deal diversifying status, payment method, attitude, 
financial resources, and announcement proximity to the date of 52-week peak/low, have 
been found to affect the completeness and performance of acquiring firms. To analyse 
the effects of different tiers of financial advisors on completeness and performance, 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (the model cannot meet the requirements of the t-test on 
normal distribution, homogeneity of variance, etc.) have been conducted, while 
multivariate regression analyses have been employed to regress completeness, 
announcement abnormal returns (CARs) and BHARs against different advisors when 
the other explanatory variables are controlled. 
 
Ordinary least square regressions are conducted to discuss the relationship among the 
bidder completeness, performances, tiers of advisers and other control variables. The 
formulas are illustrated as follows: 
Completeness= a+b(Tiers of adviser)+c(controls)+ ε 
Performance= a+b(Tiers of adviser)+c(controls)+ ε 
 
Discussion of the Potential Endogeneity of the Variable Diversification: 
Current literature indicates that diversification can also be an endogenous variable in 
149 
 
regressions for bidder performances in M&A due to reciprocal causation.  
 
Most early studies considered diversification to be an exogenous variable, and most 
results show that diversification can damage enterprise performance. Since 2000, some 
scholars began to study the relationship between diversification and enterprise 
performance from the perspective of endogeneity. However, no consistent conclusion 
is available regarding the relationship between diversification and enterprise 
performance from the endogenous perspective. Most literature shows that in addition 
to the characteristics of enterprises, macroeconomic conditions also affect 
diversification decisions.  
 
For example, Campa and Kedial (2002) believe that after using the instrumental 
variable method and the Heckman sample selection model to control the endogenous 
influence, the impairment degree of diversification on enterprise performance continues 
to decline and even becomes a premium. Villalonga (2004) believes that diversification 
decision-making of enterprises is not random but influenced by factors such as 
enterprise characteristics and sample selection bias. 
 
Campa and Kedial (2002) include PNDIV (the fraction of multi-segment firms in a 
given industry), MNUM (the number of M&A announcements in a given year) and 
MVOL (the annual deal value of an announced M&A in a given year), among others, 
as exogenous variables to determine diversification status. 
 
The same variables PNDIV, MNUM and MVOL are used to examine the variable of 
diversification in this study. However, the results of the Hausman tests showed that 
none of the instruments are available in the regressions of bidder performance in this 
research.  
 
P-value Results of the Hausman test for the Two-stage Least Squares regressions 
(control variables are consistent with the regressions in chapter 4) to show whether 
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the following variables are valid instruments of “Diversification” to regress bidder 
performances. (H0: the difference in coefficients is not systematic) 
Prob>chi2 CAR BHAR12 BHAR36 BHAR60 
PNDIV 0.9470 0.3451 0.1859 0.5008 
MNUM 1.0000 0.9997 0.9998 0.9992 
MVOL 0.6448 0.9921 0.9920 0.9983 
 
Additionally, other possible instruments, such as the fraction of each firm’s sales in the 
same given industry, used by Campa and Kedial (2002) and similar variables, such as 
the fraction of acquiror EBIT (operating income) in the same industry, have also been 
Hausman tested to instrument diversification in the regressions of bidder performances. 
However, neither of the instruments were able to pass the tests.  
 
In other literature, the variable of the number of immediate family members and 
relatives of the CEO among the ordinary shareholders of the company were also 
selected as instrumental variables for diversification (Bae, Kwon and Lee, 2011). 
However, as such information is usually sensitive and often concealed or even falsified, 
this instrument is not employed in this study.  
 
For the purpose of consistency with other chapters, chapter 4 only demonstrates the 
regressions with diversification as an independent variable.   
 
4.6 Empirical Results 
 
Table 4.1 presents the total number of completed and non-completed deals from January 
1, 1985 to March 31, 2015. Among the transactions, 1168 and 806 were pure cash deals 
and stock exchange deals, respectively, while 387 deals were combinations. In 488 
deals, top-tier financial advisors were hired, 82 and 567 bidders employed median and 
low-tier advisors, respectively, while 1224 transactions were carried out in house and 
involved no financial advisors.  
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(Table 4.1) 
 
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics of the samples, mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum for the key objective variables and control variables. 
According to the mean of the performances, the CARs and BHARs declined steadily 
over time, indicating overall performance deterioration in M&A.  
 
(Table 4.2) 
 
Table 4.3 presents the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of payment methods, controlling the 
employment of financial advisors of different levels. The table demonstrates that in-
house acquirers are most likely to use cash to complete the transaction, followed by 
acquirers using top-tier advisors, median advisors and low-tier advisors because in-
house bidders lack M&A know-how and experience, while cash deals are much more 
straightforward and involve simpler processes. Top-tier and low-tier advisors differ 
significantly in terms of making the payment by cash. Low-tier advisors use 
significantly less cash payment probably because they are usually hired by less 
financially capable bidders, who need to diversify their sources of funding. In regard to 
stock exchange deals, low-tier advisors are most likely to conduct such operations, 
followed by median, top-tier advisors and in-house bidders. In-house bidders are 
significantly not interested in pure stock exchange, while top-tier advisors also use 
significantly less stock exchange than low-tier advisors do. In-house bidders use less 
pure stock exchange, as cash simplifies transactions, while top-tier advisors use less 
pure stock in that they are able to access a variety of internal and external funding 
sources for the bidders.  
 
(Table 4.3) 
 
Table 4.4 presents the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of announcement timing, controlling 
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the employment of financial advisors of different levels. The table demonstrates that 
acquirers with top-tier advisors are most likely to announce the transaction near the date 
of the 52-week peak, followed by median-tier advisors, low-tier advisors and in-house 
bidders. Top-tier and in-house bidders are significantly different in terms of timing the 
announcements, which provides clear evidence that the top-tier advisors actually time 
or signal the market in practice. In-house bidders again might lack experience in taking 
advantage of the market timing effects or be more long-term oriented and therefore 
avoid rushing into the deal completion. On the other hand, naturally, in-house bidders 
announce the deals significantly closer to the date of the 52-week low than do top-tier 
advisors, showing that they are more reserved and cautious according to panel B. This 
table more or less indicates that an agency problem of hiring a financial advisor of any 
level could occur.   
 
(Table 4.4) 
 
Table 4.5 presents the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of being timer/signaller controlling the 
employment of financial advisors of different levels. The table shows that top- and 
median-tier advisors are more likely to be hired by signallers, while compared to top-
tier advisors, low-tier advisors are significantly less welcomed by signallers. The table 
also demonstrates that in-house bidders are significantly least likely to be market timers. 
The conclusions indicate that both signallers and timers are more likely to be connected 
to the top-tier advisors, suggesting a higher expectation and thus heralding a potential 
future reversal in terms of long-term performance.  
 
(Table 4.5) 
 
Table 4.6 presents the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of being anti-signaller/anti-timer 
controlling the employment of financial advisors of different levels. The table shows 
that in-house bidders are most likely to be anti-signallers. The table also demonstrates 
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that top- and median-tier advisors are less likely to be hired by anti-timers, while in 
comparison, low-tier advisors are significantly more welcomed by anti-timers. The 
conclusions indicate that both anti-signallers and anti-timers are more lowkey in terms 
of employing financial advisors, with either no advisor or a low-tier advisor, resulting 
in lower expectation and less long-term reversal in terms of bidder performance.  
 
(Table 4.6) 
 
Table 4.7 presents the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of advisor fee controlling the 
employment of financial advisors of different levels. The table illustrates the results of 
the rank-sum tests of advisor fee among different tiers of financial advisors on their 
ranks. It proves that top-tier advisors do charge significantly higher fees, while the low-
tier advisors charge the lowest fees.  
 
(Table 4.7) 
 
Table 4.8 demonstrates the correlation between advisor fees and short- and long-term 
returns. The table suggests that the advisor fees, as agency costs, are negatively related 
to both short- and long-term performance. 
 
(Table 4.8) 
 
Table 4.9 shows the probit regressions of the completed M&A on advisor rank as well 
as other variables. The results illustrate that given the same acquisition timing and 
payment method, all tiers of advisors seek to complete the deals (median-tier advisors 
are not significant), which is definitely in the best interest of the advisors in terms of 
the advisor fee. In contrast, in-house deals are negatively related to deal completion, 
which reflects the reality that certain bidders are simply incapable of completing the 
deals or that they prefer to give up unprofitable deals. In addition, consistent with 
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previous studies, announcement near the 52-week high date positively affects 
completeness, while announcement near the 52-week low date negatively affects 
completeness. 
 
(Table 4.9) 
 
Table 4.10 reveals the regression of CAR on advisor rankings, controlling for payment 
method, timing effects and other variables. The results disclose that no advisor achieves 
significant CARs, which unfortunately reveals the agency problem of employing an 
advisor to conduct acquisition. Not surprisingly, the low-tier advisors are significantly 
associated with poor short-term performance. Although in-house deals are less likely to 
be completed, their CARs are remarkably higher than zero, indicating that transactions 
with no financial advisor involved were better received by the market in the short term. 
Compared to the market timing and signalling effects discussed in chapter 3, advisor 
ranks are not significant in positively affecting deal performance. Cash payment was 
proven to lead to significantly higher CARs. While announcement near the 52-week 
peak date is associated with lower CAR, announcement near the 52-week low date is 
correlated with higher CAR. 
 
(Table 4.10) 
 
Table 4.11 presents the regression of 12-month BHARs on advisor rankings, controlling 
for payment method, timing effects and other variables. The results show that advisors 
have no significant influence on 12-month BHARs when comparing the payment 
method and timing effects. Consistent with table 4.6, cash payments have significantly 
higher CARs than stock exchange deals. Announcement near the 52-week peak date is 
associated with lower 12-month BHARs. 
 
In table 4.11, the results show that hiring top-tier advisers can mildly reverse the 
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negative CAR (table 4.10) to achieve a positive 12-month BHAR, although the effect 
is not significant. This phenomenon indicates that although the market may react 
negatively to hiring top-tier advisers due to concerns about agency cost, in the long 
term, because of the stable synergies created by the advisers due to their extensive 
experience and established skill sets in business, top-tier advisers can bring back 
relatively stable BHARs.  
 
Median-tier advisors have relatively stable performance in achieving positive short-
term CARs and 12-month BHARs in the long run. In comparison, low-tier advisors 
have stable negative short- and long-term performance for bidders, giving bidders every 
reason to avoid them considering that they significantly pursue the completeness of 
deals regardless of whether the deals are profitable, as shown in table 4.9. In contrast 
to top-tier advisers, in-house deals yield significant positive short-term CARs but 
reversed 12-month BHARs, reflecting the lack of experience and skills in achieving 
long-term synergies in M&As. 
 
(Table 4.11) 
 
Table 4.12 presents the regression of 36-month BHARs on advisor rankings, controlling 
for payment method, timing effects and other variables. The results are basically 
consistent with those of the 12-month BHARs, as neither the top-tier nor the median-
tier advisors achieve significant 36-month BHARs. Worse, low-tier advisors have 
significantly lower 36-month BHARs. Again, payment methods and timing effects have 
a significant influence on performance, while superior advisor ranking does not. 
Considering that advisors can help complete the transactions, it would be more cost 
effective to hire median-tier advisors to conduct the transactions. Because both the 
payment method and the deal announcement proximity to the 52-week high and low 
remarkably affect the deal completion and bidders’ performance, the date of bidders’ 
52-week high and low again could be established as important reference points in M&A. 
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(Table 4.12) 
 
4.7 Conclusion and Discussion 
 
This empirical finding suggests that in-house acquirers and bidders hiring top-tier 
advisors are most likely to use cash to conduct M&A transactions, while low-tier 
advisors are more inclined to perform stock exchange deals. Acquirers with top-tier 
advisors frequently announce the transaction near the 52-week peak, while oppositely, 
in-house bidders announce the deals closer to the 52-week low than do top-tier advisors. 
Both signallers and timers are more willing to employ the top-tier advisors, while anti-
signallers and anti-timers tend to be low profile in terms of financial advisors, carrying 
out in-house transactions and hiring low-tier advisors, respectively. 
 
Top-tier advisors charge significantly more but do not guarantee better short-term or 
long-term performance, while low-tier advisors charge remarkably less, but accordingly, 
they provide acquirers with negative CARs and BHARs. Bidders who conduct in-house 
deals are more likely to give up the acquisitions due to the limited know-how and 
experience in the field. Since neither the top-tier nor the median-tier advisors signify 
better performance, taking advisor fees into consideration, median-tier advisors are 
more cost effective in M&A. 
 
Compared to the effects of the employment of financial advisors of different tiers in 
M&A, both the payment method and the proximity of the deal timing to the 52-week 
high and low play significantly more important roles in the deal completion and bidders’ 
performances. Therefore, the effects of the bidders’ 52-week high and low reference 
points established in chapters 2 and 3 could be reaffirmed. 
 
According to all three studies, in the long term, all categories of bidders will suffer loss 
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over time following the announcement of M&A. The reasons for this phenomenon are 
not yet understood. Future investigations could seek to determine how to achieve long-
term synergies instead of short-term market reactions.  
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Table 4.1 Sample tabulate of completed and failed deals with payment methods and advisor 
tiers. 
Toptier are advisors that represent the top 8 investment banks according to the value of the deals on 
which they advised for a sample of M&A transactions targeting US firms during the period from 
January 1, 1996, to December 31, 2009, drawn from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and 
Acquisitions Database. Mediantier are advisors ranking among the top 9-25 investment banks, while 
the remainder are low-tier advisors. In-house deals are transactions with no financial advisor 
involved. 
Year Completed Deals Form of Payment Advisor Tiers 
 Total Yes No Cash Stock Other Top Median Low In House 
1985 50 25 25 23 14 13 12 0 12 26 
1986 55 28 27 25 14 16 12 1 14 28 
1987 57 18 39 25 13 19 5 0 15 37 
1988 84 29 55 44 12 28 13 1 20 50 
1989 81 27 54 27 31 23 6 0 15 60 
1990 54 24 30 21 17 16 3 0 8 43 
1991 40 4 36 7 13 20 3 0 2 35 
1992 41 20 21 7 20 14 5 1 9 26 
1993 59 23 36 20 21 18 8 0 11 40 
1994 83 42 41 25 42 16 11 1 20 51 
1995 98 54 44 32 49 17 15 4 27 52 
1996 120 57 63 51 48 21 14 0 44 62 
1997 132 84 48 53 66 13 25 4 52 51 
1998 133 89 44 52 68 13 16 7 53 57 
1999 145 87 58 68 62 15 32 6 38 69 
2000 203 80 123 117 65 21 39 5 32 127 
2001 98 54 44 48 37 13 21 3 21 53 
2002 45 27 18 27 10 8 5 2 11 27 
2003 52 32 20 28 21 3 11 1 15 25 
2004 53 35 18 33 12 8 13 6 13 21 
2005 62 39 23 37 18 7 19 5 14 24 
2006 67 48 19 43 18 6 24 5 20 18 
2007 69 43 26 44 16 9 27 2 11 29 
2008 68 34 34 39 22 7 25 2 11 30 
2009 53 30 23 27 17 9 16 5 13 19 
2010 60 35 25 43 12 5 22 2 9 27 
2011 47 25 22 31 12 4 14 2 9 22 
2012 76 42 34 58 14 4 20 5 10 41 
2013 67 36 31 51 11 5 18 4 14 31 
2014 97 58 39 55 30 12 29 7 23 38 
2015 12 6 6 7 1 4 5 1 1 5 
 2361 1235 1126 1168 806 387 488 82 567 1224 
 
 
159 
 
Table 4.2 Summary statistics. 
The objective variables include Advisor_fee, which is the total fees associated with acquisition in 
millions. A dummy variable “Completed” is equal to 1 if a deal is completed, and 0 otherwise; DNH, 
the nearness of the announcement date to the 52-week high date, is calculated as a percentage of 
“Number of workdays from 52-week high to date of announcement/254”. DNL, the nearness of the 
announcement date to the 52-week low date, is calculated as a percentage of “Number of workdays 
since 52-week low to date of announcement/254”. Other outcome variables include CAR, the 5-day 
CAR from CRSP centred on the announcement date from Thomson; BHAR12/36/60 is the 12-/36-
/60-month BHARs from CRSP. The control variables include the dummy variable “Cash_only”, 
which takes the value of 1 when the bidder uses only cash to complete the deal and 0 otherwise; the 
dummy variable “Stock_only”, which takes the value of 1 when the bidder uses only stock exchange 
to complete the deal and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Friendly”, which takes the value of 1 
when the bidder attitude is friendly and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable “Hostile”, which takes the 
value of 1 when the bidder attitude is hostile and 0 otherwise; the dummy variable for diversifying 
deals, which takes the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code is different from that of 
the target and 0 otherwise. 
Panel A: Objective 
Variables 
N Mean SD Min Max 
Advisor_fee 381 3.763971 7.398746 0.011 57 
Completed 2366* 0.521978 0.4996223 0 1 
*5 duplicated samples 
with different permno No. 
     
DNH 2181 0.4503587 0.3534718 0 1 
DNL 2181 0.5312072 0.3517186 0 1 
Panel B: Other Outcome 
Variables 
N Mean SD Min Max 
Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (-2,+2) 
2139 -0.0019114 0.1253743 -1.126695 1.436994 
12-month Buy Hold 
Abnormal Return 
1882 -0.2070893 0.4561351 -2.110995 2.849774 
36-month Buy Hold 
Abnormal Return 
1383 -0.5194106 0.7491756 -3.203724 8.311247 
60-month Buy Hold 
Abnormal Return 
1036 -0.6763112 -0.6763112 -3.976755 19.93834 
Panel C: Control Variables N Mean SD Min Max 
Payment - Cash Only 2361 0.4947056 0.5000779 0 1 
Payment - Stock Only 2361 0.3413808 0.4742734 0 1 
Attitude - Friendly 2361 0.717069 0.4505186 0 1 
Attitude - Hostile 2361 0.0406607 0.1975449 0 1 
Diversifying or Not 2361 0.7020287 0.4574635 0 1 
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Table 4.3 Results of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of payment methods controlling the 
employment of different levels of financial advisors. 
The dummy variable “Cash_only” takes the value of 1 when the bidder uses only cash to complete 
the deal, and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable “Stock_only” takes the value of 1 when the bidder 
uses only stock exchange to complete the deal, and 0 otherwise. Toptier are advisors that represent 
the top 8 investment banks according to the value of the deals on which they advised for a sample 
of M&A transactions targeting US firms during the period January 1, 1996, to December 31, 2009, 
drawn from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Mediantier are 
advisors ranking in the top 9-25 investment banks, while the remainder are low-tier advisors. In-
house deals are transactions with no financial advisor involved. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 
5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Cash Payment Co
ntrolling top tier a
dvisor 
Cash Payment co
ntrolling median t
ier advisor 
Cash Payment 
controlling low 
tier advisor 
Cash Payment 
controlling inh
ouse advisor 
Mean .5122951 .4512195 .4109347 .5294118 
Std. Dev. .5003617 .500677 .4924379 .4993382 
N 488 82 567 1224 
Wilcoxon rank-sum 
Test of Cash Payment 
Top Tier = Media
n Tier 
Median Tier =  
Low Tier 
Low Tier = Top 
Tier 
In-house = Lo
w Tier 
P-Value 0.3065 0.4894 0.0010*** 0.0000*** 
Panel B 
Stock Exchange c
ontrolling top tier 
advisor 
Stock Exchange 
controlling median 
tier advisor 
Stock Exchang
e controlling lo
w tier advisor 
Stock Exchange 
controlling 
inhouse  
advisor 
Mean .352459 .4634146 .4973545 .2565359 
Std. Dev. .4782262 .5017284 .5004345 .4368995 
N 488 82 567 1224 
Wilcoxon rank-sum 
Test of Stock Exchange 
Top Tier = 
 Median Tier 
Median Tier = 
Low Tier 
Low Tier =  
Top Tier 
In-house =  
Top Tier 
P-Value 0.0542 0.5659 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 
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Table 4.4 Results of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of announcement timing controlling the 
employment of different levels of financial advisors. 
DNH, the nearness of the announcement date to the date of the 52-week high, is calculated as a 
percentage of “Number of workdays since 52-week high to date of announcement/254”. DNL, the 
nearness of the announcement date to the date of the 52-week low, is calculated as a percentage of 
“Number of workdays since 52-week low to date of announcement/254”. Toptier are advisors that 
represent the top 8 investment banks according to the value of the deals on which they advised for 
a sample of M&A transactions targeting US firms during the period January 1, 1996, to December 
31, 2009, drawn from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Mediantier 
are advisors ranking in the top 9-25 investment banks, while the remainder are low-tier advisors. 
In-house deals are transactions with no financial advisor involved. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% 
and 5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A 
DNH controlling t
op tier advisor 
DNH controlling 
median tier advisor 
DNH controlling 
low tier advisor 
DNH 
controlling 
inhouse advisor 
Mean .4135754 .4240359 .4484935 .4716365 
Std. Dev. .3555153 .3677625 .3516664 .3514043 
N 457 78 535 1111 
Wilcoxon rank-sum 
Test of Nearness to 
Peak Date 
Top Tier =  
Median Tier 
Median Tier =  
Low Tier 
Low Tier =  
Top Tier 
In-house =  
Top Tier 
P-Value 0.6348 0.6676 0.1128 0.0014** 
Panel B 
DNL controlling to
p tier advisor 
DNL controlling 
median tier advisor 
DNL controlling 
low tier advisor 
DNL 
controlling 
inhouse advisor 
Mean .5654991 .6025641 .5382736 .5168281 
Std. Dev. .3353089 .3379751 .3473114 .361775 
N 457 78 535 1111 
Wilcoxon rank-sum 
Test of Nearness to 
Low Date 
Top Tier = 
 Median Tier 
Median Tier =  
Low Tier 
Low Tier =  
Top Tier 
In-house = 
 Top Tier 
P-Value 0.3769 0.1454 0.2501 0.0044** 
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Table 4.5 Results of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of being a timer/signaller controlling the 
employment of different levels of financial advisors. 
Signallers, which announce pure cash acquisitions a certain number of days away from the 52-week 
peak as a percentage of 254 (20% in this table), the average number of trading days, receive the 
value of 1, 0 otherwise. Timers, which announce pure stock exchange acquisitions a certain number 
of days away from the 52-week peak as a percentage of 254 (20% in this table), the average number 
of trading days, receive the value of 1, 0 otherwise. Toptier are advisors that represent the top 8 
investment banks according to the value of the deals on which they advised for a sample of M&A 
transactions targeting US firms during the period January 1, 1996, to December 31, 2009, drawn 
from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Mediantier are advisors 
ranking among the top 9-25 investment banks, while the remainder are low-tier advisors. In-house 
deals are transactions with no financial advisor involved. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 5% 
are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Signaler (20%) Co
ntrolling 
Top Tier 
Signaler (20%) C
ontrolling 
Median Tier 
Signaler (20%) 
Controlling 
Low Tier 
Signaler (20%) 
Controlling 
In-house 
Mean .182377 .195122 .1322751 .1521562 
Std. Dev. .3865512 .3987333 .3371627 .3593185 
N 488 82 567 1229 
Wilcoxon rank-sum 
Test of Bidder Being 
Signaler (20%) 
Top Tier =  
Median Tier 
Median Tier =  
Low Tier 
Low Tier =  
Top Tier 
In-house =  
Top Tier 
P-Value 0.8180 0.1258 0.0201* 0.1012 
Panel B 
Timer (20%) - 
Top Tier 
Timer (20%) - 
Median Tier 
Timer (20%) - 
Low Tier 
Timer (20%) - 
In-house 
Mean .1454918 .1585366 .1781305 .0781123 
Std. Dev. .3529578 .3674911 .3829604 .2684574 
N 488 82 567 1229 
Wilcoxon rank-sum 
Test of Bidder Being 
Timer (20%) 
Top Tier =  
Median Tier 
Median Tier =  
Low Tier 
Low Tier =  
Top Tier 
In-house =  
Top Tier 
P-Value 0.7580 0.6632 0.1526 0.0000*** 
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Table 4.6 Results of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of being anti-signaller/anti-timer controlling 
the employment of different levels of financial advisors. 
Anti-signallers, which announce pure cash acquisitions a certain number of days away from the 52-
week low as a percentage of 254 (20% in this table), the average number of trading days, receive 
the value of 1, 0 otherwise. Anti-timers, which announce pure stock exchange acquisitions a certain 
number of days away from the 52-week low as a percentage of 254 (20% in this table), the average 
number of trading days, receive the value of 1, 0 otherwise. Toptier are advisors that represent the 
top 8 investment banks according to the value of the deals on which they advised for a sample of 
M&A transactions targeting US firms during the period January 1, 1996, to December 31, 2009, 
drawn from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Mediantier are 
advisors ranking among the top 9-25 investment banks, while the remainder are low-tier advisors. 
In-house deals are transactions with no financial advisor involved. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% 
and 5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Anti-Signaler (20%)  
Controlling 
Top Tier 
Anti-Signaler (20%)  
Controlling 
Median Tier 
Anti-Signaler (20%) 
Controlling 
Low Tier 
Anti-Signaler (20%) 
Controlling 
In-house 
Mean .0983607 .0609756 .0828924 .1554109 
Std. Dev. .2981073 .2407581 .275963 .3624434 
N 488 82 567 1229 
Wilcoxon rank-sum 
Test of Bidder Being 
Anti-Signaler (20%) 
Top Tier =  
Median Tier 
Median Tier =  
Low Tier 
Low Tier =  
Top Tier 
In-house =  
Top Tier 
P-Value 0.2812 0.4948 0.3817 0.0021** 
Panel B 
Anti-Timer (20%) 
-Top Tier 
Anti-Timer (20%) 
-Median Tier 
Anti-Timer (20%) 
-Low Tier 
Anti-Timer (20%) 
-In-house 
Mean .0737705 .097561 .1269841 .0691619 
Std. Dev. .2616653 .2985461 .3332492 .2538326 
N 488 82 567 1229 
Wilcoxon rank-sum 
Test  of Bidder 
Being Anti- Timer 
(20%) 
Top Tier =  
Median Tier 
Median Tier =  
Low Tier 
Low Tier = 
 Top Tier 
In-house =  
Top Tier 
P-Value 0.4555 0.4491 0.0045** 0.7365 
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Table 4.7 Results of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of advisor fees controlling the employment of 
different levels of financial advisors. 
Advisor_fee is total fees acquired in millions. Toptier are advisors that represent the top 8 investment 
banks according to the value of the deals on which they advised for a sample of M&A transactions 
targeting US firms during the period January 1, 1996, to December 31, 2009, drawn from the 
Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Mediantier are advisors ranking 
among the top 9-25 investment banks, while the remainder are low-tier advisors. In-house deals are 
transactions with no financial advisor involved. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 5% are 
represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Top Tier 
advisor Fee 
Median Tier 
advisor Fee 
Low Tier 
advisor Fee 
Mean 7.918826 2.537885 1.94297 
Std. Dev. 10.71035 3.600012 4.400913 
Min. 0.25 0.075 0.015 
Max. 57 16.25 52 
N 115 26 235 
Wilcoxon rank-sum Test of 
Advisor Fee 
Top Tier -  
Median Tier 
Median Tier - 
 Low Tier 
Low Tier - 
 Top Tier 
P-Value 0.0002*** 0.1924 0.0000*** 
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Table 4.8 Results of the correlation between the advisor fees and short- and long-term 
returns. 
Advisor_fee, is total fees acquired in millions. CAR is the 5-day CAR from CRSP centred on the 
announcement date from Thomson; BHAR12/36/60 is 12-, 36- and 60-month BHARs from CRSP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Advisor_fee CAR BHAR12 BHAR36 BHAR60 
Advisor_fee 1.0000     
CAR -0.1434 1.0000    
BHAR12 -0.1226 -0.0069 1.0000   
BHAR36 -0.0586 0.0627 0.2954 1.0000  
BHAR60 -0.0518 0.0672 0.1849 0.8885 1.0000 
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Table 4.9 Results of probit regressions for the completed M&A on adviser ranks as well as 
other variables. 
The dependant variable “Completed” is equal to 1 given a deal is completed, and 0 otherwise. The 
vector of explanatory variables includes a dummy variable for diversifying deals take the value of 
1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target’s, and 0 otherwise. 
Hostile deals as attitude take the value of 1, and 0 friendly. Payment takes 1 if the deal is completed 
by pure stock exchange, 0 by cash only. Int_fund deals take the value of 1 when the acquiring 
company financed the transaction in some portion with its own internal resources, and 0 otherwise. 
DNH/DNL is the percentage of the days of the announcement date away from the date of 52-week 
peak/low to the average trading days of 254. The larger of DNH means further away of the 
announcement from the 52-week peak date while the smaller of DNL means closer of the 
announcement from the date of 52-week low. Toptier are advisors that represent top-8 investment 
banks according to the value of deals on which they advised for a sample of M&A transactions 
targeting U.S. firms during the period January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2009 drawn from the 
Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Mediantier are advisors ranking the 
top 9-25 investments banks while the remainders are lowtier advisors. In-house deals are 
transactions with no financial advisor involved. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance 
levels at 0.1%, 1% and 5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
Panel A 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Completed Completed Completed Completed 
Diversifying 0.232** 0.231** 0.202* 0.170* 
 (0.0826) (0.0823) (0.0830) (0.0843) 
Attitude -2.393*** -2.369*** -2.441*** -2.466*** 
 (0.248) (0.246) (0.249) (0.253) 
Payment -0.398*** -0.410*** -0.447*** -0.444*** 
 (0.0878) (0.0875) (0.0884) (0.0893) 
Int_fund 0.460** 0.486** 0.460** 0.362* 
 (0.160) (0.159) (0.159) (0.161) 
DNH -0.323** -0.336** -0.339** -0.315** 
 (0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.114) 
Toptier 0.294**    
 (0.0973)    
Mediantier  0.223   
  (0.200)   
Lowtier   0.389***  
   (0.0901)  
Inhouse    -0.594*** 
    (0.0822) 
_cons 1.003*** 1.072*** 1.012*** 1.396*** 
 (0.104) (0.101) (0.102) (0.113) 
N 1412 1412 1412 1412 
Pseudo R2 0.1206 0.1151 0.1274 0.1501 
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Panel B 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Completed Completed Completed Completed 
Completed     
Diversifying 0.231** 0.231** 0.202* 0.170* 
 (0.0825) (0.0822) (0.0829) (0.0842) 
Attitude -2.373*** -2.348*** -2.421*** -2.448*** 
 (0.247) (0.245) (0.248) (0.253) 
Payment -0.381*** -0.393*** -0.429*** -0.428*** 
 (0.0878) (0.0875) (0.0884) (0.0893) 
Int_fund 0.456** 0.486** 0.459** 0.358* 
 (0.159) (0.158) (0.159) (0.160) 
DNL 0.236* 0.239* 0.248* 0.230* 
 (0.114) (0.113) (0.114) (0.115) 
Toptier 0.301**    
 (0.0971)    
Mediantier  0.209   
  (0.200)   
Lowtier   0.390***  
   (0.0900)  
Inhouse    -0.597*** 
    (0.0821) 
_cons 0.720*** 0.782*** 0.716*** 1.124*** 
 (0.105) (0.103) (0.104) (0.115) 
N 1412 1412 1412 1412 
Pseudo R2 0.1180 0.1120 0.1244 0.1476 
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Table 4.10 Results of regression for cumulative abnormal return on advisor rankings, 
controlling for payment method, timing effects and other variables. 
The dependent variable CAR is the 5-day CAR from CRSP centred on the announcement date from 
Thomson. The vector of the explanatory variables includes a dummy variable for diversifying deals, 
which takes the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target, 
and 0 otherwise. Attitude takes the value of 1 if the deal is hostile, and 0 if friendly. Payment takes 
the value of 1 if the deal is completed by pure stock exchange, 0 if it is completed by only cash. 
Int_fund deals take the value of 1 when the acquiring company finances the transaction in some 
portion with its own internal resources and 0 otherwise. DNH/DNL is the percentage of days the 
announcement date is from the date of the 52-week peak/low to the average number of trading days, 
254. A larger DNH indicates that the announcement is further from the 52-week peak date, while a 
smaller DNL indicates that the announcement is closer to the 52-week low date. Toptier are advisors 
that represent the top 8 investment banks according to the value of the deals on which they advised 
for a sample of M&A transactions targeting US firms during the period January 1, 1996, to 
December 31, 2009, drawn from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Mediantier are advisors ranking among the top 9-25 investment banks, while the remainder are low-
tier advisors. In-house deals are transactions with no financial advisor involved. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 5% are represented by ***,**, and *, 
respectively. 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CAR CAR CAR CAR 
Diversifying 0.00500 0.00494 0.00673 0.00653 
 (0.00684) (0.00684) (0.00687) (0.00688) 
Attitude 0.00524 0.00649 0.00650 0.00523 
 (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) 
Payment -0.0330*** -0.0329*** -0.0313*** -0.0323*** 
 (0.00715) (0.00713) (0.00715) (0.00713) 
Int_fund 0.00944 0.00886 0.0103 0.0117 
 (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0107) 
DNH 0.0198* 0.0200* 0.0200* 0.0193* 
 (0.00926) (0.00924) (0.00923) (0.00924) 
Toptier -0.00265    
 (0.00750)    
Mediantier  0.0247   
  (0.0154)   
Lowtier   -0.0170*  
   (0.00698)  
Inhouse    0.0135* 
    (0.00681) 
_cons -0.00565 -0.00748 -0.00301 -0.0127 
 (0.00836) (0.00809) (0.00818) (0.00866) 
N 1371 1371 1371 1371 
R2 0.025 0.027 0.029 0.028 
adj. R2 0.021 0.023 0.025 0.024 
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Panel B 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CAR CAR CAR CAR 
Diversifying 0.00531 0.00526 0.00706 0.00689 
 (0.00685) (0.00684) (0.00687) (0.00688) 
Attitude 0.00401 0.00529 0.00527 0.00401 
 (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) 
Payment -0.0342*** -0.0342*** -0.0325*** -0.0335*** 
 (0.00716) (0.00714) (0.00716) (0.00715) 
Int_fund 0.00956 0.00892 0.0104 0.0118 
 (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0107) 
DNL -0.0221* -0.0226* -0.0224* -0.0219* 
 (0.00938) (0.00938) (0.00936) (0.00937) 
Toptier -0.00312    
 (0.00749)    
Mediantier  0.0258   
  (0.0154)   
Lowtier   -0.0171*  
   (0.00698)  
Inhouse    0.0138* 
    (0.00680) 
_cons 0.0158 0.0141 0.0186* 0.00810 
 (0.00879) (0.00858) (0.00868) (0.00920) 
N 1371 1371 1371 1371 
R2 0.026 0.028 0.030 0.029 
adj. R2 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.024 
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Table 4.11 Results of regression for 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal return on advisor 
rankings, controlling for payment methods, timing effects and other variables. 
The dependent variable BHAR 12 is 12-month BHARs from CRSP. The vector of the explanatory 
variables includes a dummy variable for diversifying deals, which takes the value of 1 when the 
acquirer’s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise. Attitude takes the 
value of 1 if the deal is hostile, and 0 if friendly. Payment takes the value of 1 if the deal is completed 
by pure stock exchange, 0 if it is completed by only cash. Int_fund deals take the value of 1 when 
the acquiring company finances the transaction in some portion with its own internal resources and 
0 otherwise. DNH/DNL is the percentage of days the announcement date is from the date of the 52-
week peak/low to the average number of trading days, 254. A larger DNH indicates that the 
announcement is further from the 52-week peak date, while a smaller DNL indicates that the 
announcement is closer to the 52-week low date. Toptier are advisors that represent the top 8 
investment banks according to the value of the deals on which they advised for a sample of M&A 
transactions targeting US firms during the period January 1, 1996, to December 31, 2009, drawn 
from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Mediantier are advisors 
ranking among the top 9-25 investment banks, while the remainder are low-tier advisors. In-house 
deals are transactions with no financial advisor involved. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
Panel A 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
BHAR12 BHAR12 BHAR12 BHAR12 
Diversifying 0.0413 0.0411 0.0441 0.0402 
 (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0269) (0.0268) 
Attitude -0.131 -0.131 -0.130 -0.132 
 (0.0683) (0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0684) 
Payment -0.186*** -0.188*** -0.185*** -0.188*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0281) (0.0280) 
Int_fund -0.0754 -0.0729 -0.0701 -0.0743 
 (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0413) (0.0415) 
DNH 0.0916* 0.0902* 0.0907* 0.0903* 
 (0.0365) (0.0366) (0.0365) (0.0366) 
Toptier 0.0417    
 (0.0293)    
Mediantier  0.0125   
  (0.0621)   
Lowtier   -0.0291  
   (0.0275)  
Inhouse    -0.00937 
    (0.0266) 
_cons -0.193*** -0.181*** -0.175*** -0.176*** 
 (0.0323) (0.0313) (0.0315) (0.0335) 
N 1241 1241 1241 1241 
R2 0.043 0.042 0.043 0.042 
adj. R2 0.039 0.037 0.038 0.037 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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 BHAR12 BHAR12 BHAR12 BHAR12 
Diversifying 0.0389 0.0388 0.0417 0.0380 
 (0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0270) (0.0269) 
Attitude -0.130 -0.130 -0.129 -0.131 
 (0.0685) (0.0687) (0.0686) (0.0686) 
Payment -0.186*** -0.189*** -0.186*** -0.189*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0281) (0.0283) (0.0282) 
Int_fund -0.0738 -0.0714 -0.0688 -0.0727 
 (0.0413) (0.0413) (0.0414) (0.0416) 
DNL 0.00870 0.00863 0.00820 0.00882 
 (0.0370) (0.0371) (0.0370) (0.0371) 
Toptier 0.0395    
 (0.0294)    
Mediantier  0.00889   
  (0.0623)   
Lowtier   -0.0278  
   (0.0276)  
Inhouse    -0.00818 
    (0.0267) 
_cons -0.156*** -0.145*** -0.139*** -0.141*** 
 (0.0345) (0.0337) (0.0341) (0.0360) 
N 1241 1241 1241 1241 
R2 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.037 
adj. R2 0.034 0.032 0.033 0.032 
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Table 4.12 Results of regression for 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal return on advisor 
rankings, controlling for payment methods, timing effects and other variables. 
The dependent variable BHAR 36 is 36-month BHARs from CRSP. The vector of the explanatory 
variables includes a dummy variable for diversifying deals, which takes the value of 1 when the 
acquirer’s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise. Attitude takes the 
value of 1 if the deal is hostile, and 0 if friendly. Payment takes the value of 1 if the deal is completed 
by pure stock exchange, 0 if it is completed by only cash. Int_fund deals take the value of 1 when 
the acquiring company finances the transaction in some portion with its own internal resources and 
0 otherwise. DNH/DNL is the percentage of days the announcement date is from the date of the 52-
week peak/low to the average number of trading days, 254. A larger DNH indicates that the 
announcement is further from the 52-week peak date, while a smaller DNL indicates that the 
announcement is closer to the 52-week low date. Toptier are advisors that represent the top 8 
investment banks according to the value of the deals on which they advised for a sample of M&A 
transactions targeting US firms during the period January 1, 1996, to December 31, 2009, drawn 
from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Mediantier are advisors 
ranking among the top 9-25 investment banks, while the remainder are low-tier advisors. In-house 
deals are transactions with no financial advisor involved. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Significance levels at 0.1%, 1% and 5% are represented by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 BHAR36 BHAR36 BHAR36 BHAR36 
Diversifying 0.0703 0.0699 0.0811 0.0695 
 (0.0485) (0.0486) (0.0488) (0.0488) 
Attitude -0.0595 -0.0545 -0.0567 -0.0589 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) 
Payment -0.301*** -0.303*** -0.294*** -0.304*** 
 (0.0515) (0.0516) (0.0517) (0.0516) 
Int_fund -0.180* -0.179* -0.165* -0.178* 
 (0.0756) (0.0758) (0.0758) (0.0761) 
DNH 0.200** 0.198** 0.202** 0.197** 
 (0.0674) (0.0675) (0.0673) (0.0675) 
Toptier 0.101    
 (0.0529)    
Mediantier  0.0862   
  (0.116)   
Lowtier   -0.112*  
   (0.0514)  
Inhouse    -0.0000602 
    (0.0492) 
_cons -0.538*** -0.513*** -0.489*** -0.508*** 
 (0.0595) (0.0577) (0.0579) (0.0619) 
N 922 922 922 922 
R2 0.051 0.048 0.053 0.048 
adj. R2 0.045 0.042 0.046 0.041 
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Panel B 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 BHAR36 BHAR36 BHAR36 BHAR36 
Diversifying 0.0773 0.0772 0.0886 0.0766 
 (0.0486) (0.0486) (0.0488) (0.0489) 
Attitude -0.0764 -0.0705 -0.0740 -0.0758 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) 
Payment -0.316*** -0.318*** -0.309*** -0.319*** 
 (0.0515) (0.0516) (0.0517) (0.0517) 
Int_fund -0.182* -0.181* -0.167* -0.179* 
 (0.0756) (0.0757) (0.0758) (0.0761) 
DNL -0.209** -0.214** -0.216** -0.209** 
 (0.0677) (0.0680) (0.0678) (0.0679) 
Toptier 0.0969    
 (0.0529)    
Mediantier  0.109   
  (0.116)   
Lowtier   -0.114*  
   (0.0513)  
Inhouse    0.000884 
    (0.0491) 
_cons -0.330*** -0.305*** -0.277*** -0.303*** 
 (0.0627) (0.0610) (0.0618) (0.0650) 
N 922 922 922 922 
R2 0.052 0.050 0.054 0.049 
adj. R2 0.046 0.043 0.048 0.042 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
 
The study examines whether the bidder 52-week high/low dates have reference point 
effects on M&A and discusses how the other most straightforward elements, such as 
payment method and the choice of financial advisor, impact the deals under the 
influence of the reference points. Clarifying the answers would help businesses wisely 
invest in M&A. The thesis argues that the bidder 52-week high/low dates do act as 
effective reference points in M&A. Second, M&A near the 52-week low date could 
even bring better results in terms of cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and buy-and-
hold abnormal return (BHAR) for the acquirers (less reversal). Moreover, the reference 
point effects are discovered as even more significant than the choice of a top-tier advisor.  
 
The first part of the thesis focuses on how the acquirer’s 52-week high and low prices 
and dates affect the completeness and the performance of the acquirers in M&A. 
Endogeneity is discussed, and the thesis eventually shows that the dates of the bidder 
52-week high/low do have reference point effects on M&A.  
 
Taking both the payment methods and M&A announcement timing into consideration, 
the second part of the thesis compares the contradictive market timing effects and 
signalling effects in M&A and ranks the different categories of acquirers by 
performance. The comparison documents anti-signallers as winners in terms of both 
short- and long-term performances.  
 
The third part of the thesis discusses how the choice of financial advisor affects bidders 
in M&A under the influence of payment method and the psychological reference points 
of the 52-week high and low. It turns out that even the contribution from top-tier 
advisors is simply not as significant as the payment method and announcement timing.  
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Specifically, in the first part of the thesis, bids announced closer to the acquirer’s 52-
week high price or date indicate significantly higher probability of deal completion, 
while bids announced closer to the acquirer’s 52-week low date either have no impact 
on deal completion, for cash deals, or are significantly associated with deal failure, for 
stock deals.  
 
Announcement of M&A with the bidder stock price near the 52-week peak is associated 
with higher bidder CAR (with endogeneity problem). When the instrumental variable 
is used to measure the deal timing, the further the announcement is from the 52-week 
high date (the closer the announcement is to the 52-week low date), the higher CAR 
and BHARs are. The results indicate that peak announcing bidders with fluctuating 
stock prices seem to have better speculative opportunities in the short term, although 
their short-term performance will be reversed in the long term. 
 
According to the existent reference point theory, the proximity of announcement to the 
52-week high stock price of the target proportionally influences the offer prices and 
positively affects the probability of deal success. In comparison, this study provides 
another perspective to complement the reference theory, whereby bidder announcement 
timing has an important effect on the completeness and performance of the M&A 
transaction. Therefore, we can further document the dates of the bidder 52-week high 
and 52-week low as psychological anchors in completing M&A.  
 
The second part of the thesis presents more specific findings. In the short term, being a 
market timer, a bidder has a significantly negative CAR, which is not consistent with 
the traditional market timing theory. The result shows that the market takes a bidder 
announcement date close to the peak as a negative signal in the transaction. In the long 
term, market timers’ performance reverses the most; thus, the theory is not applicable. 
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For the signaller, announcing a cash deal at or near the 52-week high date entails a 
positive CAR, which is in line with the signalling theory. In the long term, however, 
similarly to the market timers, signallers’ performance also reverses, but the reversal is 
significantly less severe than the reversal experienced by market timers.  
  
Anti-timers and anti-signallers have better and more stable performance than timers and 
signallers, respectively. They also experience significantly less reversal than market 
timers and signallers.  
 
Among the four categories of market players, anti-signallers have the best CAR and 
BHARs, while the timers have the worst CAR and BHARs. 
 
In addition, under the influence of the proximity of announcement to the 52-week low, 
anti-signallers and anti-timers lose the least in M&A, and the “psychological reference 
point” established from the perspective of the acquiring firms can be reaffirmed.   
 
In the third part of the thesis, the empirical findings suggest that in-house acquirers and 
bidders hiring top-tier advisors are most likely to use cash to conduct M&A transactions, 
while low-tier advisors are more inclined to perform stock exchange deals. Acquirers 
with top-tier advisors frequently announce the transaction near the date of the 52-week 
peak, while oppositely, in-house bidders announce the deals closer to the date of the 52-
week low. Both signallers and timers are more willing to employ top-tier advisors, while 
anti-signallers and anti-timers tend to be lower profiled in terms of financial advisor, 
preferring in-house transactions and hiring low-tier advisors, respectively.  
 
Top tiers advisors charge significantly more but do not guarantee better short-term or 
long-term performance, while low-tier advisors charge remarkably less, but accordingly, 
they provide acquirers with negative CARs and BHARs. Bidders who conduct in-house 
deals are more likely to give up the intended acquisitions due to their limited know-
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how and experience in the field. Because neither the top-tier nor the median-tier 
advisors signify better performance, taking advisor fees into consideration, median-tier 
advisors are more cost effective in M&A. 
 
Compared to the effects of the employment of financial advisors of different tiers in 
M&A, both the payment method and the proximity of the deal timing to the 52-week 
high and low play significantly more important roles in the deal completion and bidder 
performance, and the bidder’s 52-week high and low as reference points are reaffirmed.   
 
5.2 Research Contributions 
 
This thesis provides a bidder perspective to complement the reference theory from the 
target point of view, whereby bidder announcement timing has an important effect on 
the completeness and performance of the M&A transaction. The dates of the bidder 52-
week high and low are newly established as psychological anchors in completing M&A.  
 
This thesis considers the announcement timing to measure the intensity of the market 
timing and market-signalling effects and justify the contradictive theories. Sub-sample 
bidders are divided into signallers, timers, anti-signallers and anti-timers. Their 
performances are compared, and anti-signallers are found to be the winners. The results 
will help investors use the correct investment theories and help acquirers correctly 
predict the market reaction to their acquisition plan.  
 
This thesis clarifies how different tiers of financial advisors are connected to payment 
method and announcement timing of M&A. It discloses that payment method and 
announcement timing have greater influence on bidder performance than do financial 
advisors. To achieve cost effectiveness, bidders are suggested to employ median-tier 
financial advisors in practice when engaging in M&A.  
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5.3 Research Limitations and Further Research Areas 
 
The thesis conducts various regressions to study the correlation among deal completion, 
bidder performance, announcement timing and other variables. Most of the coefficients 
of determination are relatively low, which means that a very limited amount of the 
variation in deal completeness and bidder performance can be explained by the payment 
method and announcement timing, although both payment method and announcement 
timing are found to be the most significant variables affecting the dependent variables.  
 
Instead of combined synergies, the thesis takes only the bidder performance into 
consideration, which might lead to bias on the overall effectiveness and efficiency of 
the research methodology. To measure advisor reputation, the thesis ranks financial 
advisors according to the value of the deals on which they advised for M&A 
transactions targeting US firms during the period January 1, 1996, to December 31, 
2009, drawn from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Although the 2000 dot-com bubble and 2008 subprime mortgage crisis significantly 
influenced the landscape of the finance industry during this period, the period is still 
inconsistent with that considered in the overall sample, which included the years 1985 
to 2015, and might imply inaccurate estimates of advisor performance.  
 
Because the long-term gains of all acquirers are reversed, is it in vain to conduct M&A 
at all? What are the most important factors affecting long-term success? The reasons 
for this phenomenon are not yet understood. Future research could seek to determine 
how to achieve long-term synergies instead of short-term market reactions. Identifying 
these factors would facilitate the efficiency of resource allocation in M&A transactions.  
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